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So the conclusion for a real noisy environment is that the 
longer the codes the better the Gold code sets are, but under a 
certain code length the performance of Gold codes and OOCs 
may be similar.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper the VLC related CDM problems are 
discussed, focusing on the asynchronous mode CDM which is 
more suitable for a simple VLC system. The description of the 
most common code set types, the unipolar OOCs and bipolar 
PN codes, showed the benefits, disadvantages and 
possibilities of these codes. Obtaining information about a 
CDM channel quality is not as easy as measuring RSS on a 
single RF signal. It was showed that the most common quality 
indicator measure, the crest factor, may be misleading in some 
cases. A possible solution is proposed for this problem, 
introducing two novel advanced quality indicator (AQI) 
measures. Computing these new measures along with the crest 
factor gives a better approximation to the CDM channel 
quality. With AQI1 the noise immunity of a CDM 
transmission using Gold codes and OOCs are compared, in 
function of the code length. These AQIs, for example, may 
improve the precision of a channel quality based VLC CDM 
indoor positioning system, and allows more reliable practical 
comparison between various code sets. 
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EVERAL  [1] were developed 
 to support the transition from IPv4 to IPv6, which we are 
currently faced with, and which is expected to last for several 
years or even decades.  On the one hand, IPv6 transition 
technologies are important solutions for several different 
problems, which arise from the incompatibility of IPv4 and 
IPv6: they can enable communication in various scenarios [2]. 
However, on the other hand, they also involve a high number of 
security issues [3]. We have surveyed 26 IPv6 transition 
technologies, and prioritized them in order to be able to analyze 
the security vulnerabilities of the most important ones first [2]. 
DNS64 [4] and stateful NAT [5] were classified as having 
utmost importance, because they together provide the only 
solution for a communication scenario, which is very important 
now because of the exhaustion of the public IPv4 address pool, 
namely, they enable IPv6only clients to communicate with 
IPv4only servers. 
We have also developed a methodology for the identification 
of potential security issues of different IPv6 transition 
technologies [6]. Ref. [3] follows the STRIDE approach, which 
is a general software security solution and it uses the DFD (Data 
Flow Diagram) model of the systems to facilitate the discovery 
of various threats. We have found this approach useful and 
amended the method in [6], where we have also shown that it is 
necessary to examine the most important implementations of 
the given IPv6 transition technologies, whether they are 
susceptible to the various threats that were discovered by using 
the STRIDE approach. We have pointed out that DNS64 is 
theoretically susceptible to  [7], and now 
the important practical question is, whether its different 
implementations are actually susceptible to DNS cache 
poisoning or not. 
The purpose of this paper is to develop a simple and efficient 
methodology for DNS cache poisoning vulnerability analysis of 
DNS64 implementations. This paper is based on our workshop 
paper [8], in which we have presented our testbed and our 
method for Transaction ID prediction attack as well as our 
results for some specific DNS64 implementations. Now we 
give a more detailed introduction to cache poisoning including 
its further two components (source port number prediction, and 
the birthday paradox based attack), and also design and carry 
out their testing methods. Besides the DNS64 implementations 
included in our workshop paper, now we also include Unbound, 
because it showed much better performance than BIND [9]. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In 
section II, we examine, why DNS cache poisoning is so crucial 
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       
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EVERAL  [1] were developed 
 to support the ransition from IPv4 to IPv6, which we a e 
currently faced with, and which is expected to last for several 
y ars or even decades.  On the one hand, IPv6 transitio  
technologies are important solutions for several differe t 
problems, which rise fro  the incompatib lity of IPv4 and 
IPv6: th y can enabl  communication  various scenarios [2]. 
However, on the other hand, th y also involve a high number f 
s urity issues [3]. We have surveyed 26 IPv6 ransition 
technologies, and prior zed them in order t  be able to analyze 
the security vulnerabilities of the most important ones first [2]. 
DNS64 [4] and stateful NAT [5] were classified as havi g 
utmost importance, be use th y together pro ide the only 
solution for a communic tion scenario, wh h is very important 
now becaus  of the exhausti  of the public IPv4 address pool, 
namely, they enable IPv6only clients to communicate with 
IPv4only servers. 
We have lso developed a methodology for the iden ification 
of potent al security issues of different IPv6 transition 
technologies [6]. Ref. [3] follows he STRIDE approach, which 
is a general software security solution and it uses the DFD (Data 
Flow Diagram) model of the systems o facilitate t e discovery 
of various threa s. We have found this appr ac  useful and 
amended the method in [6], where we have also shown that it is 
necessary to examine the most important impl m ntations of 
the given IPv6 tr nsition technologi s, wheth r they are 
susceptible to the various threats that were discovered by using 
the STRIDE approach. We have pointed out that DNS64 is 
theoretically susceptible to  [7], and now 
the impor nt practical question is, whether its different 
implementations are actually susceptible to DNS cache 
poisoning or not. 
T e purpose of this paper is to develop a simple and effic ent 
methodology for DNS cache poisoning vuln rability analysis f 
DNS64 implementations. This paper is based on our worksh p 
paper [8], in which we have presented our testbed and our 
method f r Transaction ID predict on attack as well as our 
results for some specific DNS64 implementations. Now we 
give a more detailed i troduction to cache poisoning including 
i s further two components (sour e port number prediction, nd 
the birthday paradox ba ed attack), and also design and carry 
out their testing methods. Besides the DNS64 impleme tatio s 
included n our workshop pap , now we also include Unbound, 
because it showed much better performance than BIND [9]. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as foll ws. In 
section II, we examine, why DNS cache poisoning is so crucial 
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concerning the DNS64 technology and we also elaborate the 
attack model of DNS cache poisoning. In section III, we survey 
the available test tools for DNS cache poisoning analysis and 
point out that they are not suitable for our purposes. In section 
IV, we design and implement a testbed for security analysis of 
DNS64 implementations. In section V, we select the DNS64 
implementations to be tested and also present their setup. In 
sections VI, VII, and VIII, we design and carry out different 
tests for the possible components of the DNS cache poisoning 
vulnerability, namely, we test Transaction ID and source port 
predictability, as well as whether the DNS64 implementations 
send out multiple equivalent queries simultaneously, which 
would give an opportunity for an attack based on the birthday 
paradox. In section IX, we summarize and discuss our results, 
as well as we make suggestions for the elimination of the 
uncovered vulnerabilities. Section X concludes our paper. 
II. CACHE POISONING VULNERABILITY OF DNS64 
The trustworthy operation of the DNS service is a very 
important precondition for a secure Internet. The ultimate 
mitigation for DNS cache poisoning, as well as for all other 
tampering type attacks against DNS, is DNSSEC [10]. 
However, concerning the cache poisoning vulnerability of 
DNS64 servers we cannot rely on DNSSEC for two reasons. 
First of all, its deployment rate is still very low. (As of 2016, it 
was 1.7% among the Alexa top 1 million web servers [11].) The 
other reason is DNS64 specific. The task of a DNS64 server is 
to synthesize an    [12] for the 
domain names that do not have a AAAA record (IPv6 address). 
However, this a forged address from the DNSSEC point of 
view. Thus, a  and  DNS client has to 
discard it. The best possible mode of operation is, when a 
security aware client asks the DNS64 server to perform the 
validation, see section 3 of [4]. In this case, the client has to 
trust in the DNS64 server. (And of course, tampering may 
happen while the packet travels from the DNS64 server to the 
client.) 
Thus for protecting our DNS64 servers from DNS cache 
poisoning, we need to rely on the guidelines laid down in RFC 
5452 [13]. Before addressing them, we need to clarify the attack 
model, that is, the conditions of a DNS cache poisoning attack. 
We always consider  , which means that the 
attacker may not intercept the DNS requests from the attacked 
DNS server to the authoritative DNS server. The attacker may 
send DNS requests (for any domain name) and forged replies to 
the attacked DNS server. 
Now, we first quote the most important conditions from RFC 
5452, when a DNS server (called as “resolver” in the text) may 
accept information from a DNS reply packet, and then interpret 
them for our situation. 
“DNS data is to be accepted by a resolver if and only if: 
1. The question section of the reply packet is equivalent to 
that of a question packet currently waiting for a 
response. 
2. The ID field of the reply packet matches that of the 
question packet. 
3. The response comes from the same network address to 
which the question was sent. 
4. The response comes in on the same network address, 
including port number, from which the question was 
sent. 
In general, the first response matching these four conditions 
is accepted.” (from section 3 of [13]) 
Condition 1 gives a very important protection against 
spoofed answers by setting up a time limit. This  is 
equal to the round trip time between the given DNS server and 
the authoritative DNS server plus the response time of the 
authoritative DNS server. (The latter may be increased by the 
attacker by a DoS attack against the authoritative DNS server.) 
In its calculations, the RFC uses 100ms as a typical value for 
the length of this time interval. Of course, an attacker may 
attempt to initiate the opening of this time window at any time 
by sending a request for an arbitrarily chosen domain name. 
However, if a domain name is already cached, it is usually 
protected, until its TTL expires. 
Condition 2 significantly hardens the task of the attacker: the 
attacker has to guess the  for a successful attack. 
To support guessing, the attacker may send DNS resolution 
requests to the DNS server for any domain names, including 
domain names, the authoritative DNS servers of which is under 
the control of the attacker, thus the attacker may observe an 
arbitrarily long sequence of the Transaction IDs generated by 
the attacked DNS server. Therefore, DNS servers must use hard 
to predict (cryptographic) random number generators to prevent 
the attacker from being able to predict the Transaction IDs. 
Thus, on average, a number of 215 trials are necessary for a 
successful guess for the 16 bit long Transaction ID (within the 
given time period of about 100ms). 
Condition 3 further hardens the task of the attacker, but not 
very significantly. There may be a few authoritative DNS 
servers for a domain, the IP address of which are known for the 
attacker, and the DNS server may use them in a round robin 
manner. The attacker needs to spoof exactly the right one. As 
their number is usually small, this condition contributes only 
with a small multiplication factor. As for the spoofing itself, 
there are some countermeasures against source IP address 
spoofing, such as reverse path checking by routers or firewalls. 
However, we may not rely on this optional protection: we 
suppose that it is not switched on, or the attacker is able to send 
the forged replies from the “right” direction. 
Condition 4 has two contributions. The attacked DNS server 
may have more than one network interfaces (or more than one 
IP addresses may be assigned to the same interface), but this 
number is limited, thus it may be only a small factor. The 
 can be another significant factor, if the DNS server 
uses different, hard to predict source port numbers for sending 
out its every single request. As port numbers from 0 to 1023 
cannot be used, the entropy is somewhat less than 16 bits. 
We note that NAT (more exactly: NAPT) devices may 
remove the entropy of the source port numbers, thus DNS 
servers should never be placed behind NAPT devices unless the 
NAPT devices are known to comply with RFC 6056 [14], 
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which requires randomized source port number selection. 
RFC 5452 [13] describes another form of attack, which is 
based on the birthday paradox. If the attacker may achieve that 
the DNS server sends out  , that is 
queries with identical QNAME, QTYPE, and QCLASS fields, 
 (a new query is sent while another one still waits 
for an answer) then the forged replies of the attacker may match 
any of them, which significantly eases the attack. For further 
details, please refer to the CERT vulnerability note [15]. 
To sum up the essence of the above conditions, we need to 
check whether the analyzed DNS64 server implementations use 
hard to predict random numbers for both Transaction IDs and 
source port numbers and they do not send multiple equivalent 
queries concurrently. 
III. TOOLS FOR CACHE POISONING VULNERABILITY 
TESTING 
Although Daniel J. Bernstein already disclosed the 
vulnerability of the DNS system as well as the possible solution 
in 1999 [16], and there was a CERT notification about the 
possibility of the birthday paradox based attacks in 2002 [15], 
some mainstream DNS servers implementations including 
BIND did not address the issue properly until the CERT 
notification in 2008 [17], which was triggered by Dan 
Kaminsky, who invented a more powerful cache poisoning 
method. His attack is built upon two ideas: it bypasses the 
protection of the TTL by using different random names from 
the attacked domain, and goes one hierarchy level higher: 
instead of trying to insert a forged “A” record into the cache of 
the attacked DNS server, it hijacks the whole attacked zone by 
including the IP address of a DNS server controlled by the 
attacker as an IP address of a DNS server for the attacked 
domain into an Authority record of a forged answer for a query 
for a random name from the attacked zone (to trick the bailiwick 
rule), see [18] for an in depth and wellillustrated description of 
the attack.  
Then the alert was taken seriously, and patches were 
prepared for all those major DNS implementations that were 
still vulnerable. Also vulnerability testing tools were prepared 
and released. 
A contemporary web based Transaction ID and source port 
randomness tester by DNSOARC is still available [19]. It is 
documented and highly suggested by [20]. Although the 
demonstration screen at the documentation does not seem to be 
so bad, see Fig. 1, our experience was rather poor. When we 
tried it out, among others, we received the results shown in 
Fig. 2. We contend that it is not enough to test only five 
Transaction IDs. But we do not have an opportunity to tune the 
tests. 
Another webbased testing tool is mentioned in the ICANN 
presentation of Kim Davies [21], but the tool is no more 
available at the URL mentioned on slide 33 of the presentation: 
http://recursive.iana.org/. 
And there is another problem with these webbased tools: 
they require that the DNS server is configured in a live system. 
We rather decided to build a , that is, an isolated 
environment, where we can check whether the examined 
DNS64 implementations indeed have the presumed 
vulnerabilities by using any kind of tests with any parameters 
we consider necessary. 
IV. TESTBED DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
 
Although we intended to design a testbed for the security 
analysis of DNS64 server implementations, we made our 
considerations with a broader mindset, so that the testbed may 
also be used for the security analysis of other IPv6 transition 
technologies, especially NAT64. 
In general, the requirements for such a testbed usually 
include the following: 
1. isolated environment, where attacks may be performed 
2. ease of use 
3. low cost. 
A testbed for the security analysis of different IPv6 transition 
technologies should contain the fundamental basic blocks of the 
systems in which the given solutions are used. Practically it 
means that we need a few computers which are interconnected 
by IPv4 and/or IPv6 network(s). Such systems can be built in 
Fig. 1. Sample Transaction ID randomness testing results of the DNSOARC 
DNS entropy testing tool. [20] 
 
Fig. 2. Our Transaction ID randomness test result produced by the DNS
OARC DNS entropy testing tool. 
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which requires randomized source port number selection. 
RFC 5452 [13] describes another form of attack, which is 
based on the birthday paradox. If the attacker may achieve that 
the DNS server sends out  , that is 
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 (a new query is sent while another one still waits 
for an answer) then the forged replies of the attacker may match 
any of them, which significantly eases the attack. For further 
details, please refer to the CERT vulnerability note [15]. 
To sum up the essence of the above conditions, we need to 
check whether the analyzed DNS64 server implementations use 
hard to predict random numbers for both Transaction IDs and 
source port numbers and they do not send multiple equivalent 
queries concurrently. 
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vulnerability of the DNS system as well as the possible solution 
in 1999 [16], and there was a CERT notification about the 
possibility of the birthday paradox based attacks in 2002 [15], 
some mainstream DNS servers implementations including 
BIND did not address the issue properly until the CERT 
notification in 2008 [17], which was triggered by Dan 
Kaminsky, who invented a more powerful cache poisoning 
method. His attack is built upon two ideas: it bypasses the 
protection of the TTL by using different random names from 
the attacked domain, and goes one hierarchy level higher: 
instead of trying to insert a forged “A” record into the cache of 
the attacked DNS server, it hijacks the whole attacked zone by 
including the IP address of a DNS server controlled by the 
attacker as an IP address of a DNS server for the attacked 
domain into an Authority record of a forged answer for a query 
for a random name from the attacked zone (to trick the bailiwick 
rule), see [18] for an in depth and wellillustrated description of 
the attack.  
Then the alert was taken seriously, and pa ches were 
prepared for all those major DNS implementations th t wer  
still vulnerable. Also vulnerability t sting tools were prepared 
and released. 
A contemporary web based Tra saction ID and sourc port 
randomness tester by DNSOARC is still available [19]. It is 
documented and highly suggested by [20]. Although the 
demonstration screen at the documentation does not seem to be 
so bad, see Fig. 1, our experience wa  rather poor. When we 
tried it out, among others, we rec ived the results shown in 
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Transaction IDs. But w  do not have an opportunity to une the 
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Another webbased testing tool is mentioned in the ICANN 
presentation of Kim Davies [21], but the tool is no more 
available at the URL mentioned on slide 33 of the presentation: 
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concerning the DNS64 technology and we also elaborate the 
attack model of DNS cache poisoning. In section III, we survey 
the available test tools for DNS cache poisoning analysis and 
point out that they are not suitable for our purposes. In section 
IV, we design and implement a testbed for security analysis of 
DNS64 implementations. In section V, we select the DNS64 
implementations to be tested and also present their setup. In 
sections VI, VII, and VIII, we design and carry out different 
tests for the possible components of the DNS cache poisoning 
vulnerability, namely, we test Transaction ID and source port 
predictability, as well as whether the DNS64 implementations 
send out multiple equivalent queries simultaneously, which 
would give an opportunity for an attack based on the birthday 
paradox. In section IX, we summarize and discuss our results, 
as well as we make suggestions for the elimination of the 
uncovered vulnerabilities. Section X concludes our paper. 
II. CACHE POISONING VULNERABILITY OF DNS64 
The trustworthy operation of the DNS service is a very 
important precondition for a secure Internet. The ultimate 
mitigation for DNS cache poisoning, as well as for all other 
tampering type attacks against DNS, is DNSSEC [10]. 
However, concerning the cache poisoning vulnerability of 
DNS64 servers we cannot rely on DNSSEC for two reasons. 
First of all, its deployment rate is still very low. (As of 2016, it 
was 1.7% among the Alexa top 1 million web servers [11].) The 
other reason is DNS64 specific. The task of a DNS64 server is 
to synthesize an    [12] for the 
domain names that do not have a AAAA record (IPv6 address). 
However, this a forged address from the DNSSEC point of 
view. Thus, a  and  DNS client has to 
discard it. The best possible mode of operation is, when a 
security aware client asks the DNS64 server to perform the 
validation, see section 3 of [4]. In this case, the client has to 
trust in the DNS64 server. (And of course, tampering may 
happen while the packet travels from the DNS64 server to the 
client.) 
Thus for protecting our DNS64 servers from DNS cache 
poisoning, we need to rely on the guidelines laid down in RFC 
5452 [13]. Before addressing them, we need to clarify the attack 
model, that is, the conditions of a DNS cache poisoning attack. 
We always consider  , which means that the 
attacker may not intercept the DNS requests from the attacked 
DNS server to the authoritative DNS server. The attacker may 
send DNS requests (for any domain name) and forged replies to 
the attacked DNS server. 
Now, we first quote the most important conditions from RFC 
5452, when a DNS server (called as “resolver” in the text) may 
accept information from a DNS reply packet, and then interpret 
them for our situation. 
“DNS data is to be accepted by a resolver if and only if: 
1. The question section of the reply packet is equivalent to 
that of a question packet currently waiting for a 
response. 
2. The ID field of the reply packet matches that of the 
question packet. 
3. The response comes from the same network address to 
which the question was sent. 
4. The response comes in on the same network address, 
including port number, from which the question was 
sent. 
In general, the first response matching these four conditions 
is accepted.” (from section 3 of [13]) 
Condition 1 gives a very important protection against 
spoofed answers by setting up a time limit. This  is 
equal to the round trip time between the given DNS server and 
the authoritative DNS server plus the response time of the 
authoritative DNS server. (The latter may be increased by the 
attacker by a DoS attack against the authoritative DNS server.) 
In its calculations, the RFC uses 100ms as a typical value for 
the length of this time interval. Of course, an attacker may 
attempt to initiate the opening of this time window at any time 
by sending a request for an arbitrarily chosen domain name. 
However, if a domain name is already cached, it is usually 
protected, until its TTL expires. 
Condition 2 significantly hardens the task of the attacker: the 
attacker has to guess the  for a successful attack. 
To support guessing, the attacker may send DNS resolution 
requests to the DNS server for any domain names, including 
domain names, the authoritative DNS servers of which is under 
the control of the attacker, thus the attacker may observe an 
arbitrarily long sequence of the Transaction IDs generated by 
the attacked DNS server. Therefore, DNS servers must use hard 
to predict (cryptographic) random number generators to prevent 
the attacker from being able to predict the Transaction IDs. 
Thus, on average, a number of 215 trials are necessary for a 
successful guess for the 16 bit long Transaction ID (within the 
given time period of about 100ms). 
Condition 3 further hardens the task of the attacker, but not 
very significantly. There may be a few authoritative DNS 
servers for a domain, the IP address of which are known for the 
attacker, and the DNS server may use them in a round robin 
manner. The attacker needs to spoof exactly the right one. As 
their number is usually small, this condition contributes only 
with a small multiplication factor. As for the spoofing itself, 
there are some countermeasures against source IP address 
spoofing, such as reverse path checking by routers or firewalls. 
However, we may not rely on this optional protection: we 
suppose that it is not switched on, or the attacker is able to send 
the forged replies from the “right” direction. 
Condition 4 has two contributions. The attacked DNS server 
may have more than one network interfaces (or more than one 
IP addresses may be assigned to the same interface), but this 
number is limited, thus it may be only a small factor. The 
 can be another significant factor, if the DNS server 
uses different, hard to predict source port numbers for sending 
out its every single request. As port numbers from 0 to 1023 
cannot be used, the entropy is somewhat less than 16 bits. 
We note that NAT (more exactly: NAPT) devices may 
remove the entropy of the source port numbers, thus DNS 
servers should never be placed behind NAPT devices unless the 
NAPT devices are known to comply with RFC 6056 [14], 
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To sum up the essence of the above conditions, we need to 
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hard to predict random numbers for both Transaction IDs and 
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attacker as an IP address of a DNS server for the attacked 
domain into an Authority record of a forged answer for a query 
for a random name from the attacked zone (to trick the bailiwick 
rule), see [18] for an in depth and wellillustrated description of 
the attack.  
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prepared for all those major DNS implementations that were 
still vulnerable. Also vulnerability testing tools were prepared 
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randomness tester by DNSOARC is still available [19]. It is 
documented and highly suggested by [20]. Although the 
demonstration screen at the documentation does not seem to be 
so bad, see Fig. 1, our experience was rather poor. When we 
tried it out, among others, we received the results shown in 
Fig. 2. We contend that it is not enough to test only five 
Transaction IDs. But we do not have an opportunity to tune the 
tests. 
Another webbased testing tool is mentioned in the ICANN 
presentation of Kim Davies [21], but the tool is no more 
available at the URL mentioned on slide 33 of the presentation: 
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considerations with a broader mindset, so that the testbed may 
also be used for the security analysis of other IPv6 transition 
technologies, especially NAT64. 
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include the following: 
1. isolated environment, where attacks may be performed 
2. ease of use 
3. low cost. 
A testbed for the security analysis of different IPv6 transition 
technologies should contain the fundamental basic blocks of the 
systems in which the given solutions are used. Practically it 
means that we need a few computers which are interconnected 
by IPv4 and/or IPv6 network(s). Such systems can be built in 
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which requires randomized source port number selection. 
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BIND did not address the issue properly until the CERT 
notification in 2008 [17], which was triggered by Dan 
Kaminsky, who invented a more powerful cache poisoning 
method. His attack is built upon two ideas: it bypasses the 
protection of the TTL by using different random names from 
the attacked domain, and goes one hierarchy level higher: 
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prepared for all those major DNS implementations th t were 
still vulnerable. Also vulnerability testing tools were prepared 
and released. 
A contemporary web based Transaction ID and source port 
randomness tester by DNSOARC is still available [19]. It is 
documented and highly suggested by [20]. Although the 
demonstration screen at the documentation does not seem to be 
so bad, see Fig. 1, our experience was rather poor. When we 
tried it out, among others, we received the results shown in 
Fig. 2. We contend that it is not enough to test only five 
Transaction IDs. But we do not have an opportunity to tune the 
tests. 
Another webbased testing tool is mentioned in the ICANN 
presentation of Kim Davies [21], but the tool is no more 
available at the URL mentioned on slide 33 of the presentation: 
http://recursive.iana.org/. 
And there is another problem with these webbased tools: 
they require that the DNS server is configured in a live system. 
We rather decided to build a , that is, an isolated 
environment, where we can check whether the examined 
DNS64 implementations indeed have the presumed 
vulnerabilities by using any kind of tests with any parameters 
we consider necessary. 
IV. TESTBED DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
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In general, the requirements for such a testbed usually 
include the following: 
1. isolated environment, where attacks may be performed 
2. ease of use 
3. low cost. 
A testbed for the security analysis of different IPv6 transition 
technologies should contain the fundamental basic blocks of the 
systems in which the given solutions are used. Practically it 
means that we need a few computers which are interconnected 
by IPv4 and/or IPv6 network(s). Such systems can be built in 
Fig. 1. Sample Transaction ID randomness testing results of the DNSOARC 
DNS entropy testing tool. [20] 
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documented and highly suggested by [20]. Although the 
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also be used for the security analysis of other IPv6 transition 
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In general, the requirements for such a testbed usually 
include the following: 
1. isolated environment, where attacks may be performed 
2. ease of use 
3. low cost. 
A testbed for the security analysis of different IPv6 transition 
technologies should contain the fundamental basic blocks of the 
systems in which the given solutions are used. Practically it 
means that we need a few computers which are interconnected 
by IPv4 and/or IPv6 network(s). Such systems can be built in 
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any of them, which significantly eases the attack. For further 
details, please refer to the CERT vulnerability note [15]. 
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rule), see [18] for an in depth and wellillustrated description of 
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technologies, especially NAT64. 
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include the following: 
1. isolated environment, where attacks may be performed 
2. ease of use 
3. low cost. 
A testbed for the security analysis of different IPv6 transition 
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means that we need a few computers which are interconnected 
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Fig. 1. Sample ra s ti  t sting results of the DNSOARC 
ti  t ol. [20] 
 
Fig. 2. Our Transaction ID randomness test result produced by the DNS
OARC DNS entropy testing tool. 
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between the NAT64 gateway and the IPv4only server. 
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we set also an IPv6 address at the authoritative DNS server to 
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operability. 
We also note that the  interfaces were not necessary for 
the tests, we used them for providing the virtual machines with 
Internet access, which was sometimes necessary, e.g. for 
installing various packages under Debian Linux. We have 
separated this communication from the testing communication, 
which happened always through the  interfaces of the 
virtual computers. 
 
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 and the  virtual machines. 
 
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In this section, we demonstrate the correct operation of the 
test system, and also introduce the operation of DNS64 servers, 
which will be important later.  
We tested the operation of the testbed by issuing the 
following command on the  computer: 

The  Linux command was used to request a AAAA 
record for the  domain name from the 
DNS64 server executed by the host named . 
The DNS messages were captured by  on the 
 interface using the  capture filter. The six 
captured packets are shown in Fig. 4. Now we shall identify the 
six messages and observe their Transaction IDs, which are used 
to match the answer with the query. We will experiment with 
them later. 
1. Request for a AAAA record from the client to the 
DNS64 server with Transaction ID 0x7c4a, generated by 
the  command. 
2. Request for a AAAA record from the DNS64 server to 
the authoritative DNS server with a different Transaction 
ID, 0xcad0, generated by BIND. 
3. An “empty” reply for the AAAA record request sent by 
the authoritative DNS server to the DNS64 server, and 
its Transaction ID is the same as that of the 
corresponding request. 
4. Request for an A record from the DNS64 server to the 
authoritative DNS server with a different Transaction ID, 
0xee9d, generated by BIND. 
5. A valid reply with an A record sent by the authoritative 
DNS server to the DNS64 server, and its Transaction ID 
is the same as that of the corresponding request. 
6. The reply of the DNS64 server to the client containing 
the synthesized  [12] with 
the same Transaction ID as message 1. 
Thus we have found that the testbed worked fine, and it was 
ready for testing. 
V. DNS64 IMPLEMENTATION SELECTION AND SETUP 
We have laid down our implementations selection guidelines 
in [2] as follows: 
“As for the implementations, we only deal with those that are 
free software [25] (also called open source [26]) for multiple 
reasons: 
 The licenses of certain vendors (e.g. [27] and [28]) do 
not allow reverse engineering and sometimes even the 
publication of benchmarking results is prohibited. 
 Free software can be used by anyone for any purposes 
thus our results can be helpful for anyone. 
 Free software is available free of charge for us, too. 
Within the category of the free software implementations, we 
 
Fig. 4. Wireshark capture taken during the functional checking of the DNS64 testbed. 
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several ways, including the usage of: 
1. server computers 
2. desktop or laptop computers 
3. singleboard computers [22] 
4. virtual machines. 
We contend that the consecutive solutions result in less cost 
and higher comfort in use including easy mobility. Our decision 
was also influenced by the fact that we have been successfully 
using virtual Linux boxes (executed under Windows 7) for the 
practical education of DNS64 and NAT64 IPv6 transition 
technologies at the Budapest University of Technology and 
Economics since 2015. 
As the existing virtual machine images were suitable for our 
current testing purposes, it was a convenient solution to reuse 
them. The virtual machine images were prepared by a script 
called , written by Dániel Bakai [23]. (This script 
creates a small, low memory usage, userdefined Debian virtual 
machine disk image, which can be used in various hypervisors 
including VMware and KVM.) They contain Debian 8 
distributions, which were now updated to Debian version 8.9. 
They were executed by VMware Workstation 12 Player. 
 
We propose the structure of a simple testbed suitable for the 
security analysis of the DNS64 and the stateful NAT64 IPv6 
transition technologies. Similar testbeds can be built for the 
security analysis of other IPv6 transition technologies. 
The testing of DNS64 or NAT64 requires a network of three 
hosts. As for DNS64, they are: client, DNS64 server and 
authoritative DNS server, where the DNS64 server should be 
interconnected with both the client and the authoritative DNS 
server. As for NAT64, only the roles are different: client, 
NAT64 gateway and IPv4only server; the topology is the 
same. Thus the same network can be used for the testing of the 
different implementations of both IPv6 transition technologies, 
only some software components need to be changed. 
As for the attacker, two further hosts could have been added, 
one for tampering with each connections, but we eliminated 
them with a trick. First of all, we used a single shared medium 
to interconnect the three computers, see Fig. 3, thus only one 
extra device would have been enough. However, as in our 
current tests we used only wiretapping, it could be done at any 
of the three computers, thus no further computer was necessary. 
 
We have implemented the test network shown in Fig. 3 by 
three virtual machines, each of which had a single CPU core, 
128MB of RAM, and (theoretically) 40GB of hard disks, but 
the starting size of the images were under 1GB. (They were 
growing during the experiments, but remained under 3GB.) 
Table 1 shows the Linux and WMware settings used for the 
virtual machines. 
We note that the IP version between the client, which is an 
IPv6only client, and the DNS64 server must be 6. There is no 
restriction for the IP version between the DNS64 server and the 
DNS server, but when testing NAT64, IPv4 must be used 
 
Fig. 3. Topology of the test network. 
Table 1.  Linux and VMware Network Settings for Virtual Machines. 
Virtual machine name    
Role IPv6only client  DNS64 server Authoritative DNS server 
 Linux settings  IPv6 static: fd00::1/64  IPv6 static: fd00::2/64 
IPv4 static 10.0.0.2/24 
IPv6 static: fd00::3/64 
IPv4 static: 10.0.0.3/24 
 Linux settings IPv4 DHCP  IPv4 DHCP IPv4 DHCP 
 VMware settings VMnet1  VMnet1 VMnet1 
 VMware settings NAT  NAT NAT 
 
4 
> REPLACE THIS LINE WITH YOUR PAPER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (DOUBLECLICK HERE TO EDIT) < 
 
several ways, including the usage of: 
1. server computers 
2. desktop or laptop computers 
3. singleboard computers [22] 
4. virtual machines. 
We contend that the consecutive solutions result in less cost 
and higher comfort in use including easy mobility. Our decision 
was also influenced by the fact that we have been successfully 
using virtual Linux boxes (executed under Windows 7) for the 
practical education of DNS64 and NAT64 IPv6 transition 
technologies at the Budapest University of Technology and 
Economics since 2015. 
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creates a small, low memory usage, userdefined Debian virtual 
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authoritative DNS server, where the DNS64 server should be 
interconnected with both the client and the authoritative DNS 
server. As for NAT64, only the roles are different: client, 
NAT64 gateway and IPv4only server; the topology is the 
same. Thus the same network can be used for the testing of the 
different implementations of both IPv6 transition technologies, 
only some software components need to be changed. 
As for the attacker, two further hosts could have been added, 
one for tampering with each connections, but we eliminated 
them with a trick. First of all, we used a single shared medium 
to interconnect the three computers, see Fig. 3, thus only one 
extra device would have been enough. However, as in our 
current tests we used only wiretapping, it could be done at any 
of the three computers, thus no further computer was necessary. 
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several ways, including the usage of: 
1. server computers 
2. desktop or laptop computers 
3. singleboard computers [22] 
4. virtual machines. 
We contend that the consecutive solutions result in less cost 
and higher comfort in use including easy mobility. Our decision 
was also influenced by the fact that we have been successfully 
using virtual Linux boxes (executed under Windows 7) for the 
practical education of DNS64 and NAT64 IPv6 transition 
technologies at the Budapest University of Technology and 
Economics since 2015. 
As the existing virtual machine images were suitable for our 
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called , written by Dániel Bakai [23]. (This script 
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including VMware and KVM.) They contain Debian 8 
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NAT64 gateway and IPv4only server; the topology is the 
same. Thus the same network can be used for the testing of the 
different implementations of both IPv6 transition technologies, 
only some software components need to be changed. 
As for the attacker, two further hosts could have been added, 
one for tampering with each connections, but we eli inated 
them with a trick. First of all, we used a single shared medium 
to interconnect the three computers, see Fig. 3, thus only one 
extra device would have been enough. However, as in our 
current tests we used only wiretapping, it could be done at any 
of the three computers, thus no further computer was necessary. 
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several ways, including the usage of: 
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3. singleboard computers [22] 
4. virtual machines. 
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and higher comfort in use including easy mobility. Our decision 
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between the NAT64 gateway and the IPv4only server. 
Although we used IPv4 between the DNS64 server and the 
authoritative DNS server during our DNS64 vulnerability tests, 
we set also an IPv6 address at the authoritative DNS server to 
be able to reach it directly from the client for testing its 
operability. 
We also note that the  interfaces were not necessary for 
the tests, we used them for providing the virtual machines with 
Internet access, which was sometimes necessary, e.g. for 
installing various packages under Debian Linux. We have 
separated this communication from the testing communication, 
which happened always through the  interfaces of the 
virtual computers. 
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The purpose of this setup was to check whether the testbed 
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In this section, we demonstrate the correct operation of the 
test system, and also introduce the operation of DNS64 servers, 
which will be important later.  
We tested the operation of the testbed by issuing the 
following command on the  computer: 
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The  Linux command was used to request a AAAA 
record for the  domain name from the 
DNS64 server executed by the host named . 
The DNS messages were captured by  on the 
 interface using the  capture filter. The six 
captured packets are shown in Fig. 4. Now we shall identify the 
six messages and observe their Transaction IDs, which are used 
to match the answer with the query. We will experiment with 
them later. 
1. Request for a AAAA record from the client to the 
DNS64 server with Transaction ID 0x7c4a, generated by 
the  command. 
2. Request for a AAAA record from the DNS64 server to 
the authoritative DNS server with a different Transaction 
ID, 0xcad0, generated by BIND. 
3. An “empty” reply for the AAAA record request sent by 
the authoritative DNS server to the DNS64 server, and 
its Transaction ID is the same as that of the 
corresponding request. 
4. Request for an A record from the DNS64 server to the 
authoritative DNS server with a different Transaction ID, 
0xee9d, generated by BIND. 
5. A valid reply with an A record sent by the authoritative 
DNS server to the DNS64 server, and its Transaction ID 
is the same as that of the corresponding request. 
6. The reply of the DNS64 server to the client containing 
the synthesized  [12] with 
the same Transaction ID as message 1. 
Thus we have found that the testbed worked fine, and it was 
ready for testing. 
V. DNS64 IMPLEMENTATION SELECTION AND SETUP 
We have laid down our implementations selection guidelines 
in [2] as follows: 
“As for the implementations, we only deal with those that are 
free software [25] (also called open source [26]) for multiple 
reasons: 
 The licenses of certain vendors (e.g. [27] and [28]) do 
not allow reverse engineering and sometimes even the 
publication of benchmarking results is prohibited. 
 Free software can be used by anyone for any purposes 
thus our results can be helpful for anyone. 
 Free software is available free of charge for us, too. 
Within the category of the free software implementations, we 
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between the NAT64 gateway and the IPv4only server. 
Although we used IPv4 between the DNS64 server and the 
authoritative DNS server during our DNS64 vulnerability tests, 
we set also an IPv6 address at the authoritative DNS server to 
be able to reach it directly from the client for testing its 
operability. 
We also note that the  interfaces were not necessary for 
the tests, we used them for providing the virtual machines with 
Internet access, which was sometimes necessary, e.g. for 
installing various packages under Debian Linux. We have 
separated this communication from the testing communication, 
which happened always through the  interfaces of the 
virtual computers. 
 
The purpose of this setup was to check whether the testbed 
works properly. We have installed BIND9 [24] to both the 
 and the  virtual machines. 
 
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In this section, we demonstrate the correct operation of the 
test system, and also introduce the operation of DNS64 servers, 
which will be important later.  
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captured packets are shown in Fig. 4. Now we shall identify the 
six essages and observe their Transaction IDs, which are used 
to atch the answer with the query. We will experiment with 
them later. 
1. Request for a AAAA record from the client to the 
DNS64 server with Transaction ID 0x7c4a, generated by 
the  command. 
2. Request for a AAAA record from the DNS64 server to 
the authoritative DNS server with a different Transaction 
ID, 0xcad0, generated by BIND. 
3. An “empty” reply for the AAAA record request sent by 
the authoritative DNS server to the DNS64 server, and 
its Transaction ID is the same as that of the 
corresponding request. 
4. Request for an A record from the DNS64 server to the 
authoritative DNS server with a different Transaction ID, 
0xee9d, generated by BIND. 
5. A valid reply with an A record sent by the authoritative 
DNS server to the DNS64 server, and its Transaction ID 
is the same as that of the corresponding request. 
6. The reply of the DNS64 server to the client containing 
the synthesized  [12] with 
the same Transaction ID as message 1. 
Thus we have found that the testbed worked fine, and it was 
ready for testing. 
V. DNS64 IMPLEMENTATION SELECTION AND SETUP 
We have laid down our implementations selection guidelines 
in [2] as follows: 
“As for the implementations, we only deal with those that are 
free software [25] (also called open source [26]) for multiple 
reasons: 
 The licenses of certain vendors (e.g. [27] and [28]) do 
not allow reverse engineering and sometimes even the 
publication of benchmarking results is prohibited. 
 Free software can be used by anyone for any purposes 
thus our results can be helpful for anyone. 
 Free software is available free of charge for us, too. 
Within the category of the free software implementations, we 
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between the NAT64 gateway and the IPv4only server. 
Although we used IPv4 between the DNS64 server and the 
authoritative DNS server during our DNS64 vulnerability tests, 
we set also an IPv6 address at the authoritative DNS server to 
be able to reach it directly from the client for testing its 
operability. 
We also note that the  interfaces were not necessary for 
the tests, we used them for providing the virtual machines with 
Internet access, which was sometimes necessary, e.g. for 
installing various packages under Debian Linux. We have 
separated this communication from the testing communication, 
which happened always through the  interfaces of the 
virtual computers. 
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The purpose of this setup was to check whether the testbed 
works properly. We have installed BIND9 [24] to both the 
 and the  virtual machines. 
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In this section, we demonstrate the correct operation of the 
test system, and also introduce the operation of DNS64 servers, 
which will be important later.  
We tested the operation of the testbed by issuing the 
following command on the  computer: 
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The  Linux command was used to request a AAAA 
record for the  domain name from the 
DNS64 server executed by the host named . 
The DNS messages were captured by  on the 
 interface using the  capture filter. The six 
captured packets are shown in Fig. 4. Now we shall identify the 
six messages and observe their Transaction IDs, which are used 
to match the answer with the query. We will experiment with 
them later. 
1. Request for a AAAA record from the client to the 
DNS64 server with Transaction ID 0x7c4a, generated by 
the  command. 
2. Request for a AAAA record from the DNS64 server to 
the authoritative DNS server with a different Transaction 
ID, 0xcad0, generated by BIND. 
3. An “empty” reply for the AAAA record request sent by 
the authoritative DNS server to the DNS64 server, and 
its Transaction ID is the same as that of the 
corresponding request. 
4. Request for an A record from the DNS64 server to the 
authoritative DNS server with a different Transaction ID, 
0xee9d, generated by BIND. 
5. A valid reply with an A record sent by the authoritative 
DNS server to the DNS64 server, and its Transaction ID 
is the same as that of the corresponding request. 
6. The reply of the DNS64 server to the client containing 
the synthesized  [12] with 
the same Transaction ID as message 1. 
Thus we have found that the testbed worked fine, and it was 
ready for testing. 
V. DNS64 IMPLEMENTATION SELECTION AND SETUP 
We have laid down our implementations selection guidelines 
in [2] as follows: 
“As for the implementations, we only deal with those that are 
free software [25] (also called open source [26]) for multiple 
reasons: 
 The licenses of certain vendors (e.g. [27] and [28]) do 
not allow reverse engineering and sometimes even the 
publication of benchmarking results is prohibited. 
 Free software can be used by anyone for any purposes 
thus our results can be helpful for anyone. 
 Free software is available free of charge for us, too. 
Within the category of the free software implementations, we 
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between the NAT64 gateway and the IPv4only server. 
Although we used IPv4 between the DNS64 server and the 
authoritative DNS server during our DNS64 vulnerability tests, 
we set also an IPv6 address at the authoritative DNS server to 
be able to reach it directly from the client for testing its 
operability. 
e also note that the  interfaces were not necessary for 
the tests, we used them for providing the virtual machines with 
Internet access, which was sometimes necessary, e.g. for 
installing various packages under Debian Linux. e have 
separated this communication from the testing communication, 
which happened always through the  interfaces of the 
virtual computers. 
 
The purpose of this setup was to check whether the testbed 
works properly. e have installed BIND9 [24] to both the 
 and the  virtual machines. 
 
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In this section, we demonstrate the correct operation of the 
test system, and also introduce the operation of DNS64 servers, 
which will be important later.  
e tested the operation of the testbed by issuing the 
following command on the  computer: 
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The  Linux command was used to request a AAAA 
record for the  domain name from the 
DNS64 server executed by the host named . 
The DNS messages were captured by  on the 
 interface using the  capture filter. The six 
captured packets are shown in Fig. 4. Now we shall identify the 
six messages and observe their Transaction IDs, which are used 
to match the answer with the query. e will experiment with 
them later. 
1. Request for a AAAA record from the client to the 
DNS64 server with Transaction ID 0x7c4a, generated by 
the  command. 
2. Request for a AAAA record from the DNS64 server to 
the authoritative DNS server with a different Transaction 
ID, 0xcad0, generated by BIND. 
3. An “empty” reply for the AAAA record request sent by 
the authoritative DNS server to the DNS64 server, and 
its Transaction ID is the same as that of the 
corresponding request. 
4. Request for an A record from the DNS64 server to the 
authoritative DNS server with a different Transaction ID, 
0xee9d, generated by BIND. 
5. A valid reply with an A record sent by the authoritative 
DNS server to the DNS64 server, and its Transaction ID 
is the same as that of the corresponding request. 
6. The reply of the DNS64 server to the client containing 
the synthesized  [12] with 
the same Transaction ID as message 1. 
Thus we have found that the testbed worked fine, and it was 
ready for testing. 
V. DNS64 IMPLEMENTATION SELECTION AND SETUP 
e have laid down our implementations selection guidelines 
in [2] as follows: 
“As for the implementations, we only deal with those that are 
free software [25] (also called open source [26]) for multiple 
reasons: 
 The licenses of certain vendors (e.g. [27] and [28]) do 
not allow reverse engineering and sometimes even the 
publication of benchmarking results is prohibited. 
 Free software can be used by anyone for any purposes 
thus our results can be helpful for anyone. 
 Free software is available free of charge for us, too. 
ithin the category of the free software implementations, we 
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bet een the T64 gate ay and the IPv4only server. 
lthough e used IPv4 b t een the S64 server and the
au ritative S server during our S64 vuln ability tests,
e set also an IPv6 address at the authoritative S serv r to
b  able t reach it di ctly fro  e client for testing its
operabili y. 
e also note that the  interfaces ere not necessary for 
the t sts, e used the for providing the vi tual achines ith
Internet acce s, hich as so eti s necessary, e.g. for
i stalling various pa kages under ebia  Linux. e have
sep rated this co unication fro the testing co unication,
hich happened al ays through the  interfaces of the 
virtual co puters. 
  
The purpose of this setup as to check hether the testbed 
orks ro erly. e have installed BI 9 [24] to both the
 and the  virtual achines. 
  
The   file as used 
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In this section, e de onstrate the correct operation of the 
test syste , and also introduce th op ration of S64 servers,
hich ill be i portant later.  
e tested the operation of the testbed by issuing the 
follo ing co and on the  co puter: 

The  Linux co and as used to request a  
record for the  o ain na e fro  the 
S64 serv r executed by the host na ed . 
The S essages ere captured by  on the 
 interface using the  capture filter. The six 
captured packets are sho n in Fig. 4. o  e shal  identify the
six essages and observe their Transaction I , h ch are used
to atch the s er ith the query. e ill experi ent ith
he  later. 
1. Request for a  record fro  the client to the 
S64 server ith Transa tion I  0x7c4a, generated by
the  co and. 
2. R quest for a  record fro  the S64 server to 
the authoritative S s rver ith a different Transaction
I , 0xcad0, generated by BI . 
3. n “e pty” r ply for the  record request sent by 
the authoritative S s rver to th  S64 server, and
its Transact on I  is the sa e as that of the
corresponding request. 
4. Request for an  r cord fro  the S64 server to the 
authori ative S server ith a different Transaction I ,
0xee9d, generated by BI . 
5.  valid reply ith an  record sent by the authoritative 
S server to the S64 se ver, and its Tr nsact on I
is the sa e as at of the cor esponding reque t. 
6. The reply of the S64 server to the client containing 
the synthesized   [12] ith
a e Transaction I  as essage 1. 
Thus e have found that the testb d orked fine, and it as 
ready for testing. 
. S64 I PLE ENTATION SELECTION AND SETUP 
e have laid do n our i ple entations selection guidelines 
in [2] as fol o s: 
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be ween th  NAT64 gat ay and the IPv4only server. 
Al ugh we used IPv4 between the DNS64 s ver and the
authoritative DNS serve  during our DNS64 vulnerability t sts,
we set als  an IPv6 a d ss at the aut oritative DNS erver to 
be able to reach it directly from the client for testing its 
operability. 
e also note that the  interfaces were not necessary for 
the tests, we used them for providing th  virtual machines with 
I ternet access, whi h was sometimes ecessary, e.g. for
inst lling various packages under Debian Linux. e have
separated this communication from the testing communication, 
which happen d always through the  interfaces of the 
virtual computers. 
 
The ur ose of this setup was to check whether the testbed
works properly. e have installed BIND9 [24] to both the 
 and the   virtual machines. 
 
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In this section, we demonstrat  th  correct operation of the
test system, and also introduce the operation of DNS64 servers, 
which will be important later.  
e tested the operation of the testbed by issuing the 
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 interface u ing the  capture filter. The six 
captured packets are shown in Fig. 4. Now we hall identify the
six messages d observe their Transaction IDs, which are used
o atch the answer with the query. e will experiment with 
them lat r. 
1. Request for a AAAA re ord from the client to the
DNS64 server with Transaction ID 0x7c4a, generated by 
th   command. 
2. R quest for a AAAA r cord from the DNS64 server to
the authoritative DNS server with a different Transaction 
ID, 0xcad0, g nerated by BIND. 
3. An “empty” reply for th  AAAA r cord request sent by
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its Transaction ID is the same as that of the 
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5. A valid reply with an A record sent by the uthor tative
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6. The reply of the DNS64 server to the client containing
ynthesized  [12] with 
the same Transaction ID as m ssage 1. 
Thus we have found that the testbed worked fine, and it was 
ready for testing. 
V. DNS64 IMPLEMENTATION SELECTION AND SETUP 
e have aid down our implementations selection guidelines 
in [2] as follows: 
“As or th  implementations, we only deal with th se tha  ar  
free software [25] (also called open source [26]) for multiple 
reasons: 
 The licenses of certain v ndors (e.g. [27] and [28]) do
not allow reverse engineering and sometimes even the 
publication of be chmarking results is prohibited. 
 Free software can be us d by anyone for any purposes 
thus our results can be h lpful for anyone. 
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between the NAT64 gateway and the IPv4only server. 
Although we used IPv4 between the DNS64 server and the 
authoritative DNS server during our DNS64 vulnerability tests, 
we set also an IPv6 address at the authoritative DNS server to 
be able to reach it directly from the client for testing its 
operability. 
We also note that the  interfaces were not necessary for 
the tests, we used them for providing the virtual machines with 
Internet access, which was sometimes necessary, e.g. for 
installing various packages under Debian Linux. We have 
separated this communication from the testing communication, 
which happened always through the  interfaces of the 
virtual computers. 
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The purpose of this setup was to check whether the testbed 
works properly. We have installed BIND9 [24] to both the 
 and the  virtual machines. 
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 interface using the  capture filter. The six 
captured packets are shown in Fig. 4. Now we shall identify the 
six messages and observe their Transaction IDs, which are used 
to match the answer with the query. We will experiment with 
them later. 
1. Request for a AAAA record from the client to the 
DNS64 server with Transaction ID 0x7c4a, generated by 
the  command. 
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the authoritative DNS server with a different Transaction 
ID, 0xcad0, generated by BIND. 
3. An “empty” reply for the AAAA record request sent by 
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its Transaction ID is the same as that of the 
corresponding request. 
4. Request for an A record from the DNS64 server to the 
authoritative DNS server with a different Transaction ID, 
0xee9d, generated by BIND. 
5. A valid reply with an A record sent by the authoritative 
DNS server to the DNS64 server, and its Transaction ID 
is the same as that of the corresponding request. 
6. The reply of the DNS64 server to the client containing 
the synthesized  [12] with 
the same Transaction ID as message 1. 
Thus we have found that the testbed worked fine, and it was 
ready for testing. 
V. DNS64 IMPLEMENTATION SELECTION AND SETUP 
We have laid down our implementations selection guidelines 
in [2] as follows: 
“As for the implementations, we only deal with those that are 
free software [25] (also called open source [26]) for multiple 
reasons: 
 The licenses of certain vendors (e.g. [27] and [28]) do 
not allow reverse engineering and sometimes even the 
publication of benchmarking results is prohibited. 
 Free software can be used by anyone for any purposes 
thus our results can be helpful for anyone. 
 Free software is available free of charge for us, too. 
Within the category of the free software implementations, we 
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several ways, including the usage of: 
1. server computers 
2. desktop or laptop computers 
3. singleboard computers [22] 
4. virtual machines. 
We contend that the consecutive solutions result in less cost 
and higher comfort in use including easy mobility. Our decision 
was also influenced by the fact that we have been successfully 
using virtual Linux boxes (executed under Windows 7) for the 
practical education of DNS64 and NAT64 IPv6 transition 
technologies at the Budapest University of Technology and 
Economics since 2015. 
As the existing virtual machine images were suitable for our 
current testing purposes, it was a convenient solution to reuse 
them. The virtual machine images were prepared by a script 
called , written by Dániel Bakai [23]. (This script 
creates a small, low memory usage, userdefined Debian virtual 
machine disk image, which can be used in various hypervisors 
including VMware and KVM.) They contain Debian 8 
distributions, which were now updated to Debian version 8.9. 
They were executed by VMware Workstation 12 Player. 
 
We propose the structure of a simple testbed suitable for the 
security analysis of the DNS64 and the stateful NAT64 IPv6 
transition technologies. Similar testbeds can be built for the 
security analysis of other IPv6 transition technologies. 
The testing of DNS64 or NAT64 requires a network of three 
hosts. As for DNS64, they are: client, DNS64 server and 
authoritative DNS server, where the DNS64 server should be 
interconnected with both the client and the authoritative DNS 
server. As for NAT64, only the roles are different: client, 
NAT64 gateway and IPv4only server; the topology is the 
same. Thus the same network can be used for the testing of the 
different implementations of both IPv6 transition technologies, 
only some software components need to be changed. 
As for the attacker, two further hosts could have been added, 
one for tampering with each connections, but we eliminated 
them with a trick. First of all, we used a single shared medium 
to interconnect the three computers, see Fig. 3, thus only one 
extra device would have been enough. However, as in our 
current tests we used only wiretapping, it could be done at any 
of the three computers, thus no further computer was necessary. 
 
We have implemented the test network shown in Fig. 3 by 
three virtual machines, each of which had a single CPU core, 
128MB of RAM, and (theoretically) 40GB of hard disks, but 
the starting size of the images were under 1GB. (They were 
growing during the experiments, but remained under 3GB.) 
Table 1 shows the Linux and WMware settings used for the 
virtual machines. 
We note that the IP version between the client, which is an 
IPv6only client, and the DNS64 server must be 6. There is no 
restriction for the IP version between the DNS64 server and the 
DNS server, but when testing NAT64, IPv4 must be used 
 
Fig. 3. Topology of the test network. 
Table 1.  Linux and VMware Network Settings for Virtual Machines. 
Virtual machine name    
Role IPv6only client  DNS64 server Authoritative DNS server 
 Linux settings  IPv6 static: fd00::1/64  IPv6 static: fd00::2/64 
IPv4 static 10.0.0.2/24 
IPv6 static: fd00::3/64 
IPv4 static: 10.0.0.3/24 
 Linux settings IPv4 DHCP  IPv4 DHCP IPv4 DHCP 
 VMware settings VMnet1  VMnet1 VMnet1 
 VMware settings NAT  NAT NAT 
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between the NAT64 gateway and the IPv4only server. 
Although we used IPv4 between the DNS64 server and the 
authoritative DNS server during our DNS64 vulnerability tests, 
we set also an IPv6 address at the authoritative DNS server to 
be able to reach it directly from the client for testing its 
operability. 
We also note that the  interfaces were not necessary for 
the tests, we used them for providing the virtual machines with 
Internet access, which was sometimes necessary, e.g. for 
installing various packages under Debian Linux. We have 
separated this communication from the testing communication, 
which happened always through the  interfaces of the 
virtual computers. 
 
The purpose of this setup was to check whether the testbed 
works properly. We have installed BIND9 [24] to both the 
 and the  virtual machines. 
 
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them later. 
1. Request for a AAAA record from the client to the 
DNS64 server with Transaction ID 0x7c4a, generated by 
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its Transaction ID is the same as that of the 
corresponding request. 
4. Request for an A record from the DNS64 server to the 
authoritative DNS server with a different Transaction ID, 
0xee9d, generated by BIND. 
5. A valid reply with an A record sent by the authoritative 
DNS server to the DNS64 server, and its Transaction ID 
is the same as that of the corresponding request. 
6. The reply of the DNS64 server to the client containing 
the synthesized  [12] with 
the same Transaction ID as message 1. 
Thus we have found that the testbed worked fine, and it was 
ready for testing. 
V. DNS64 IMPLEMENTATION SELECTION AND SETUP 
We have laid down our implementations selection guidelines 
in [2] as follows: 
“As for the implementations, we only deal with those that are 
free software [25] (also called open source [26]) for multiple 
reasons: 
 The licenses of certain vendors (e.g. [27] and [28]) do 
not allow reverse engineering and sometimes even the 
publication of benchmarking results is prohibited. 
 Free software can be used by anyone for any purposes 
thus our results can be helpful for anyone. 
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several ways, including the usage of: 
1. server computers 
2. desktop or laptop computers 
3. singleboard computers [22] 
4. virtual machines. 
We contend that the consecutive solutions result in less cost 
and higher comfort in use including easy mobility. Our decision 
was also influenced by the fact that we have been successfully 
using virtual Linux boxes (executed under Windows 7) for the 
practical education of DNS64 and NAT64 IPv6 transition 
technologies at the Budapest University of Technology and 
Economics since 2015. 
As the existing virtual machine images were suitable for our 
current testing purposes, it was a convenient solution to reuse 
them. The virtual machine images were prepared by a script 
called , written by Dániel Bakai [23]. (This script 
creates a small, low memory usage, userdefined Debian virtual 
machine disk image, which can be used in various hypervisors 
including VMware and KVM.) They contain Debian 8 
distributions, which were now updated to Debian version 8.9. 
They were executed by VMware Workstation 12 Player. 
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We propose the structure of a simple testbed suitable for the 
security analysis of the DNS64 and the stateful NAT64 IPv6 
transition technologies. Similar testbeds can be built for the 
security analysis of other IPv6 transition technologies. 
The testing of DNS64 or NAT64 requires a network of three 
hosts. As for DNS64, they are: client, DNS64 server and 
authoritative DNS server, where the DNS64 server should be 
interconnected with both the client and the authoritative DNS 
server. As for NAT64, only the roles are different: client, 
NAT64 gateway and IPv4only server; the topology is the 
same. Thus the same network can be used for the testing of the 
different implementations of both IPv6 transition technologies, 
only some software components need to be changed. 
As for the attacker, two further hosts could have been added, 
one for tampering with each connections, but we eli inated 
them with a trick. First of all, we used a single shared medium 
to interconnect the three computers, see Fig. 3, thus only one 
extra device would have been enough. However, as in our 
current tests we used only wiretapping, it could be done at any 
of the three computers, thus no further computer was necessary. 
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We note that the IP version between the client, which is an 
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Table 1.  Linux and VMware Network Settings for Virtual Machines. 
Virtual machine name    
Role IPv6only client  DNS64 server Authoritative DNS server 
 Linux settings  IPv6 static: fd00::1/64  IPv6 static: fd 0:: /6  
IPv4 static 10.0.0.2/24 
IPv6 static: fd00::3/6  
IPv4 static: 10.0.0.3/24 
 Linux settings IPv4 DHCP  IPv4 DHCP IPv4 DHCP 
 VMware settings VMnet1  VMnet1 VMnet1 
 VMware settings NAT  NAT NAT 
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between the NAT64 gateway and the IPv4only server. 
Although we used IPv4 between the DNS64 server and the 
authoritative DNS server during our DNS64 vulnerability tests, 
we set also an IPv6 address at the authoritative DNS server to 
be able to reach it directly from the client for testing its 
operability. 
We also note that the  interfaces were not necessary for 
the tests, we used them for providing the virtual machines with 
Internet access, which was sometimes necessary, e.g. for 
installing various packages under Debian Linux. We have 
separated this communication from the testing communication, 
which happened always through the  interfaces of the 
virtual computers. 
 
The purpose of this setup was to check whether the testbed 
works properly. We have installed BIND9 [24] to both the 
 and the  virtual machines. 
 
The  file was used 
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In this secti n, we demonstrate the correct operation of the 
test system, and also introduce the operation of DNS64 servers, 
which will be important later.  
We tested the operation of the testbed by issuing the 
following command on the  computer: 

The  Linux command was used to request a AAAA 
record for the  domain name from the 
DNS64 server executed by the host named . 
The DNS messages were captured by  on the 
 interface using the  capture filter. The six 
captured packets are shown in Fig. 4. Now we shall identify the 
six messages and observe their Transaction IDs, which are used 
to match the answer with the query. We will experiment with 
them later. 
1. Request for a AAAA record from the client to the 
DNS64 server with Transaction ID 0x7c4a, generated by 
the  command. 
2. Request for a AAAA record from the DNS64 server to 
the authoritative DNS server with a different Transaction 
ID, 0xcad0, generated by BIND. 
3. An “empty” reply for the AAAA record request sent by 
the authoritative DNS server to the DNS64 server, and 
its Transaction ID is the same as that of the 
corresponding request. 
4. Request for an A record from the DNS64 server to the 
authoritative DNS server with a different Transaction ID, 
0xee9d, generated by BIND. 
5. A valid reply with an A record sent by the authoritative 
DNS server to the DNS64 server, and its Transaction ID 
is the same as that of the corresponding request. 
6. The reply of the DNS64 server to the client containing 
the synthesized  [12] with 
the same Transaction ID as message 1. 
Thus we have found that the testbed worked fine, and it was 
ready for testing. 
V. DNS64 IMPLEMENTATION SELECTION AND SETUP 
We have laid down our implementations selection guidelines 
in [2] as follows: 
“As for the implementations, we only deal with those that are 
free software [25] (also called open source [26]) for multiple 
reasons: 
 The licenses of certain vendors (e.g. [27] and [28]) do 
not allow reverse engineering and sometimes even the 
publication of benchmarking results is prohibited. 
 Free software can be used by anyone for any purposes 
thus our results can be helpful for anyone. 
 Free software is available free of charge for us, too. 
Within the category of the free software implementations, we 
 
Fig. 4. Wireshark capture taken during the functional checking of the DNS64 testbed. 
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between the NAT64 gateway and the IPv4only server. 
Although we used IPv4 between the DNS64 server and the 
authoritative DNS server during our DNS64 vulnerability tests, 
we set also an IPv6 address at the authoritative DNS server to 
be able to reach it directly from the client for testing its 
operability. 
We also note that the  interfaces were not necessary for 
the tests, we used them for providing the virtual machines with 
Internet access, which was sometimes necessary, e.g. for 
installing various packages under Debian Linux. We have 
separated this communication from the testing communication, 
which happened always through the  interfaces of the 
virtual computers. 
 
The purpose of this setup was to check whether the testbed 
works properly. We have installed BIND9 [24] to both the 
 and the  virtual machines. 
 
The  file was used 
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In this section, we demonstrate the correct operation of the 
test system, and also introduce the operation of DNS64 servers, 
which will be important later.  
We tested the operation of the testbed by issuing the 
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The  Linux command was used to request a AAAA 
record for the  domain name from the 
DNS64 server executed by the host named . 
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captured packets are shown in Fig. 4. Now we shall identify the 
six essages and observe their Transaction IDs, which are used 
to atch the answer with the query. We will experiment with 
them later. 
1. Request for a AAAA record from the client to the 
DNS64 server with Transaction ID 0x7c4a, generated by 
the  command. 
2. Request for a AAAA record from the DNS64 server to 
the authoritative DNS server with a different Transaction 
ID, 0xcad0, generated by BIND. 
3. An “empty” reply for the AAAA record request sent by 
the authoritative DNS server to the DNS64 server, and 
its Transaction ID is the same as that of the 
corresponding request. 
4. Request for an A record from the DNS64 server to the 
authoritative DNS server with a different Transaction ID, 
0xee9d, generated by BIND. 
5. A valid reply with an A record sent by the authoritative 
DNS server to the DNS64 server, and its Transaction ID 
is the same as that of the corresponding request. 
6. The reply of the DNS64 server to the client containing 
the synthesized  [12] with 
the same Transaction ID as message 1. 
Thus we have found that the testbed worked fine, and it was 
ready for testing. 
V. DNS64 IMPLEMENTATION SELECTION AND SETUP 
We have laid down our implementations selection guidelines 
in [2] as follows: 
“As for the implementations, we only deal with those that are 
free software [25] (also called open source [26]) for multiple 
reasons: 
 The licenses of certain vendors (e.g. [27] and [28]) do 
not allow reverse engineering and sometimes even the 
publication of benchmarking results is prohibited. 
 Free software can be used by anyone for any purposes 
thus our results can be helpful for anyone. 
 Free software is available free of charge for us, too. 
Within the category of the free software implementations, we 
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several ways, including the usage of: 
1. server computers 
2. desktop or laptop computers 
3. singleboard computers [22] 
4. virtual machines. 
We contend that the consecutive solutions result in less cost 
and higher comfort in use including easy mobility. Our decision 
was also influe ced by the fact that we have been successfully 
using virtual Linux boxes (executed under Windows 7) for the 
practical education of DNS64 and NAT64 IPv6 transition 
technologies at the Budapest University of Technology and 
Economics since 2015. 
As the existing virtual machine images were s itable for our 
current testing purposes, it was a convenient solution to reuse 
them. The virtual machine images were prepared by a ri t 
called , written by Dániel Bakai [23]. (This script 
creates a small, low memory usage, userdefined Debian irtual 
machine disk im g , which can be used in various hypervisors 
including VMware and KVM.) They contain Debian 8 
distributions, which were now updated to Debian version 8.9. 
They were executed by VMware Workstation 12 Player. 
 
We propose the structure of a simple testbed suitable for the 
security analysis f the DNS64 and the stateful NAT64 IPv6 
transition technologies. Similar testbeds ca  be built for the 
security analysis of other IPv6 transition technologies. 
The testing of DNS64 or NAT64 requires a network of three 
hosts. As for DNS64, they are: client, DNS64 server and 
authoritative DNS server, where the DNS64 server should be 
interconnected with both the client and the authoritative DNS 
server. As for NAT64, only the roles are different: client, 
NAT64 gateway and IPv4only server; the topology is t e 
same. Thus the same netw rk can be used for the testing of the 
different implementations of both IPv6 transition technologies, 
only s me software components need to be changed. 
As for the attacker, two further hosts could have been adde , 
one for tampering with each connections, but we eli inated 
them with a trick. First of all, we used a single shared medium 
to interconnect the t ree computers, see Fig. 3, thus only ne 
extra device would have been enough. However, as in our 
current tests we used only wiretapping, it could be done at any 
of the three computers, thus no further computer was necessary. 
 
We have i plemented the test network shown in Fig. 3 by 
three virtual machi es, each of which had a single CPU core, 
128MB of RAM, and (theoretically) 40GB of hard disks, but 
the starting size of the images were under 1GB. (They were 
growing during the experiments, but remai ed nder 3GB.) 
Table 1 shows the Linux and WMware settings used for the 
virtual machines. 
We note that the IP version between the client, which is an 
IPv6only client, and the DNS64 server must be 6. There is no 
restriction for the IP version between the DNS64 server and the 
DNS server, but when testing NAT64, IPv4 must be used 
 
Fig. 3. Topology of the test network. 
Table 1.  Linux and VMware Network Settings for Virtual Machines. 
Virtual machine name    
Role IPv6only client  DNS64 server Authori ative DNS server 
 Linux settings  IPv6 static: fd00::1/64  IPv6 static: fd00::2/64 
IPv4 static 10.0.0.2/24 
IPv6 static: fd00::3/64 
IPv4 static: 10.0.0.3/24 
 Linux s ttings IPv4 DHCP  IPv4 DHCP IPv4 DHCP 
 are se tings VMnet1  VMnet1 VMnet1 
 VMware settings NAT  NAT NAT 
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between the NAT64 gateway and the IPv4only server. 
Although we used IPv4 between the DNS64 server and the 
auth ritativ  DNS ser er during our DNS64 vulnerability tests, 
we set lso an IPv6 address at the authoritative DNS serv r to 
b able to reach it ir ctly from t e client for testing its 
operability. 
We also note that the  interfaces were not necessary for 
the t sts, we used them for providing the vi tual ma hines with 
Internet acce s, which was sometimes necess ry, .g. for 
installing various package  under D bia  Linux. We have 
sep rated this communication from th  testing communication, 
which happened always through the  interfaces of the 
virtual computers. 
 
The purpose of this setup was to check whether the testbed 
works properly. We have installed BIND9 [24] o both the 
 and the  virtual machines. 
 
The  file was used 
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 
In this section, we demonstrate the correct operation of the 
test system, and also introduce th  operation of DNS64 servers, 
which will be important later.  
We tested the operation of the testbed by issuing the 
following command on the  computer: 

The  Linux command was used to request a AAAA 
record for the  domain name from the 
DNS64 serv r executed by the host named . 
The DNS messag s were captured by  on the 
 interface using the  capture filter. The six 
captured packets are shown in Fig. 4. Now we shall identify the 
six m ssages and ob erve their Transaction ID , wh ch are used 
to atch the answer with the query. We will experiment with 
them later. 
1. Request for a AAAA record from the client to the 
DNS64 server with Transaction ID 0x7c4a, g erated by 
the  command. 
2. R quest for a AAAA record from the DNS64 server to 
the authoritative DNS server with a different Transaction 
ID, 0xcad0, generated by BIND.
3. An “empty” reply for the AAAA record request sent by 
the authoritative DNS server to the DNS64 serv r, and 
its Transac on ID is the same as that of the 
corresponding request. 
4. Request for an A record from the DNS64 server to the 
authoritative DNS server with a different Transaction ID, 
0xee9d, generated by BIND. 
5. A valid r ply with an A record sent by the authoritative 
DNS se ver to the DNS64 se ver, and its Transaction ID 
is the same as at of the cor esponding reque t. 
6. The reply of t e DNS64 se ver to the client containing 
t  synthesized  [12] with 
the same Transaction ID as message 1. 
Thus we have found hat the testbed worked fine, and it was 
ready for testing. 
V. DNS64 IMPLEMENTATION SELECTION AND SETUP 
We have laid down our implementations selection guidelines 
in [2] as follows: 
“As for the implementations, we only deal with those that are 
free oftware [25] (also called open source [26]) for multiple 
r asons: 
 The licenses of certain vendors (e.g. [27] and [28]) do 
not allow reverse engineering and sometimes even the 
publication of b nchmarking result  is prohibit d. 
 Free software can be used by anyone for any purposes 
thus our results can be h lpful for a yone. 
 Free software is vailable free f charge for us, too. 
Within the category of the fr e software implementa i ns, we 
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between the NAT64 gateway and the IPv4only server. 
Although we used IPv4 between the DNS64 server and the 
authoritative DNS server during our DNS64 vulnerability tests, 
we set also an IPv6 address at the authoritative DNS server to 
be able to reach it directly from the client for testing its 
operability. 
e also note that the  interfaces were not necessary for 
the tests, we used them for providing the virtual machines with 
Internet access, which was sometimes necessary, e.g. for 
installing various packages under Debian Linux. e have 
separated this communication from the testing communication, 
which happened always through the  interfaces of the 
virtual computers. 
 
The purpose of this setup was to check whether the testbed 
works properly. e have installed BIND9 [24] to both the 
 and the  virtual machines. 
 
The  file was used 
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In this section, we demonstrate the correct operation of the 
test system, and also introduce the operation of DNS64 servers, 
which will be important later.  
e tested the operation of the testbed by issuing the 
following command on the  computer: 

The  Linux command was used to request a AAAA 
record for the  domain name from the 
DNS64 server executed by the host named . 
The DNS messages were captured by  on the 
 interface using the  capture filter. The six 
captured packets are shown in Fig. 4. Now we shall identify the 
six messages and observe their Transaction IDs, which are used 
to match the answer with the query. e will experiment with 
them later. 
1. Request for a AAAA record from the client to the 
DNS64 server with Transaction ID 0x7c4a, generated by 
the  command. 
2. Request for a AAAA record from the DNS64 server to 
the authoritative DNS server with a different Transaction 
ID, 0xcad0, generated by BIND. 
3. An “empty” reply for the AAAA record request sent by 
the authoritative DNS server to the DNS64 server, and 
its Transaction ID is the same as that of the 
corresponding request. 
4. Request for an A record from the DNS64 server to the 
authoritative DNS server with a different Transaction ID, 
0xee9d, generated by BIND. 
5. A valid reply with an A record sent by the authoritative 
DNS server to the DNS64 server, and its Transaction ID 
is the same as that of the corresponding request. 
6. The reply of the DNS64 server to the client containing 
the synthesized  [12] with 
the same Transaction ID as message 1. 
Thus we have found that the testbed worked fine, and it was 
ready for testing. 
V. DNS64 IMPLEMENTATION SELECTION AND SETUP 
e have laid down our implementations selection guidelines 
in [2] as follows: 
“As for the implementations, we only deal with those that are 
free software [25] (also called open source [26]) for multiple 
reasons: 
 The licenses of certain vendors (e.g. [27] and [28]) do 
not allow reverse engineering and sometimes even the 
publication of benchmarking results is prohibited. 
 Free software can be used by anyone for any purposes 
thus our results can be helpful for anyone. 
 Free software is available free of charge for us, too. 
ithin the category of the free software implementations, we 
 
Fig. 4. Wireshark capture taken during the functional checking of the DNS64 testbed. 
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bet een the T64 gate ay and the IPv4only server. 
lthough e used IPv4 b t een the S64 server and the
au ritative S server during our S64 vuln ability tests,
e set also an IPv6 address at the authoritative S serv r to
b  able t reach it di ctly fro  e client for testing its
operabili y. 
e also note that the  interfaces ere not necessary for 
the t sts, e used the for providing the vi tual achines ith
Internet acce s, hich as so eti s necessary, e.g. for
i stalling various pa kages under ebia  Linux. e have
sep rated this co unication fro the testing co unication,
hich happened al ays through the  interfaces of the 
virtual co puters. 
  
The purpose of this setup as to check hether the testbed 
orks ro erly. e have installed BI 9 [24] to both the
 and the  virtual achines. 
  
The   file as used 





The   file as used to 























In this section, e de onstrate the correct operation of the 
test syste , and also introduce th op ration of S64 servers,
hich ill be i portant later.  
e tested the operation of the testbed by issuing the 
follo ing co and on the  co puter: 

The  Linux co and as used to request a  
record for the  o ain na e fro  the 
S64 serv r executed by the host na ed . 
The S essages ere captured by  on the 
 interface using the  capture filter. The six 
captured packets are sho n in Fig. 4. o  e shal  identify the
six essages and observe their Transaction I , h ch are used
to atch the s er ith the query. e ill experi ent ith
he  later. 
1. Request for a  record fro  the client to the 
S64 server ith Transa tion I  0x7c4a, generated by
the  co and. 
2. R quest for a  record fro  the S64 server to 
the authoritative S s rver ith a different Transaction
I , 0xcad0, generated by BI . 
3. n “e pty” r ply for the  record request sent by 
the authoritative S s rver to th  S64 server, and
its Transact on I  is the sa e as that of the
corresponding request. 
4. Request for an  r cord fro  the S64 server to the 
authori ative S server ith a different Transaction I ,
0xee9d, generated by BI . 
5.  valid reply ith an  record sent by the authoritative 
S server to the S64 se ver, and its Tr nsact on I
is the sa e as at of the cor esponding reque t. 
6. The reply of the S64 server to the client containing 
the synthesized   [12] ith
a e Transaction I  as essage 1. 
Thus e have found that the testb d orked fine, and it as 
ready for testing. 
. S64 I PLE ENTATION SELECTION AND SETUP 
e have laid do n our i ple entations selection guidelines 
in [2] as fol o s: 
“ s for the i ple entations, e only deal ith those that are 
free so t ar [25] (also called open source [26]) f r ul ipl
reasons: 
 The licenses of certain vendors (e.g. [27] and [28]) do 
not allo  reverse engine ring and so eti es even the
publication of bench arking results is prohibited. 
 Free soft are ca  be used by anyone for any purposes 
thus our results can be h lpful for a yone. 
 Free soft are is vailable free of charge for us, too. 
ithin the category of the free soft are i ple entations, e 
 
Fig. 4. ireshark capture taken during the functional checking of the DNS64 testbed. 
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be een th  T64 gat ay and the IPv4only server. 
l ough e used IPv4 bet een the S64 s ver and the
authoritative S serve  during our S64 vulnerability tests,
e set als  an IPv6 add ess at the authoritative S erver to 
be able to reach it directly fro  the client for testing its 
operability. 
e also note that the  interfaces ere not necessary for 
the tests, e used the  for providing th  virtual achines ith 
I ternet access, hi h as so eti es necessary, e.g. for
insta ling various packages under ebian Linux. e have
separated this co unication fro  the testing co unication, 
hich happen d al ays through the  interfaces of the 
virtual co puters. 
  
The ur ose of this setup as to check hether the testbed
orks properly. e have insta led BI 9 [24] to both the 
 and the   virtual achines. 
  
The  file as used 





The  file as used to 





The content of the  file as: 
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
     














In this section, e de onstrate th  co rect operation of the
test syste , and also introduce the operation of S64 servers, 
hich i l be i portant later.  
e tested the operation of the testbed by issuing the 
fo lo ing co and on the  co puter: 

The  Linux co and as use  to request a  
record for the  do ain na e fro  the 
S64 server xecuted by the host na ed . 
The S essages ere captured by  on the 
 interface u ing the  capture filter. The six 
captured packets are sho n in Fig. 4. o  e sha l identify the
six essages d observe their Transaction I s, hich are used
o atch the ans er ith the query. e i l experi ent ith 
the  lat r. 
1. Request for a  re ord fro  the client to the
S64 server ith Transaction I  0x7c4a, generated by 
the  co and. 
2. R quest for a r cord fro  the S64 server to
the authoritative S server ith a di ferent Transaction 
I , 0xcad0, g nerated by BI . 
3. n “e pty” reply for th   r cord request sent by
the authoritative S server to the S64 server, and
its Transaction I  is the sa e as that of the 
corresponding requ st. 
4. Request for an  r cord fro  the S64 server to the
authoritative S server ith a di ferent Transaction I , 
0xee9 , generated by BI . 
5.  valid reply ith an  record sent by the uthor tative
S serv r to the S64 server, and its Transaction I  
is the sa e as that of the co responding request. 
6. The reply of the S64 server to the client containing
ynthesized   [12] ith 
the sa e Transaction I as ssage 1. 
Thus e have found that the testbed orked fine, and it as 
ready for testing. 
. S64 I PLE ENTATION SELECTION AND SETUP 
e have aid do n our i ple entations selection guidelines 
in [2] as fo lo s: 
“ s or th  i ple entations, e only deal ith th se tha  ar  
free soft are [25] (also ca led open source [26]) for ultiple 
reasons: 
 The licenses of certain v ndors (e.g. [27] and [28]) do
not a lo  reverse engineering and so eti es even the 
publication of be ch arking results is prohibited. 
 Free soft are can be used by anyone for any purposes 
thus our results can be h lpful for anyone. 
 Free soft are is availabl  free of charge for us, too. 
ithin the category of the free soft are i ple entations, e 
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give further priority to those, which are used widespread and/or 
are known to be stable and high performance (if such 
information is available).” [2] 
Although several DNS implementations exist, only very few 
of them can do DNS64, thus finding such DNS64 
implementations was not an easy task. We selected the 
following DNS64 implementations for testing: 
1. BIND 9.9.59+deb8u12Debian [24] 
2. TOTD 1.5.2 (referred later as OLDTOTD) [29] 
3. TOTD 1.5.3 (referred later as NEWTOTD) [30] 
4. mtd64ng 1.1.0 [31] 
5. PowerDNS Recursor 3.6.2 [32] 
6. Unbound 1.6.0 [33] 
Remarks: 
 Including BIND9 was a must as it is the de facto industry 
standard DNS server, therefore, it is very likely wide
spread used for DNS64 purposes, too. 
 Some years before we have prepared a patch for TOTD, 
which resolved some security issues [30], and now we 
tested its both patched and unpatched versions.  
 We also have a new tiny DNS64 proxy called mtd64ng 
[31], which is currently developed in an ongoing 
university project. Although it is not yet ready for 
deployment, we have also included it. 
We have already introduced the DNS64 configuration of 
BIND in section IV.D.1. 
The configuration of both versions of TOTD was done in the 




The configuration of the mtd64ng DNS proxy was done in 





The DNS64 configuration of PowerDNS was a bit more 
complex. 
In the  file, we made 












As for Unbound, its 1.4.22 version distributed in Debian 8.9 
did not contain the DNS64 module, which was included from 
its next version, namely 1.5.0. Therefore we upgraded the 
 host to Debian 9.3 after the execution of all the 
experiments with the other DNS64 implementations.  
As for its configuration, we have added the following lines 









VI. TRANSACTION ID PREDICTION VULNERABILITY 
TESTING 
 
We extended the configuration of our testbed to be able to 
examine the Transaction IDs of a high number of messages 
even if the examined DNS64 implementations use caching. 
 
To be able to perform a high number of tests, we needed a 
name space which can be generated systematically. We have 
found that the name space used in our earlier DNS64 tests [34] 
would be appropriate. It was the following name space: 
10abc.dns64perf.test, where a, b, c are integers from the 
[0, 255] interval. 
We have used only the 100{0..255}{0..225} part of it. For 
generating the zone file, we used the modified version of the 
zone file generator script called , which is 
shipped together with the  program (documented 
in [34] and available from [35]). 
The  file of the 





Thus, BIND used our newly generated zone file after its 
being restarted. 
 
The measurements were performed by the  [34] 
program, which used sequential Transaction IDs from 0 to 
65535. The command line of the test program was: 

The first argument specified the “a” parameter described 
above, the second argument meant that the test program needed 
to use only one thread, the third one specified the timeout of 1 
second, and the last one was the host name of the DNS64 server 
to be tested. 
The traffic was captured by the  program executed 
by the  host, the memory size of which was raised to 
256MB, because 128MB was not enough and the  
program exited during the measurement. All the packets from 
the  interface that matched the   capture filter 
were saved to a file. The following command line was used: 

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where the  string was replaced by the name of the tested 
DNS64 implementation. 
 
Predictability of the Transaction IDs is a hard question. E.g. 
if pseudorandom numbers are used that were generated by a 
linear congruential generator (LCG), then they are predictable. 
There are a high number of methods described for testing 
randomness both in university lecture notes [36] and research 
papers [37]. 
Since our solution of using a testbed ensures us full control 
of the testing method, and gives us access to the raw results, we 
have the possibility to use multiple methods for evaluation if 
needed. We decided to use first a simple, graphical method, 
which is somewhat similar to that of the earlier mentioned 
entropy tester of DNSOARC [19], but we contend that our 
method is more thorough than that. 
We have checked two kinds of correlations using 
visualization. Before introducing them, let us define some 
notations first. Let  denote the ordinal number of a message in 
the message sequence introduced in section IV.E, where  is in 
[1, 6]. Let  denote the ordinal number of the AAAA record 
request sent by the  program, where  is in [0, 
65535]. Let  denote the Transaction ID of the th message 
from the six messages used to resolve the th query of the 
 program. As the test program uses sequential 
Transaction IDs from 0, it is sure that:  =  = . 
We use two graphs. An (x, y) plot of the (, ) pairs may 
reveal correlation between the Transaction ID used by the 
 program and the first Transaction ID generated 
by the DNS64 program. An (x, y) plot of the (, ) pairs may 
 
Fig. 5. BIND, Transaction ID input correlation (left) and autocorrelation (right) 
 
 
Fig. 6. OLDTOTD, Transaction ID input correlation (left) and autocorrelation (right) 
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give further priority to those, which are used widespread and/or 
are known to be stable and high performance (if such 
information is available).” [2] 
Although several DNS implementations exist, only very few 
of them can do DNS64, thus finding such DNS64 
implementations was not an easy task. We selected the 
following DNS64 implementations for testing: 
1. BIND 9.9.59+deb8u12Debian [24] 
2. TOTD 1.5.2 (referred later as OLDTOTD) [29] 
3. TOTD 1.5.3 (referred later as NEWTOTD) [30] 
4. mtd64ng 1.1.0 [31] 
5. PowerDNS Recursor 3.6.2 [32] 
6. Unbound 1.6.0 [33] 
Remarks: 
 Including BIND9 was a must as it is the de facto industry 
standard DNS server, therefore, it is very likely wide
spread used for DNS64 purposes, too. 
 Some years before we have prepared a patch for TOTD, 
which resolved some security issues [30], and now we 
tested its both patched and unpatched versions.  
 We also have a new tiny DNS64 proxy called mtd64ng 
[31], which is currently developed in an ongoing 
university project. Although it is not yet ready for 
deployment, we have also included it. 
We have already introduced the DNS64 configuration of 
BIND in section IV.D.1. 
The configuration of both versions of TOTD was done in the 




The configuration of the mtd64ng DNS proxy was done in 
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In the  file, we made 












As for Unbound, its 1.4.22 version distributed in Debian 8.9 
did not contain the DNS64 module, which was included from 
its next version, namely 1.5.0. Therefore we upgraded the 
 host to Debian 9.3 after the execution of all the 
experiments with the other DNS64 implementations.  
As for its configuration, we have added the following lines 
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To be able to perform a high number of tests, we needed a 
name space which can be generated systematically. We have 
found that the name space used in our earlier DNS64 tests [34] 
would be appropriate. It was the following name space: 
10abc.dns64perf.test, where a, b, c are integers from the 
[0, 255] interval. 
We have used only the 100{0..255}{0..225} part of it. For 
generating the zone file, we used the modified version of the 
zone file generator script called , which is 
shipped together with the  program (documented 
in [34] and available from [35]). 
The  file of the 





Thus, BIND used our newly generated zone file after its 
being restarted. 
 
The measurements were performed by the  [34] 
program, which used sequential Transaction IDs from 0 to 
65535. The command line of the test program was: 

The first argument specified the “a” parameter described 
above, the second argument meant that the test program needed 
to use only one thread, the third one specified the timeout of 1 
second, and the last one was the host name of the DNS64 server 
to be tested. 
The traffic was captured by the  program executed 
by the  host, the memory size of which was raised to 
256MB, because 128MB was not enough and the  
program exited during the measurement. All the packets from 
the  interface that matched the   capture filter 
were saved to a file. The following command line was used: 

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give further priority to those, which are used widespread and/or 
are known to be stable and high performance (if such 
information is available).” [2] 
Although several DNS implementations exist, only very few 
of them can do DNS64, thus finding such DNS64 
implementations was not an easy task. We selected the 
following DNS64 implementations for testing: 
1. BIND 9.9.59+deb8u12Debian [24] 
2. TOTD 1.5.2 (referred later as OLDTOTD) [29] 
3. TOTD 1.5.3 (referred later as NEWTOTD) [30] 
4. mtd64ng 1.1.0 [31] 
5. PowerDNS Recursor 3.6.2 [32] 
6. Unbound 1.6.0 [33] 
Remarks: 
 Including BIND9 was a must as it is the de facto industry 
standard DNS server, therefore, it is very likely wide
spread used for DNS64 purposes, too. 
 Some years before we have prepared a patch for TOTD, 
which resolved some security issues [30], and now we 
tested its both patched and unpatched versions.  
 We also have a new tiny DNS64 proxy called mtd64ng 
[31], which is currently developed in an ongoing 
university project. Although it is not yet ready for 
deployment, we have also included it. 
We have already introduced the DNS64 configuration of 
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where the  string was replaced by the name of the tested 
DNS64 implementation. 
 
Predictability of the Transaction IDs is a hard question. E.g. 
if pseudorandom numbers are used that were generated by a 
linear congruential generator (LCG), then they are predictable. 
There are a high number of methods described for testing 
randomness both in university lecture notes [36] and research 
papers [37]. 
Since our solution of using a testbed ensures us full control 
of the testing method, and gives us access to the raw results, we 
have the possibility to use multiple methods for evaluation if 
needed. We decided to use first a simple, graphical method, 
which is somewhat similar to that of the earlier mentioned 
entropy tester of DNSOARC [19], but we contend that our 
method is more thorough than that. 
We have checked two kinds of correlations using 
visualization. Before introducing them, let us define some 
notations first. Let  denote the ordinal number of a message in 
the message sequence introduced in section IV.E, where  is in 
[1, 6]. Let  denote the ordinal number of the AAAA record 
request sent by the  program, where  is in [0, 
65535]. Let  denote the Transaction ID of the th message 
from the six messages used to resolve the th query of the 
 program. As the test program uses sequential 
Transaction IDs from 0, it is sure that:  =  = . 
We use two graphs. An (x, y) plot of the (, ) pairs may 
reveal correlation between the Transaction ID used by the 
 program and the first Transaction ID generated 
by the DNS64 program. An (x, y) plot of the (, ) pairs may 
 
Fig. 5. BIND, Transaction ID input correlation (left) and autocorrelation (right) 
 
 
Fig. 6. OLDTOTD, Transaction ID input correlation (left) and autocorrelation (right) 
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z e file e erat r scri t calle  , ic  is 
s i e  t et er it  t e  r ra  ( c e te  
i  [ ] a  a aila le fr  [ ]). 
e  file f t e 
a t ritati e  ser er as ifie  as f ll s: 
s, I  se  r e l  e erate  z e file after its 
ei  restarte . 
          
e eas re e ts ere erf r e   t e  [ ] 
r ra , ic  se  se e tial ra sacti  I s fr   t  
. e c a  li e f t e test r ra  as: 
e first ar e t s ecifie  t e “a” ara eter escri e  
a e, t e sec  ar e t ea t t at t e test r ra  ee e  
t  se l  e t rea , t e t ir  e s ecifie  t e ti e t f  
sec , a  t e last e as t e st a e f t e  ser er 
t  e teste . 
e traffic as ca t re   t e  r ra  e ec te  
 t e  st, t e e r  size f ic  as raise  t  
, eca se  as t e  a  t e  
r ra  e ite  ri  t e eas re e t. ll t e ac ets fr  
t e  i terface t at atc e  t e  ca t re filter 
ere sa e  t  a file. e f ll i  c a  li e as se : 
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give further priority to those, which are used widespread and/or 
are known to be stable and igh performance (if such 
informatio  is available).” [2] 
Although several DNS implementations exist, only very few 
of them can do DNS64, thus fi ding such DNS64 
implementations was not an easy task. We selected the 
following DNS64 implementations for testing: 
1. BIND 9.9.59+d b8u12Debian [24] 
2. TOT  1.5.2 (ref rred later as OLDTOTD) [29] 
3.  . .3    NEWT T ) [30] 
4. mtd64ng 1.1.0 [31] 
5 PowerDNS Recursor 3.6.2 [32] 
6. Unbound 1.6.0 [33] 
Remarks: 
 Including BIND9 was a must as it is the de facto industry 
standard DNS server, therefore, it is very likely wide
pread used for DNS64 purp s s, oo. 
 Some years before we have prepared a patch for TOTD, 
which r solved some security issues [30], and now we 
tested its both patched and unpatch d versio s.  
 We also have a new tiny DNS64 proxy called mtd64ng 
[31], which is currently developed in an ongoi
university project. Although it is not yet ready for 
deployment, we have als  included it. 
We have alr ady introduced the DNS64 configuration of 
BIND in section IV.D.1. 
The configuration of both versions of TOTD was done in the 




The configuration of the mtd64ng DNS proxy was done in 





The DNS64 configuration of PowerDNS was a bit more 
complex. 
In the  file, we made 





The content of the  file 
was: 





As for Unbound, its 1.4.22 version distributed in Debian 8.9 
did not contain the DNS64 module, which was included from 
its ext version, namely 1.5.0. Therefore we upgraded the 
 host to ebian 9.3 after the execution of all the 
experiments with the other DNS64 implementations.  
As for its configuration, we have added the f llowing lines 









VI. TRANSACTION ID PREDICTION VULNERABILITY 
TESTING 
 
We extended the configuration of our testbed to be able to 
examine the Transa tion IDs of a high number f messages 
even if the exami ed DNS64 implementations use caching. 
 
To be able to perform a high number of tests, we needed a 
name space which can be generated systematically. We have 
found th t the name space us d in our earlier DNS64 tests [34] 
would be appropriate. It was the following name space: 
10abc.dns64perf.test, where a, b, c are integers from the 
[0, 255] interval. 
We have used only the 100{0..255}{0..225} part of it. For 
generating the zone file, we used the modified version of the 
zone file generator script called , which is 
shipped together with the  program (documented 
in [34] and available from [35]). 
The  file of the 





Thus, BIND used our newly generated zone file after its 
being restarted. 
 
The measurements were performed by the  [34] 
progra , which used sequential Transaction IDs from 0 to 
65535. The comman  line of the test program was: 

The first argument specified the “a” parameter described 
above, the second argument m ant that the test program need  
to us  only one thread, the third one specifi d the timeout of 1 
second, and th  last one was the h st name of the DNS64 server 
to be teste . 
The traffic was captured by the  program executed 
by the  host, the memory size of which was raised to 
256MB, because 128MB was not enough and the  
program exited during the measurement. All the packets from 
the  interface that matched the   capture filter 
were saved to a file. The following command line was used: 

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give further priority to those, which are used widespread and/or 
are known to be stable and high performance (if such 
information is available).” [2] 
Although several DNS implementations exist, only very few 
of them can do DNS64, thus finding such DNS64 
implementations was not an easy task. e selected the 
following DNS64 implementations for testing: 
1. BIND 9.9.59+deb8u12Debian [24] 
2. TOTD 1.5.2 (referred later as OLDTOTD) [29] 
3. TOTD 1.5.3 (referred later as NE TOTD) [30] 
4. mtd64ng 1.1.0 [31] 
5. PowerDNS Recursor 3.6.2 [32] 
6. Unbound 1.6.0 [33] 
Remarks: 
 Including BIND9 was a must as it is the de facto industry 
standard DNS server, therefore, it is very likely wide
spread used for DNS64 purposes, too. 
 Some years before we have prepared a patch for TOTD, 
which resolved some security issues [30], and now we 
tested its both patched and unpatched versions.  
 e also have a new tiny DNS64 proxy called mtd64ng 
[31], which is currently developed in an ongoing 
university project. Although it is not yet ready for 
deployment, we have also included it. 
e have already introduced the DNS64 configuration of 
BIND in section IV.D.1. 
The configuration of both versions of TOTD was done in the 




The configuration of the mtd64ng DNS proxy was done in 





The DNS64 configuration of PowerDNS was a bit more 
complex. 
In the  file, we made 





The content of the  file 
was: 





As for Unbound, its 1.4.22 version distributed in Debian 8.9 
did not contain the DNS64 module, which was included from 
its next version, namely 1.5.0. Therefore we upgraded the 
 host to Debian 9.3 after the execution of all the 
experiments with the other DNS64 implementations.  
As for its configuration, we have added the following lines 









VI. TRANSACTION ID PREDICTION VULNERABILITY 
TESTING 
 
e extended the configuration of our testbed to be able to 
examine the Transaction IDs of a high number of messages 
even if the examined DNS64 implementations use caching. 
 
To be able to perform a high number of tests, we needed a 
name space which can be generated systematically. e have 
found that the name space used in our earlier DNS64 tests [34] 
would be appropriate. It was the following name space: 
10abc.dns64perf.test, where a, b, c are integers from the 
[0, 255] interval. 
e have used only the 100{0..255}{0..225} part of it. For 
generating the zone file, we used the modified version of the 
zone file generator script called , which is 
shipped together with the  program (documented 
in [34] and available from [35]). 
The  file of the 





Thus, BIND used our newly generated zone file after its 
being restarted. 
 
The measurements were performed by the  [34] 
program, which used sequential Transaction IDs from 0 to 
65535. The command line of the test program was: 

The first argument specified the “a” parameter described 
above, the second argument meant that the test program needed 
to use only one thread, the third one specified the timeout of 1 
second, and the last one was the host name of the DNS64 server 
to be tested. 
The traffic was captured by the  program executed 
by the  host, the memory size of which was raised to 
256MB, because 128MB was not enough and the  
program exited during the measurement. All the packets from 
the  interface that matched the   capture filter 
were saved to a file. The following command line was used: 

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where the  string was replaced by the name of the tested 
DNS64 implementation. 
 
Pr dictability of the T ansaction IDs is a hard qu stion. E.g.
if pseudorandom numbers are used t at were gene ated by a
lin ar congruential generator (LCG), then they are predictable.
There ar  a high n mb  of methods d cribed for testing
randomness both in university lecture notes [36] and research 
papers [37]. 
Sinc  our soluti n of using a testbed ensures us full control
of the testing method, and gives us access to the raw results, we
have the possibility to use multiple methods for evaluation if
needed. We d cided to use firs   simple, graphical method,
which is somewhat similar to that of the earlier mentioned
entropy tester of DNSOARC [19], but we contend that our 
method is more thorough han that. 
We have checked two kinds of correlations using
visualization. B fore introducing them, let us define some
notations first. Let  denote the ordinal number of a m ssage
the message sequence introduced in secti n IV.E, where  is in
[1, 6]. Let  denot the ordinal number of the AAAA record
request sent by the  program, w ere  is in [0,
65535]. Let  denot  the Transaction ID of the th messag
from the six messages used to r olve the th query of he
 program. As the test program uses sequential 
Transaction IDs from 0, it is sure that:  =  = . 
We use two graphs. A  (x, y) plot of the (, ) pairs may
reveal correlation betwee  the Trans ction ID used by he
 r r  and the first Transaction ID generated
by the DNS64 program. An (x, y) plot of the (, ) pairs may 
 
Fig. 5. BIND, Transaction ID input correlation (left) and autocorrelation (right) 
 
 
Fig. 6. OLDTOTD, Transaction ID input correlation (left) and autocorrelation (right) 
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reveal correlation between the consecutive Transaction IDs 
generated by the DNS64 program. For simplicity, we will refer 
to the first one as  , and the second one as 
. 
We used  scripts to extract the appropriate Transaction 
IDs from the text file output of the  program, and the 
graphs were prepared by .  
 
Fig. 5 shows the input correlation and the autocorrelation of 
the Transaction IDs of BIND. They seem to be like noise, thus 
we can say that no predictability problems were revealed by our 
simple evaluation method. 
The left graph of Fig. 6 shows the input correlation of the 
Transaction IDs of OLDTOTD. The regular patterns indicate 
that there is a problem with the predictability of the Transaction 
IDs. Before giving the explanation, let us have a look at the 
autocorrelation of the Transaction IDs of OLDTOTD on the 
right side of Fig. 6. Now, the predictability is even more 
deliberate. Let us look into the CSV file containing the (, ) 






Whereas the  Transaction IDs start from 0 and increase by 
1, the  Transaction IDs start from a different number and 
increase by 512. The CSV file containing the (, ) pairs for 




Fig. 7. NEWTOTD, Transaction ID input correlation (left) and autocorrelation (right) 
 
 
Fig. 8. mtd64ng, Transaction ID initial correlation (left) and autocorrelation (right) 
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give further priority to those, which are used widespread and/or 
are known to be stable and high performance (if such 
information is available).” [2] 
Although several DNS implementations exist, only very few 
of them can do DNS64, thus finding such DNS64 
implementations was not an easy task. We selected the 
following DNS64 implementations for testing: 
1. BIND 9.9.59+deb8u12Debian [24] 
2. TOTD 1.5.2 (referred later as OLDTOTD) [29] 
3. TOTD 1.5.3 (referred later as NEWTOTD) [30] 
4. mtd64ng 1.1.0 [31] 
5. PowerDNS Recursor 3.6.2 [32] 
6. Unbound 1.6.0 [33] 
Remarks: 
 Including BIND9 was a must as it is the de facto industry 
standard DNS server, therefore, it is very likely wide
spread used for DNS64 purposes, too. 
 Some years before we have prepared a patch for TOTD, 
which resolved some security issues [30], and now we 
tested its both patched and unpatched versions.  
 We also have a new tiny DNS64 proxy called mtd64ng 
[31], which is currently developed in an ongoing 
university project. Although it is not yet ready for 
deployment, we have also included it. 
We have already introduced the DNS64 configuration of 
BIND in section IV.D.1. 
The configuration of both versions of TOTD was done in the 




The configuration of the mtd64ng DNS proxy was done in 





The DNS64 configuration of PowerDNS was a bit more 
complex. 
In the  file, we made 












As for Unbound, its 1.4.22 version distributed in Debian 8.9 
did not contain the DNS64 module, which was included from 
its next version, namely 1.5.0. Therefore we upgraded the 
 host to Debian 9.3 after the execution of all the 
experiments with the other DNS64 implementations.  
As for its configuration, we have added the following lines 









VI. TRANSACTION ID PREDICTION VULNERABILITY 
TESTING 
 
We extended the configuration of our testbed to be able to 
examine the Transaction IDs of a high number of messages 
even if the examined DNS64 implementations use caching. 
 
To be able to perform a high number of tests, we needed a 
name space which can be generated systematically. We have 
found that the name space used in our earlier DNS64 tests [34] 
would be appropriate. It was the following name space: 
10abc.dns64perf.test, where a, b, c are integers from the 
[0, 255] interval. 
We have used only the 100{0..255}{0..225} part of it. For 
generating the zone file, we used the modified version of the 
zone file generator script called , which is 
shipped together with the  program (documented 
in [34] and available from [35]). 
The  file of the 





Thus, BIND used our newly generated zone file after its 
being restarted. 
 
The measurements were performed by the  [34] 
program, which used sequential Transaction IDs from 0 to 
65535. The command line of the test program was: 

The first argument specified the “a” parameter described 
above, the second argument meant that the test program needed 
to use only one thread, the third one specified the timeout of 1 
second, and the last one was the host name of the DNS64 server 
to be tested. 
The traffic was captured by the  program executed 
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where the  string was replaced by the name of the tested 
DNS64 implementation. 
 
Predictability of the Transaction IDs is a hard question. E.g. 
if pseudorandom numbers are used that were generated by a 
linear congruential generator (LCG), then they are predictable. 
There are a high number of methods described for testing 
randomness both in university lecture notes [36] and research 
papers [37]. 
Since our solution of using a testbed ensures us full control 
of the testing method, and gives us access to the raw results, we 
have the possibility to use multiple methods for evaluation if 
needed. We decided to use first a simple, graphical method, 
which is somewhat similar to that of the earlier mentioned 
entropy tester of DNSOARC [19], but we contend that our 
method is more thorough than that. 
We have checked two kinds of correlations using 
visualization. Before introducing them, let us define some 
notations first. Let  denote the ordinal number of a message in 
the message sequence introduced in section IV.E, where  is in 
[1, 6]. Let  denote the ordinal number of the AAAA record 
request sent by the  program, where  is in [0, 
65535]. Let  denote the Transaction ID of the th message 
from the six messages used to resolve the th query of the 
 program. As the test program uses sequential 
Transaction IDs from 0, it is sure that:  =  = . 
We use two graphs. An (x, y) plot of the (, ) pairs may 
reveal correlation between the Transaction ID used by the 
 program and the first Transaction ID generated 
by the DNS64 program. An (x, y) plot of the (, ) pairs may 
 
Fig. 5. BIND, Transaction ID input correlation (left) and autocorrelation (right) 
 
 
Fig. 6. OLDTOTD, Transaction ID input correlation (left) and autocorrelation (right) 
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give further priority to those, which are used widespread and/or 
are known to be stable and high performance (if such 
information is available).” [2] 
Although several DNS implementations exist, only very few 
of them can do DNS64, thus finding such DNS64 
implementations was not an easy task. e selected the 
following DNS64 implementations for testing: 
1. BIND 9.9.59+deb8u12Debian [24] 
2. TOTD 1.5.2 (referred later as OLDTOTD) [29] 
3. TOTD 1.5.3 (referred later as NE TOTD) [30] 
4. mtd64ng 1.1.0 [31] 
5. PowerDNS Recursor 3.6.2 [32] 
6. Unbound 1.6.0 [33] 
Remarks: 
 Including BIND9 was a must as it is the de facto industry 
standard DNS server, therefore, it is very likely wide
spread used for DNS64 purposes, too. 
 Some years before we have prepared a patch for TOTD, 
which resolved some security issues [30], and now we 
tested its both patched and unpatched versions.  
 e also have a new tiny DNS64 proxy called mtd64ng 
[31], which is currently developed in an ongoing 
university project. Although it is not yet ready for 
deployment, we have also included it. 
e have already introduced the DNS64 configuration of 
BIND in section IV.D.1. 
The configuration of both versions of TOTD was done in the 




The configuration of the mtd64ng DNS proxy was done in 





The DNS64 configuration of PowerDNS was a bit more 
complex. 
In the  file, we made 












As for Unbound, its 1.4.22 version distributed in Debian 8.9 
did not contain the DNS64 module, which was included from 
its next version, namely 1.5.0. Therefore we upgraded the 
 host to Debian 9.3 after the execution of all the 
experiments with the other DNS64 implementations.  
As for its configuration, we have added the following lines 









VI. TRANSACTION ID PREDICTION VULNERABILITY 
TESTING 
 
e extended the configuration of our testbed to be able to 
examine the Transaction IDs of a high number of messages 
even if the examined DNS64 implementations use caching. 
 
To be able to perform a high number of tests, we needed a 
name space which can be generated systematically. e have 
found that the name space used in our earlier DNS64 tests [34] 
would be appropriate. It was the following name space: 
10abc.dns64perf.test, where a, b, c are integers from the 
[0, 255] interval. 
e have used only the 100{0..255}{0..225} part of it. For 
generating the zone file, we used the modified version of the 
zone file generator script called , which is 
shipped together with the  program (documented 
in [34] and available from [35]). 
The  file of the 





Thus, BIND used our newly generated zone file after its 
being restarted. 
 
The measurements were performed by the  [34] 
program, which used sequential Transaction IDs from 0 to 
65535. The command line of the test program was: 

The first argument specified the “a” parameter described 
above, the second argument meant that the test program needed 
to use only one thread, the third one specified the timeout of 1 
second, and the last one was the host name of the DNS64 server 
to be tested. 
The traffic was captured by the  program executed 
by the  host, the memory size of which was raised to 
256MB, because 128MB was not enough and the  
program exited during the measurement. All the packets from 
the  interface that matched the   capture filter 
were saved to a file. The following command line was used: 

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university project. Although it is not yet ready for 
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BIND in section IV.D.1. 
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VI. TRANSACTION ID PREDICTION VULNERABILITY 
TESTING 
 
e extended the configuration of our testbed to be able to 
examine the Transaction IDs of a high number of messages 
even if the examined DNS64 implementations use caching. 
 
To be able to perform a high number of tests, we needed a 
name space which can be generated systematically. e have 
found that the name space used in our earlier DNS64 tests [34] 
would be appropriate. It was the following name space: 
10abc.dns64perf.test, where a, b, c are integers from the 
[0, 255] interval. 
e have used only the 100{0..255}{0..225} part of it. For 
generating the zone file, we used the modified version of the 
zone file generator script called , which is 
shipped together with the  program (documented 
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The  file of the 





Thus, BIND used our newly generated zone file after its 
being restarted. 
 
The measurements were performed by the  [34] 
program, which used sequential Transaction IDs from 0 to 
65535. The command line of the test program was: 
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The first argument specified the “a” parameter described 
above, the second argument meant that the test program needed 
to use only one thread, the third one specified the timeout of 1 
second, and the last one was the host name of the DNS64 server 
to be tested. 
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where the  string was replaced by the name of the tested 
DNS64 implementation. 
 
Pr dictability of the T ansaction IDs is a hard qu stion. E.g.
if pseudorandom numbers are used t at were gene ated by a
lin ar congruential generator (LCG), then they are predictable.
There ar  a high n mb  of methods d cribed for testing
randomness both in university lecture notes [36] and research 
papers [37]. 
Sinc  our soluti n of using a testbed ensures us full control
of the testing method, and gives us access to the raw results, we
have the possibility to use multiple methods for evaluation if
needed. We d cided to use firs   simple, graphical method,
which is somewhat similar to that of the earlier mentioned
entropy tester of DNSOARC [19], but we contend that our 
method is more thorough han that. 
We have checked two kinds of correlations using
visualization. B fore introducing them, let us define some
notations first. Let  denote the ordinal number of a m ssage
the message sequence introduced in secti n IV.E, where  is in
[1, 6]. Let  denot the ordinal number of the AAAA record
request sent by the  program, w ere  is in [0,
65535]. Let  denot  the Transaction ID of the th messag
from the six messages used to r olve the th query of he
 program. As the test program uses sequential 
Transaction IDs from 0, it is sure that:  =  = . 
We use two graphs. A  (x, y) plot of the (, ) pairs may
reveal correlation betwee  the Trans ction ID used by he
 r r  and the first Transaction ID generated
by the DNS64 program. An (x, y) plot of the (, ) pairs may 
 
Fig. 5. BIND, Transaction ID input correlation (left) and autocorrelation (right) 
 
 
Fig. 6. OLDTOTD, Transaction ID input correlation (left) and autocorrelation (right) 
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It is well visible that the consecutive Transaction IDs always 
increase by 256. And now we give the explanation. As we 
disclosed it in [30], the old version of TOTD generated 
sequential numbers as Transaction IDs. The increase of 256 is 
the result of the facts that the notebook used for testing has an 
Intel CPU, which uses LSB byte order (least significant byte 
first), whereas the network byte order is MSB (most significant 
byte first). The programmer could have been used the standard 
 function for the conversion, but omitting it is just a 
feature and not a bug, as Transaction IDs are just identifiers and 
they do not convey any special meaning. For more information 
about the bug, which randomly caused an unresponsiveness of 
the old version of TOTD, and for its correction, please refer to 
[30], where we have also described the elimination of its 
vulnerability for Transaction ID prediction attack. 
Fig. 7 shows the input correlation and autocorrelation of the 
Transaction IDs of NEWTOTD. They seem to be like noise, 
which is exactly what we expected. 
Fig. 8 shows the input correlation and autocorrelation of the 
Transaction IDs of mtd64ng. They are two completely 
identical graphs, as the two CSV files were found also 
completely identical. It is visibly the graph of y=x function, 
because mtd64ng reuses the Transaction ID of the received 
query and sends both of its own queries with the same 
Transaction ID, which is a serious vulnerability. 
As we already mentioned, mtd64ng is a result of an ongoing 
university project and it not yet ready to be used in production 
systems [31]. 
As for PowerDNS and Unbound, we have also performed the 
tests and evaluated the results. All their plots looked like the 
plots of BIND or NEWTOTD, thus we can state that we found 
no signs of Transaction ID predictability. (We omit the four 
plots, because we see no point in including further four “random 
art” images.) 
VII. SOURCE PORT NUMBER RANDOMNESS TESTING 
The results of the Transaction ID prediction tests could have 
been used also for port number randomness tests, but  
did not include the port numbers in its output. (Its default output 
contains the same data as the Wireshark screen shown in 
Fig. 4.) Therefore, we had to make a new series of 





The capture filter ensured that only IPv4 packets sent from 
the DNS64 server program at  (with source IP address 
10.0.0.2) to the authoritative DNS server program (listening at 
port 53 of ) be included. The output file contained only the 
source port numbers. As expected, the result files contained 
131072 numbers, except for BIND, in the case of which there 
were 131073 numbers in the file. We have investigated the case 
and found that it was so because BIND also sent a query for the 
IP addresses of the root DNS servers. None of the other 
implementations did so. 
We have summarized our results in Table 2. BIND, 
PowerDNS and Unbound follow the guidelines of RFC 5452 
[13] and choose a source port number randomly from the largest 
available range of [1024, 65535]. Both versions of TOTD use 
source port 53 for all outgoing queries. This is trivially 
predictable. As for mtd64ng, what can be seen from Table 2, 
is that the source port number range is [32768, 61000]. What 
cannot be seen from the table is that the same source ports are 
used for querying the AAAA record and the A record for the 
same domain name.  This is deliberate from the raw 







And it is also deliberate from the source code [38]. Although, 
this phenomenon does not mean predictability in the bind 
spoofing attack model, we recommend the usage of different 
source ports for the AAAA and A record queries. 
It can also be seen from the source code, that mtd64ng 
entrusts the source port selection to the operating system. It can 
be satisfactory, if the operating system complies with RFC 6056 
[14], but we contend that is safer if source port randomization 
is done by the DNS or DNS64 implementation itself. 
VIII. MULTIPLE EQUIVALENT QUERIES VULNERABILITY 
TESTING 
To be able to test, whether the examined DNS64 
implementations send multiple equivalent queries concurrently, 
we had to modify the test program so that it can send multiple 
queries for the same domain name. 
      

The  [35] test program was used as a starting 
point of our new  program. Its arguments 
are: , , ,  and . Parameter  can 
Table 2.  Source Port Randomness Test Results 
DNS64 
Implementation 
source ports observed in the experiments 
minimum maximum std. dev. 
BIND 1024 65535 18635 
OLDTOTD 53 53 0 
NEWTOTD 53 53 0 
mtd64ng 32768 61000 8136 
PowerDNS 1025 65534 18655 
Unbound 1024 65535 17467 
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reveal correlation between the consecutive Transaction IDs 
generated by the DNS64 program. For simplicity, we will refer 
to the first one as  , and the second one as 
. 
We used  scripts to extract the appropriate Transaction 
IDs from the text file output of the  program, and the 
graphs were prepared by .  
 
Fig. 5 shows the input correlation and the autocorrelation of 
the Transaction IDs of BIND. They seem to be like noise, thus 
we can say that no predictability problems were revealed by our 
simple evaluation method. 
The left graph of Fig. 6 shows the input correlation of the 
Transaction IDs of OLDTOTD. The regular patterns indicate 
that there is a problem with the predictability of the Transaction 
IDs. Before giving the explanation, let us have a look at the 
autocorrelation of the Transaction IDs of OLDTOTD on the 
right side of Fig. 6. Now, the predictability is even more 
deliberate. Let us look into the CSV file containing the (, ) 






Whereas the  Transaction IDs start from 0 and increase by 
1, the  Transaction IDs start from a different number and 
increase by 512. The CSV file containing the (, ) pairs for 




Fig. 7. NEWTOTD, Transaction ID input correlation (left) and autocorrelation (right) 
 
 
Fig. 8. mtd64ng, Transaction ID initial correlation (left) and autocorrelation (right) 
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point of our new  program. Its arguments 
are: , , ,  and . Parameter  can 
Table 2.  Source Port Randomness Test Results 
DNS64 
Implementation 
source ports observed in the experiments 
minimum maximum std. dev. 
BIND 1024 65535 18635 
OLDTOTD 53 53 0 
NEWTOTD 53 53 0 
mtd64ng 32768 61000 8136 
PowerDNS 1025 65534 18655 
Unbound 1024 65535 17467 
 
8 
> REPLACE THIS LINE WITH YOUR PAPER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (DOUBLECLICK HERE TO EDIT) < 
 
reveal correlation be ween the consecutive Transaction IDs 
gene ated by he DNS64 rogram. For simplicity, we will refer 
to t e first on  s  , and the second one as 
. 
We used  scripts to extract the appropriate Transaction 
IDs from the text file output of the  program, and the 
graphs were prepared by .  
 
Fig. 5 shows the input correlation and the autocorrelation of 
the Transaction IDs of BIND. They se m to be like noise, thus 
we can say that no predictability problems were revealed by our 
simple evaluation method. 
The left graph of Fig. 6 shows the input correlati n of t e 
Transaction IDs of OLDTOTD. The regular patterns indicate 
that there is a problem with the predictability of the Transaction 
IDs. Before giving the explanation, let us have a look at the 
autocorrelation of the Transaction IDs of OLDTOTD on the 
right side of Fig. 6. Now, the predictability is even more 
deliberate. Let us look into the CSV file containing the (, ) 
pairs for input correlation checking: 





Whereas the  Transaction IDs start from 0 and increase by 
1, the  Transaction IDs start from a different number and 
increase by 512. The CSV file containing the (, ) pairs for 




Fig. 7. NEWTOTD, Transaction ID input correlation (left) and autocorrelation (right) 
 
 
Fig. 8. mtd64ng, Transaction ID initial correlation (left) and autocorrelation (right) 
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reveal correlation between the consecutive Transaction IDs 
generated by the DNS64 program. For simplicity, we will refer 
to the first one as  , and the second one as 
. 
We used  scripts to extract the appropriate Transaction 
IDs from the text file output of the  program, and the 
graphs were prepared by .  
 
Fig. 5 shows the input correlation and the autocorrelation of 
the Transaction IDs of BIND. They seem to be like noise, thus 
we can say that no predictability problems were revealed by our 
simple evaluation method. 
The left graph of Fig. 6 shows the input correlation of the 
Transaction IDs of OLDTOTD. The regular patterns indicate 
that there is a problem with the predictability of the Transaction 
IDs. Before giving the explanation, let us have a look at the 
aut correl tion f the Transaction IDs of OLDTOTD on the 
right side of Fig. 6. Now, the predictability is even more 
deliberate. Let us look into the CSV file containing the (, ) 






Whereas the  Transaction IDs start from 0 and increase by 
1, the  Transaction IDs start from a different number and 
increase by 512. The CSV file containing the (, ) pairs for 




Fig. 7. NEWTOTD, Transaction ID input correlation (left) and autocorrelation (right) 
 
 
Fig. 8. mtd64ng, Transaction ID initial correlation (left) and autocorrelation (right) 
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r v al correlation between the consecutive Transaction IDs 
generated by the DNS64 program. For simplicity, we will refer 
to the first one as  , and the second one as 
.
We used  scripts to extract the appropriate Transaction
IDs from the t xt file output of the  program, and the 
graphs were prepared by .  
 
Fig. 5 shows the input correlation and the autocorrelation of 
the Transaction IDs of BIND. They s em to be lik  noise, th s 
we can say that no predictability problems were revealed by our 
simple valuation method. 
The left graph of Fig. 6 shows th  input correlati n of th
Transaction IDs f OLDTOTD. The regular patterns indicate
that there is a problem with the predictability of the Transaction 
IDs. Before giving the expl nation, let us have a look at t e 
autocorr lation of the Transaction IDs of OLDTOTD on the 
right side of Fig. 6. N w, the predi tability is even more 
deliberate. Let us look into the CSV fil  containing the (, )






Whereas the  Transaction IDs start from 0 and increase by 
1, the  Transaction IDs start from a different number and 
increase by 512. The CSV file containing the (, ) pairs for 




Fig. 7. NEWTOTD, Transaction ID input correlation (left) and autocorrelation (right) 
 
 
Fig. 8. mtd64ng, Transaction ID initial correlation (left) and autocorrelation (right) 
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It is well visible that the consecutive Transaction IDs always 
increase by 256. And now we give the explanation. As we 
disclosed it in [30], the old version of TOTD generated 
sequential numbers as Transaction IDs. The increase of 256 is 
the result of the facts that the notebook used for testing has an 
Intel CPU, which uses LSB byte order (least significant byte 
first), whereas the network byte order is MSB (most significant 
byte first). The programmer could have been used the standard 
 function for the conversion, but omitting it is just a 
feature and not a bug, as Transaction IDs are just identifiers and 
they do not convey any special meaning. For more information 
about the bug, which randomly caused an unresponsiveness of 
the old version of TOTD, and for its correction, please refer to 
[30], where we have also described the elimination of its 
vulnerability for Transaction ID prediction attack. 
Fig. 7 shows the input correlation and autocorrelation of the 
Transaction IDs of NEWTOTD. They seem to be like noise, 
which is exactly what we expected. 
Fig. 8 shows the input correlation and autocorrelation of the 
Transaction IDs of mtd64ng. They are two completely 
identical graphs, as the two CSV files were found also 
completely identical. It is visibly the graph of y=x function, 
because mtd64ng reuses the Transaction ID of the received 
query and sends both of its own queries with the same 
Transaction ID, which is a serious vulnerability. 
As we already mentioned, mtd64ng is a result of an ongoing 
university project and it not yet ready to be used in production 
systems [31]. 
As for PowerDNS and Unbound, we have also performed the 
tests and evaluated the results. All their plots looked like the 
plots of BIND or NEWTOTD, thus we can state that we found 
no signs of Transaction ID predictability. (We omit the four 
plots, because we see no point in including further four “random 
art” images.) 
VII. SOURCE PORT NUMBER RANDOMNESS TESTING 
The results of th  Transaction ID prediction tests could have 
been used also for port number randomness tests, but  
did not include the port numbers in its output. (Its default output 
contains the same data as the Wireshark screen shown in 
Fig. 4.) Therefore, we had to make a new series of 





The capture filter ensured that only IPv4 packets sent from 
the DNS64 server program at  (with source IP address 
10.0.0.2) to the authoritative DNS server program (listening at 
port 53 of ) be included. The output file contained only the 
source port numbers. As expected, the result files contained 
131072 numbers, except for BIND, in the case of which there 
were 131073 numbers in the file. We have investigated the case 
and found that it was so because BIND also sent a query for the 
IP addresses of the root DNS servers. None of the other 
implementations did so. 
We have summarized our results in Table 2. BIND, 
PowerDNS and Unbound follow the guidelines of RFC 5452 
[13] and choose a source port number randomly from the largest 
available range of [1024, 65535]. Both versions of TOTD use 
source port 53 for all outgoing queries. This is trivially 
predictable. As for mtd64ng, what can be seen from Table 2, 
is that the source port number range is [32768, 61000]. What 
cannot be seen from the table is that the same source ports are 
used for querying the AAAA record and the A record for the 
same domain name.  This is deliberate from the raw 







And it is also deliberate from the source code [38]. Although, 
this phenomenon does not mean predictability in the bind 
spoofing attack model, we recommend the usage of different 
source ports for the AAAA and A record queries. 
It can also be seen from the source code, that mtd64ng 
entrusts the source port selection to the operating system. It can 
be satisfactory, if the operating system complies with RFC 6056 
[14], but we contend that is safer if source port randomization 
is done by the DNS or DNS64 implementation itself. 
VIII. MULTIPLE EQUIVALENT QUERIES VULNERABILITY 
TESTING 
To e able to test, whether the examined DNS64 
implementations send multiple equivalent queries concurrently, 
we had to modify the test program so that it can send multiple 
queries for the same domain name. 
      

The  [35] test program was used as a starting 
point of our new  program. Its arguments 
are: , , ,  and . Parameter  can 
Table 2.  Source Port Randomness Test Results 
DNS64 
Implementation 
source ports observed in the experiments 
minimum maximum std. dev. 
BIND 1024 65535 18635 
OLDTOTD 53 53 0 
NEWTOTD 53 53 0 
mtd64ng 32768 61000 8136 
PowerDNS 1025 65534 18655 
Unbound 1024 65535 17467 
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reveal correlation between the consecutive Transaction IDs 
g n rated by the DNS64 program. For simplicity, we will refer 
to the first one as  , and the second one as
.
We used  scripts to extract the appropriate Transaction 
IDs from the text file output of the  program, and the 
graphs were pr pared by .  
 
Fig. 5 shows the input correlation and the autocorrelation of 
the Transaction IDs of BIND. They seem to be like noise, thus 
we can say that no predictability probl ms were rev aled by o r 
simple evaluation method. 
The l ft graph of Fig. 6 shows the input correlation of the 
Transaction IDs of OLDTOTD. The regular patterns indicat  
th t there is a problem with the predictability of the Transaction 
IDs. Before giving the explanation, let us have a look at the 
autocorrelation of the Trans ction IDs of OLDTOTD on t e 
right sid of Fig. 6. Now, the predictability is even more 
deliberate. Let us look int  the CSV file ontaining the (, ) 






Whereas the  Transaction IDs start from 0 and increase by 
1, the  Transaction IDs start from a different number and 
increase by 512. The CSV file containing the (, ) pairs for 




Fig. 7. NEWTOTD, Transaction ID input correlation (left) and autocorrelation (right) 
 
 
Fig. 8. mtd64ng, Transaction ID initial correlation (left) and autocorrelation (right) 
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It is well visible that the consecutive Transaction IDs always 
increase by 256. And now we give the explanation. As we 
disclosed it in [30], the old version of TOTD generated 
sequential numbers as Transaction IDs. The increase of 256 is 
the result of the facts hat the notebook used for testing has an 
I tel CPU, which uses LSB byte order (l ast sign ficant byt
first), whereas the network byte order is MSB (most sig ificant 
byte first). The programmer could have been used the standard
 unction for the co versi n, but omitting it is just a
feature and not a bug, as Transaction IDs are just identifiers and
they do not conv y any special meaning. For more information
about the bug, which randomly caused an u re ponsiveness of
the old versio  of TOTD, and for its correction, please refer to
[30], where we have also described the elim nation of its
vulnerability for Tr saction ID pred ction attack. 
Fig. 7 shows t e input c rrelation and a tocorrelation of the
Transaction IDs of NEWTOTD. They s em to b  like noise, 
which is xactly what we expected. 
Fig. 8 shows the i put correlation and autocorrelation of the 
Transaction IDs of mtd64ng. They re two completely 
identical graphs, as the two CSV fil s were found also
completely identical. It is visibly the graph of y=x function, 
because mtd64ng reuses the Transaction ID of the received 
query and sends both of its own queri s ith the same
Transaction ID, which is a serious vulnerability. 
As we already mentioned, mtd64ng is  result of an o going
university project and it not yet eady to be used in production
systems [31]. 
As for PowerDNS and Unbound, we have also performed the 
tests and evaluated the r sults. All the r plots lo ked like the
plots of BIND or NEWTOTD, thus we can state that we found 
no signs of Transaction ID predictability. (We omit the four 
plots, because we see no point in including further four “ran om
art” images.) 
VII. SOURCE PORT NUMBER RANDOMNESS TESTING 
The results of the Transaction ID prediction tests could have 
been used also for port number randomness tests, but  
did not include the port numbers in its output. (Its default output 
contains the same data as the Wireshark screen shown in 
Fig. 4.) Therefore, we had to make a new series of 





The capture filter ensured that only IPv4 packets sent from 
the DNS64 server program at  (with source IP address 
10.0.0.2) to the authoritative DNS server program (listening at 
port 53 of ) be included. The output file contained only the 
sourc  por  numb s. As xpec ed, the result file  co tained 
131072 numbers, except for BIND, in the ca e of which th re
were 131073 numbers n he file. We have investigated the case
and found that it was so b cause BIND also sent a query for
IP addresses of the root DNS servers. None of the other
implementation  did so. 
We have summar zed our results  Table 2. BIND,
PowerDNS nd Unbound follow the guidelines of RFC 5452
[13] and choose a source port numb  randomly from the largest 
availabl  r nge of [1024, 65535]. Both versions of TOTD use 
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predictable. As for mtd64ng, what can be seen from Table 2, 
is th t the s urce port number range is [32768, 61000]. Wha
cannot be seen from the table is that e same source ports ar  
used for querying the AAAA record and the A record for the 
same domain name.  This is deliberat  from the raw







And it is also deliberate from the source code [38]. Although, 
this phenomenon does not mean predictability in the bind 
spoofing attack model, we recommend the usage of different 
source ports for the AAAA and A record queries. 
It can also be seen from the source code, that m d64ng 
entrusts the source p rt selection to the operat ng system. It can
be sat sfactory, if the operating system complies with RFC 6056 
[14], but we contend that is safer if s urce port randomization 
is done by the DNS or DNS64 implementation itself. 
VIII. MULTIPLE EQUIVALENT QUERIES VULNERABILITY 
TESTING
To be able to test, whether the examined DNS64 
implementations send multiple equivalent queries concurrently, 
we had to modify the test program so that it can send multiple 
queries for the same domain name. 
      

The  [35] test program was used as a starting 
point of our new  program. Its arguments 
are: , , ,  and . Parameter  can 
Table 2.  Source Port Randomness Test Results 
DNS64 
Implementation 
source ports observed in the experiments 
minimum maximum std. dev. 
BIND 1024 65535 18635 
OLDTOTD 53 53 0 
NEWTOTD 53 53 0 
mtd64ng 32768 61000 8136 
PowerDNS 1025 65534 18655 
Unbound 1024 65535 17467 
 
7 
> REPLACE THIS LINE WITH YOUR PAPER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (DOUBLECLICK HERE TO EDIT) <
 
where the  string was replaced by the name of the tested
DNS64 implementation. 
 
Predictability of the Transaction IDs is a hard question. E.g. 
if pseudorandom numbers are used that were generated by a 
linear congruential generator (LCG), then they are predictable. 
There are a high nu ber of methods described for testing 
randomness both in university lecture notes [36] and research 
papers [37]. 
Since our solution of using a testbed ensures us full control 
of the testing method, and gives us access to the raw results, we 
have the possibility to use multiple methods for evaluation if 
needed. We decided to use first a simple, graphical method, 
which is somewhat similar to that of the earlier mentioned 
entropy tester of DNSOARC [19], but we contend that our 
method is more thorough than that. 
We have che ked two kinds of correlations using 
visualization. Before introducing them, let us define some 
notations first. Let  denote the ordinal number of a message in 
the message sequence introduced in section IV.E, where  is in 
[1, 6]. Let  denote the ordinal number of the AAAA record 
request sent by the  program, where  is in [0, 
65535]. Let  denote the Transaction ID of the th message 
from the six messages used to resolve the th query of the 
 program. As the test program uses sequential 
Transaction IDs from 0, it is sure that:  =  = . 
We use two graphs. An (x, y) plot of the (, ) pairs may 
reveal correlation between the Transaction ID used by the 
 program and the first Transaction ID generated 
by the DNS64 program. An (x, y) plot of the (, ) pairs may 
 
Fig. 5. BIND, Transaction ID input correlation (left) and autocorrelation (right) 
 
 
Fig. 6. OLDTOTD, Transaction ID input correlation (left) and autocorrelation (right) 
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reveal correlation between the consecutive Transaction IDs 
enerated by the DNS64 rogram. For simplicity, we will refer 
to the first on  s  , and the second one as 
 . 
We used  scripts to extract the appropriate Transaction 
IDs from the text file output of the  program, and the 
gra hs were prepared by .  
 
Fig. 5 shows the input correlation and the autocorrelation of 
the Transaction IDs of BIND. They seem to be like noise, thus 
we can say that no predictability problems were revealed by our 
simple evaluation method. 
The left graph of Fig. 6 shows the input correlation of the 
Transaction IDs of OLDTOTD. The regular patterns indicate 
that there is a problem with the predictability of the Transaction 
IDs. Before giving the ex lanation, let us have a look at the 
autocorrelation f the Transaction IDs of OLDTOTD on the 
right side of Fig. 6. Now, the predictability is even more 
deliberate. Let us look into the CSV file containing the (, ) 






Whereas the  Transaction IDs start from 0 and increase by 
1, the  Transaction IDs start from a different number and 
increase by 512. The CSV file containing the (, ) pairs for 




Fig. 7. NEWTOTD, Transaction ID input correlation (left) and autocorrelation (right) 
 
 
Fig. 8. mtd64ng, Transaction ID initial correlat on (left) and autocorrelation (right) 
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It i  well visible tha  the consecutive Transaction IDs always 
i crease by 256. And now we give the xplanation. As w  
di closed it in [30], the old version of TOTD ge erated 
sequential numbers as Transaction IDs. The increase of 256 is 
the result o  the facts that the oteb ok used for testing has an 
Intel CPU, which uses LSB byte order (least significant byte 
first), whereas the network byte order is MSB (most significant 
byte first). The programmer could have been used the standard 
 fu ction for the conversion, but omitting it is just a 
feature and not a bug, as Transaction IDs are just identifiers and 
they do not convey any special meaning. For more information 
about the bug, w ich rand mly caused an nresponsive ess of 
the old version of TOTD, and for its correction, please refer to 
[30], where we have also described the elimination of its 
vulnerability for Transaction ID prediction attack. 
Fig. 7 shows the input correlation and autocorrelation of the 
Transaction IDs of NEWTOTD. They seem to be like noise, 
which is exactly what we expected. 
Fig. 8 shows the input correlation and autocorrelation of the 
Transaction IDs of mtd64ng. They are two completely 
identical graphs, as the two CSV files were found also 
completely identical. It is visibly the graph of y=x function, 
because mtd64ng reuses the Transaction ID of the received 
query and sends both of its own queries with the same 
Transaction ID, which is a serious vulnerability. 
As we already mentioned, mtd64ng is a result of an ongoing 
university project and it not yet ready to be used in production 
systems [31]. 
As for PowerDNS and Unbound, we have also performed the 
tests and evaluated the results. All their plots looked like the 
plots of BIND or NEWTOTD, thus we can state that we found 
no signs of Transaction ID predictability. (We omit the four 
plots, because we see no point in including further four “random 
art” images.) 
VII. SOURCE PORT NUMBER RANDOMNESS TESTING 
The results of the Transaction ID prediction tests could have 
been used also for port number randomness tests, but  
did not include the port numbers in its output. (Its default output 
contains the same data as the Wireshark screen shown in 
Fig. 4.) Therefore, we had to make a new series of 





The capture filter ensured that only IPv4 packets sent from 
the DNS64 server program at  (with source IP address 
10.0.0.2) to the authoritativ DNS s rver program (listening t 
port 53 of ) be included. Th  output file co ained only the 
source port numbers. As expected, th  result files contained 
131072 numbers, except for BIND, in the case of which there 
were 131073 numbers in the file. W  have investigated the case 
and found th t it was so because BIND also se t a query for the 
IP addresses of the root DNS servers. None f t  oth r 
implementations did so. 
We have summarized our results in Table 2. BIND, 
PowerDNS and Unbound follo  the guid lines of RFC 5452 
[13] nd cho se a sou ce port number randomly from the largest 
available range of [1024, 65535]. Both version  of TOTD use 
source port 53 for all outgoing queries. This is trivially 
predictable. As for td64ng, what can  seen fro  Table 2, 
is that the sou ce port number range is [327 8, 61000]. What 
cannot be seen from the table is that the same source ports are 
used for querying the AAAA record and the A record for the 
same domain name.  This is deliberate from the raw 







And it is also deliberate from the source code [38]. Although, 
this phenomenon does not mean predictability in the bind 
spoofing attack model, we recommend the usage of different 
source ports for the AAAA and A record queries. 
It can also be seen from the source code, that mtd64ng 
entrusts the source port selection to the operating system. It can 
be satisfactory, if the operating system complies with RFC 6056 
[14], but we contend that is safer if source port randomization 
is done by the DNS or DNS64 implementation itself. 
VIII. MULTIPLE EQUIVALENT QUERIES VULNERABILITY 
TESTING
To be able to test, whether the examined DNS64 
implementations send multiple equivalent queries concurrently, 
we had to modify the test program so that it can send multiple 
queries for the same domain name. 
       

The  [35] test program was used as a starting 
point of our new  program. Its arguments 
are: , , ,  and . Parameter  can 
Table 2.  Source Port Randomness Test Results 
DNS64 
Implementation 
source ports observed in the experiments 
minimum maximum std. dev. 
BIND 1024 65535 18635 
OLDTOTD 53 53 0 
NEWTOTD 53 53 0 
mtd64ng 32768 61000 8136 
PowerDNS 1025 65534 18655 
Unbound 1024 65535 17467 
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be used to perform multiple tests with a different domain name 
in each test. It is for convenience: when multiple tests are done, 
the DNS64 server may cache the previously used domain names 
and it is easier to use a different one for a new test, than 
restarting the DNS64 server. Parameter  specifies the number 
of queries to be sent. The rest of the parameters are to be 
interpreted as that of the original test program, that is, 
,  and  specify the timeout value of 
the receive function, the IPv6 address (or host name) of the 
DNS64 server to be tested and the port number, where the 
DNS64 server listens, respectively. (The port number is 
optional, its default value is 53.)  
The program sends  number of AAAA record requests for 
the 100b0.dns64perf.test domain name, where  and  
should be in the [0, 255] interval. After sending all the queries, 
it also receives the replies, but it does not use them for any 
purposes. It receives them only to avoid the annoying 
“Destination Unreachable (Port Unreachable)” ICMP error 
messages. 
The source code of the test program is available from [39]. 
 
The concurrently sent multiple equivalent queries 
vulnerability tests were performed in the same testbed as the 
previous two measurements. Wireshark (executed on the host 
computer under Windows) was used to monitor the behavior of 
the DNS64 implementations. We captured the packets on the 
VMnet1 interface using the  capture filter. 
The usual command line was: 

(However, sometimes different values were used for , e.g. 
3 instead of 0 in the case shown in Fig. 9.) 
The results produced by BIND can be seen in Fig. 9. 
Although we sent two queries for the AAAA record of the same 
domain name, BIND sent only one request to the authoritative 
DNS server for the AAAA record of the given domain name. 
(Its next query is for the A record.) Thus BIND is not vulnerable 
to the “birthday attack”. 
The results produced by OLDTOTD can be seen in Fig. 10. 
It sent two equivalent queries for the same resource records 
(first for AAAA records and then for A records). It can be also 
observed that the Transaction IDs were incremented by 0x100, 
as they took the values: 0x7ca9, 0x7da9, 0x7ea9, 0x7fa9. 
We note that none of them is a serious problem, because 
TOTD does not use caching. Thus no cache poisoning attack 
against TOTD is possible. The attacker can at most achieve that 
a single client receives forged answer. 
The results produced by NEWTOTD can be seen in Fig. 11. 
The only improvement over OLDTOTD is the proper 
Transaction ID randomization. 
We performed two measurements with mtd64ng because of 
the following reasons. As only one CPU core was assigned to 
the  virtual machine in the testbed, originally we set the 
 
Fig. 9. Wireshark capture taken during the birthday attack vulnerability test of BIND. 
 
Fig. 10. Wireshark capture taken during the birthday attack vulnerability test of OLDTOTD. 
 
Fig. 11. Wireshark capture taken during the birthday attack vulnerability test of NEWTOTD. 
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It is well visible that the consecutive Transaction IDs always 
increase by 256. And now we give the explanation. As we 
disclosed it in [30], the old version of TOTD generated 
sequential numbers as Transaction IDs. The increase of 256 is 
the result of the facts that the notebook used for testing has an 
Intel CPU, which uses LSB byte order (least significant byte 
first), whereas the network byte order is MSB (most significant 
byte first). The programmer could have been used the standard 
 function for the conversion, but omitting it is just a 
feature and not a bug, as Transaction IDs are just identifiers and 
they do not convey any special meaning. For more information 
about the bug, which randomly caused an unresponsiveness of 
the old version of TOTD, and for its correction, please refer to 
[30], where we have also described the elimination of its 
vulnerability for Transaction ID prediction attack. 
Fig. 7 shows the input correlation and autocorrelation of the 
Transaction IDs of NEWTOTD. They seem to be like noise, 
which is exactly what we expected. 
Fig. 8 shows the input correlation and autocorrelation of the 
Transaction IDs of mtd64ng. They are two completely 
identical graphs, as the two CSV files were found also 
completely identical. It is visibly the graph of y=x function, 
because mtd64ng reuses the Transaction ID of the received 
query and sends both of its own queries with the same 
Transaction ID, which is a serious vulnerability. 
As we already mentioned, mtd64ng is a result of an ongoing 
university project and it not yet ready to be used in production 
systems [31]. 
As for PowerDNS and Unbound, we have also performed the 
tests and evaluated the results. All their plots looked like the 
plots of BIND or NEWTOTD, thus we can state that we found 
no signs of Transaction ID predictability. (We omit the four 
plots, because we see no point in including further four “random 
art” images.) 
VII. SOURCE PORT NUMBER RANDOMNESS TESTING 
The results of the Transaction ID prediction tests could have 
been used also for port number randomness tests, but  
did not include the port numbers in its output. (Its default output 
contains the same data as the Wireshark screen shown in 
Fig. 4.) Therefore, we had to make a new series of 





The capture filter ensured that only IPv4 packets sent from 
the DNS64 server program at  (with source IP address 
10.0.0.2) to the authoritative DNS server program (listening at 
port 53 of ) be included. The output file contained only the 
source port numbers. As expected, the result files contained 
131072 numbers, except for BIND, in the case of which there 
were 131073 numbers in the file. We have investigated the case 
and found that it was so because BIND also sent a query for the 
IP addresses of the root DNS servers. None of the other 
implementations did so. 
We have summarized our results in Table 2. BIND, 
PowerDNS and Unbound follow the guidelines of RFC 5452 
[13] and choose a source port number randomly from the largest 
available range of [1024, 65535]. Both versions of TOTD use 
source port 53 for all outgoing queries. This is trivially 
predictable. As for mtd64ng, what can be seen from Table 2, 
is that the source port number range is [32768, 61000]. What 
cannot be seen from the table is that the same source ports are 
used for querying the AAAA record and the A record for the 
same domain name.  This is deliberate from the raw 







And it is also deliberate from the source code [38]. Although, 
this phenomenon does not mean predictability in the bind 
spoofing attack model, we recommend the usage of different 
source ports for the AAAA and A record queries. 
It can also be seen from the source code, that mtd64ng 
entrusts the source port selection to the operating system. It can 
be satisfactory, if the operating system complies with RFC 6056 
[14], but we contend that is safer if source port randomization 
is done by the DNS or DNS64 implementation itself. 
VIII. MULTIPLE EQUIVALENT QUERIES VULNERABILITY 
TESTING 
To be able to test, whether the examined DNS64 
implementations send multiple equivalent queries concurrently, 
we had to modify the test program so that it can send multiple 
queries for the same domain name. 
      

The  [35] test program was used as a starting 
point of our new  program. Its arguments 
are: , , ,  and . Parameter  can 
Table 2.  Source Port Randomness Test Results 
DNS64 
Implementation 
source ports observed in the experiments 
minimum maximum std. dev. 
BIND 1024 65535 18635 
OLDTOTD 53 53 0 
NEWTOTD 53 53 0 
mtd64ng 32768 61000 8136 
PowerDNS 1025 65534 18655 
Unbound 1024 65535 17467 
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reveal correlation between the consecutive Transaction IDs 
generated by the DNS64 program. For simplicity, we will refer 
to the first one as  , and the second one as 
. 
We used  scripts to extract the appropriate Transaction 
IDs from the text file output of the  program, and the 
graphs were prepared by .  
 
Fig. 5 shows the input correlation and the autocorrelation of 
the Transaction IDs of BIND. They seem to be like noise, thus 
we can say that no predictability problems were revealed by our 
simple evaluation method. 
The left graph of Fig. 6 shows the input correlation of the 
Transaction IDs of OLDTOTD. The regular patterns indicate 
that there is a problem with the predictability of the Transaction 
IDs. Before giving the explanation, let us have a look at the 
autocorrelation of the Transaction IDs of OLDTOTD on the 
right side of Fig. 6. Now, the predictability is even more 
deliberate. Let us look into the CSV file containing the (, ) 






Whereas the  Transaction IDs start from 0 and increase by 
1, the  Transaction IDs start from a different number and 
increase by 512. The CSV file containing the (, ) pairs for 




Fig. 7. NEWTOTD, Transaction ID input correlation (left) and autocorrelation (right) 
 
 
Fig. 8. mtd64ng, Transaction ID initial correlation (left) and autocorrelation (right) 
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It is well visible that the consecutive Transaction IDs always 
increase by 256. And now we give the explanation. As we 
disclosed it in [30], the old version of TOTD generated 
sequential numbers as Transaction IDs. The increase of 256 is 
the result of the facts that the notebook used for testing has an 
Intel CPU, which uses LSB byte order (least significant byte 
first), whereas the network byte order is MSB (most significant 
byte first). The programmer could have been used the standard 
 function for the conversion, but omitting it is just a 
feature and not a bug, as Transaction IDs are just identifiers and 
they do not convey any special meaning. For more information 
about the bug, which randomly caused an unresponsiveness of 
the old version of TOTD, and for its correction, please refer to 
[30], where we have also described the elimination of its 
vulnerability for Transaction ID prediction attack. 
Fig. 7 shows the input correlation and autocorrelation of the 
Transaction IDs of NEWTOTD. They seem to be like noise, 
which is exactly what we expected. 
Fig. 8 shows the input correlation and autocorrelation of the 
Transaction IDs of mtd64ng. They are two completely 
identical graphs, as the two CSV files were found also 
completely identical. It is visibly the graph of y=x function, 
because mtd64ng reuses the Transaction ID of the received 
query and sends both of its own queries with the same 
Transaction ID, which is a serious vulnerability. 
As we already mentioned, mtd64ng is a result of an ongoing 
university project and it not yet ready to be used in production 
systems [31]. 
As for PowerDNS and Unbound, we have also performed the 
tests and evaluated the results. All their plots looked like the 
plots of BIND or NEWTOTD, thus we can state that we found 
no signs of Transaction ID predictability. (We omit the four 
plots, because we see no point in including further four “random 
art” images.) 
VII. SOURCE PORT NUMBER RANDOMNESS TESTING 
The results of the Transaction ID prediction tests could have 
been used also for port number randomness tests, but  
did not include the port numbers in its output. (Its default output 
contains the same data as the Wireshark screen shown in 
Fig. 4.) Therefore, we had to make a new series of 





The capture filter ensured that only IPv4 packets sent from 
the DNS64 server program at  (with source IP address 
10.0.0.2) to the authoritative DNS server program (listening at 
port 53 of ) be included. The output file contained only the 
source port numbers. As expected, the result files contained 
131072 numbers, except for BIND, in the case of which there 
were 131073 numbers in the file. We have investigated the case 
and found that it was so because BIND also sent a query for the 
IP addresses of the root DNS servers. None of the other 
implementations did so. 
We have summarized our results in Table 2. BIND, 
PowerDNS and Unbound follow the guidelines of RFC 5452 
[13] and choose a source port number randomly from the largest 
available range of [1024, 65535]. Both versions of TOTD use 
source port 53 for all outgoing queries. This is trivially 
predictable. As for mtd64ng, what can be seen from Table 2, 
is that the source port number range is [32768, 61000]. What 
cannot be seen from the table is that the same source ports are 
used for querying the AAAA record and the A record for the 
same domain name.  This is deliberate from the raw 







And it is also deliberate from the source code [38]. Although, 
this phenomenon does not mean predictability in the bind 
spoofing attack model, we recommend the usage of different 
source ports for the AAAA and A record queries. 
It can also be seen from the source code, that mtd64ng 
entrusts the source port selection to the operating system. It can 
be satisfactory, if the operating system complies with RFC 6056 
[14], but we contend that is safer if source port randomization 
is done by the DNS or DNS64 implementation itself. 
VIII. MULTIPLE EQUIVALENT QUERIES VULNERABILITY 
TESTING 
To be able to test, whether the examined DNS64 
implementations send multiple equivalent queries concurrently, 
we had to modify the test program so that it can send multiple 
queries for the same domain name. 
      

The  [35] test program was used as a starting 
point of our new  program. Its arguments 
are: , , ,  and . Parameter  can 
Table 2.  Source Port Randomness Test Results 
DNS64 
Implementation 
source ports observed in the experiments 
minimum maximum std. dev. 
BIND 1024 65535 18635 
OLDTOTD 53 53 0 
NEWTOTD 53 53 0 
mtd64ng 32768 61000 8136 
PowerDNS 1025 65534 18655 
Unbound 1024 65535 17467 
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It is well visible that the consecutive Transaction IDs always 
increase by 256. And now we give the explanation. As we 
disclosed it in [30], the old version of TOTD generated 
sequential numbers as Transaction IDs. The increase of 256 is 
the result of the facts that the notebook used for testing has an 
Intel CPU, which uses LSB byte order (least significant byte 
first), whereas the network byte order is MSB (most significant 
byte first). The programmer could have been used the standard 
 function for the conversion, but omitting it is just a 
feature and not a bug, as Transaction IDs are just identifiers and 
they do not convey any special meaning. For more information 
about the bug, which randomly caused an unresponsiveness of 
the old version of TOTD, and for its correction, please refer to 
[30], where we have also described the elimination of its 
vulnerability for Transaction ID prediction attack. 
Fig. 7 shows the input correlation and autocorrelation of the 
Transaction IDs of NEWTOTD. They seem to be like noise, 
which is exactly what we expected. 
Fig. 8 shows the input correlation and autocorrelation of the 
Transaction IDs of mtd64ng. They are two completely 
identical graphs, as the two CSV files were found also 
completely identical. It is visibly the graph of y=x function, 
because mtd64ng reuses the Transaction ID of the received 
query and sends both of its own queries with the same 
Transaction ID, which is a serious vulnerability. 
As we already mentioned, mtd64ng is a result of an ongoing 
university project and it not yet ready to be used in production 
systems [31]. 
As for PowerDNS and Unbound, we have also performed the 
tests and evaluated the results. All their plots looked like the 
plots of BIND or NEWTOTD, thus we can state that we found 
no signs of Transaction ID predictability. (We omit the four 
plots, because we see no point in including further four “random 
art” images.) 
VII. SOURCE PORT NUMBER RANDOMNESS TESTING 
The results of th  Transaction ID prediction tests could have 
been used also for port number randomness tests, but  
did not include the port numbers in its output. (Its default output 
contains the same data as the Wireshark screen shown in 
Fig. 4.) Therefore, we had to make a new series of 





The capture filter ensured that only IPv4 packets sent from 
the DNS64 server program at  (with source IP address 
10.0.0.2) to the authoritative DNS server program (listening at 
port 53 of ) be included. The output file contained only the 
source port numbers. As expected, the result files contained 
131072 numbers, except for BIND, in the case of which there 
were 131073 numbers in the file. We have investigated the case 
and found that it was so because BIND also sent a query for the 
IP addresses of the root DNS servers. None of the other 
implementations did so. 
We have summarized our results in Table 2. BIND, 
PowerDNS and Unbound follow the guidelines of RFC 5452 
[13] and choose a source port number randomly from the largest 
available range of [1024, 65535]. Both versions of TOTD use 
source port 53 for all outgoing queries. This is trivially 
predictable. As for mtd64ng, what can be seen from Table 2, 
is that the source port number range is [32768, 61000]. What 
cannot be seen from the table is that the same source ports are 
used for querying the AAAA record and the A record for the 
same domain name.  This is deliberate from the raw 







And it is also deliberate from the source code [38]. Although, 
this phenomenon does not mean predictability in the bind 
spoofing attack model, we recommend the usage of different 
source ports for the AAAA and A record queries. 
It can also be seen from the source code, that mtd64ng 
entrusts the source port selection to the operating system. It can 
be satisfactory, if the operating system complies with RFC 6056 
[14], but we contend that is safer if source port randomization 
is done by the DNS or DNS64 implementation itself. 
VIII. MULTIPLE EQUIVALENT QUERIES VULNERABILITY 
TESTING 
To e able to test, whether the examined DNS64 
implementations send multiple equivalent queries concurrently, 
we had to modify the test program so that it can send multiple 
queries for the same domain name. 
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It is well visible that the consecutive Transaction IDs always 
increase by 256. And now we give the explanation. As we 
disclosed it in [30], the old version of TOTD generated 
sequential numbers as Transaction IDs. The increase of 256 is 
the result of the facts hat the notebook used for testing has an 
I tel CPU, which uses LSB byte order (l ast sign ficant byt
first), whereas the network byte order is MSB (most sig ificant 
byte first). The programmer could have been used the standard
 unction for the co versi n, but omitting it is just a
feature and not a bug, as Transaction IDs are just identifiers and
they do not conv y any special meaning. For more information
about the bug, which randomly caused an u re ponsiveness of
the old versio  of TOTD, and for its correction, please refer to
[30], where we have also described the elim nation of its
vulnerability for Tr saction ID pred ction attack. 
Fig. 7 shows t e input c rrelation and a tocorrelation of the
Transaction IDs of NEWTOTD. They s em to b  like noise, 
which is xactly what we expected. 
Fig. 8 shows the i put correlation and autocorrelation of the 
Transaction IDs of mtd64ng. They re two completely 
identical graphs, as the two CSV fil s were found also
completely identical. It is visibly the graph of y=x function, 
because mtd64ng reuses the Transaction ID of the received 
query and sends both of its own queri s ith the same
Transaction ID, which is a serious vulnerability. 
As we already mentioned, mtd64ng is  result of an o going
university project and it not yet eady to be used in production
systems [31]. 
As for PowerDNS and Unbound, we have also performed the 
tests and evaluated the r sults. All the r plots lo ked like the
plots of BIND or NEWTOTD, thus we can state that we found 
no signs of Transaction ID predictability. (We omit the four 
plots, because we see no point in including further four “ran om
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VII. SOURCE PORT NUMBER RANDOMNESS TESTING 
The results of the Transaction ID prediction tests could have 
been used also for port number randomness tests, but  
did not include the port numbers in its output. (Its default output 
contains the same data as the Wireshark screen shown in 
Fig. 4.) Therefore, we had to make a new series of 





The capture filter ensured that only IPv4 packets sent from 
the DNS64 server program at  (with source IP address 
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131072 numbers, except for BIND, in the ca e of which th re
were 131073 numbers n he file. We have investigated the case
and found that it was so b cause BIND also sent a query for
IP addresses of the root DNS servers. None of the other
implementation  did so. 
We have summar zed our results  Table 2. BIND,
PowerDNS nd Unbound follow the guidelines of RFC 5452
[13] and choose a source port numb  randomly from the largest 
availabl  r nge of [1024, 65535]. Both versions of TOTD use 
source port 53 for all outgoing queries. his is trivially
predictable. As for mtd64ng, what can be seen from Table 2, 
is th t the s urce port number range is [32768, 61000]. Wha
cannot be seen from the table is that e same source ports ar  
used for querying the AAAA record and the A record for the 
same domain name.  This is deliberat  from the raw
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[14], but we contend that is safer if s u ce ort r ndom za ion 
is done by the DNS or DNS64 implementation itself. 
VIII. MULTIPLE EQUIVALENT QUERIES VULNERABILITY 
TESTING
To be able to test, whether the examined DNS64 
implementations send multiple equivalent queries concurrently, 
we had to modify the test program so that it can send multiple 
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Fig. 7 shows the input correlation and autocorrel of the 
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which is exactly what we expected. 
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Transaction IDs of mtd64ng. They are two completely 
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completely identical. It is visibly the graph of y=x function, 
because mtd64ng reuses the Transaction ID of the received 
query and sends both of it  own queries with the same 
Transaction ID, which is a serious vulnerability. 
As we already mentioned, mtd64 g is a result of an ongoing 
university project and it not yet ready to be used in production 
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As for PowerDNS and Unbound, we hav  al o performed the 
tests and evaluated the results. All their plots looked like the 
plots of BIND or EWTOTD, thus c n state that we found 
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The capture filter ensured that only IPv4 packets sent from 
the DNS64 server program at  (with source IP address 
10.0.0.2) to th  au horitative DNS server program (list ing at 
port 53 of ) be included. The output file contained only the 
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and found that it was so because BIND also sent a query for the 
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reveal correlation between the consecutive Transaction IDs 
generated by the DNS64 program. For simplicity, we will refer 
to the first one as  , and the second one as 
. 
We used  scripts to extract the appropriate Transaction 
IDs from the text file output of the  program, and the 
graphs were prepared by .  
 
Fig. 5 shows the input correlation and the autocorrelation of 
the Transaction IDs of BIND. They seem to be like noise, thus 
we can say that no predictability problems were revealed by our 
simple evaluation method. 
The left graph of Fig. 6 shows the input correlation of the 
Transaction IDs of OLDTOTD. The regular patterns indicate 
that there is a problem with the predictability of the Transaction 
IDs. Before giving the explanation, let us have a look at the 
autocorrelation of the Transaction IDs of OLDTOTD on the 
right side of Fig. 6. Now, the predictability is even more 
deliberate. Let us look into the CSV file containing the (, ) 






Whereas the  Transaction IDs start from 0 and increase by 
1, the  Transaction IDs start from a different number and 
increase by 512. The CSV file containing the (, ) pairs for 




Fig. 7. NEWTOTD, Transaction ID input correlation (left) and autocorrelation (right) 
 
 
Fig. 8. mtd64ng, Transaction ID initial correlation (left) and autocorrelation (right) 
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It is well visible that the consecutive Transaction IDs always 
increase by 256. And now we give the explanation. As we 
disclosed it in [30], the old version of TOTD generated 
sequential numbers as Transaction IDs. The increase of 256 is 
the result of the facts that the notebook used for testing has an 
Intel CPU, which uses LSB byte order (least significant byte 
first), whereas the network byte order is MSB (most significant 
byte first). The programmer could have been used the standard 
 function for the conversion, but omitting it is just a 
feature and not a bug, as Transaction IDs are just identifiers and 
they do not convey any special meaning. For more information 
about the bug, which randomly caused an unresponsiveness of 
the old version of TOTD, and for its correction, please refer to 
[30], where we have also described the elimination of its 
vulnerability for Transaction ID prediction attack. 
Fig. 7 shows the input correlation and autocorrelation of the 
Transaction IDs of NEWTOTD. They seem to be like noise, 
which is exactly what we expected. 
Fig. 8 shows the input correlation and autocorrelation of the 
Transaction IDs of mtd64ng. They are two completely 
identical graphs, as the two CSV files were found also 
completely identical. It is visibly the graph of y=x function, 
because mtd64ng reuses the Transaction ID of the received 
query and sends both of its own queries with the same 
Transaction ID, which is a serious vulnerability. 
As we already mentioned, mtd64ng is a result of an ongoing 
university project and it not yet ready to be used in production 
systems [31]. 
As for PowerDNS and Unbound, we have also performed the 
tests and evaluated the results. All their plots looked like the 
plots of BIND or NEWTOTD, thus we can state that we found 
no signs of Transaction ID predictability. (We omit the four 
plots, because we see no point in including further four “random 
art” images.) 
VII. SOURCE PORT NUMBER RANDOMNESS TESTING 
The results of the Transaction ID prediction tests could have 
been used also for port number randomness tests, but  
did not include the port numbers in its output. (Its default output 
contains the same data as the Wireshark screen shown in 
Fig. 4.) Therefore, we had to make a new series of 





The capture filter ensured that only IPv4 packets sent from 
the DNS64 server program at  (with source IP address 
10.0.0.2) to the authoritative DNS server program (listening at 
port 53 of ) be included. The output file contained only the 
source port numbers. As expected, the result files contained 
131072 numbers, except for BIND, in the case of which there 
were 131073 numbers in the file. We have investigated the case 
and found that it was so because BIND also sent a query for the 
IP addresses of the root DNS servers. None of the other 
implementations did so. 
We have summarized our results in Table 2. BIND, 
PowerDNS and Unbound follow the guidelines of RFC 5452 
[13] and choose a source port number randomly from the largest 
available range of [1024, 65535]. Both versions of TOTD use 
source port 53 for all outgoing queries. This is trivially 
predictable. As for mtd64ng, what can be seen from Table 2, 
is that the source port number range is [32768, 61000]. What 
cannot be seen from the table is that the same source ports are 
used for querying the AAAA record and the A record for the 
same domain name.  This is deliberate from the raw 







And it is also deliberate from the source code [38]. Although, 
this phenomenon does not mean predictability in the bind 
spoofing attack model, we recommend the usage of different 
source ports for the AAAA and A record queries. 
It can also be seen from the source code, that mtd64ng 
entrusts the source port selection to the operating system. It can 
be satisfactory, if the operating system complies with RFC 6056 
[14], but we contend that is safer if source port randomization 
is done by the DNS or DNS64 implementation itself. 
VIII. MULTIPLE EQUIVALENT QUERIES VULNERABILITY 
TESTING 
To be able to test, whether the examined DNS64 
implementations send multiple equivalent queries concurrently, 
we had to modify the test program so that it can send multiple 
queries for the same domain name. 
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
The  [35] test program was used as a starting 
point of our new  program. Its arguments 
are: , , ,  and . Parameter  can 
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first), whereas the network byte order is MSB (most significant 
byte first). The programmer could have been used the standard 
 fu ction for the conversion, but omitting it is just a 
feature and not a bug, as Transaction IDs re just identifiers and 
they do not convey any special meaning. For more information
about th  bug, w ich rand mly caused an nresponsive ess of 
the old version of TOTD, and for its correction, please refer to 
[30], where we have also described the elimination of its 
vulnerability for Transaction ID prediction attack. 
Fig. 7 shows the input correlation and autocorrelation of the 
Transaction IDs of NEWTOTD. They seem to be like noise, 
which is exactly what we expected. 
Fig. 8 shows the input correlation and autocorrelation of the 
Transaction IDs of mtd64ng. They are two completely 
identical graphs, as the two CSV files were found also 
completely identical. It is visibly the graph of y=x function, 
because mtd64ng reuses the Transaction ID of the received 
query and sends both of its own queries with the same 
Transaction ID, which is a serious vulnerability. 
As we already mentioned, mtd64ng is a result of an ongoing 
university project and it not yet ready to be used in production 
systems [31]. 
As for PowerDNS and Unbound, we have also performed the 
tests and evaluated the results. All their plots looked like the 
plots of BIND or NEWTOTD, thus we can state that we found 
no signs of Transaction ID predictability. (We omit the four 
plots, because we see no point in including further four “random 
art” images.) 
VII. SOURCE PORT NUMBER RANDOMNESS TESTING 
The results of the Transaction ID prediction tests could have 
been used also for port number randomness tests, but  
did not include the port numbers in its output. (Its default output 
contains the same data as the Wireshark screen shown in 
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It is well visible that the consecutive Transaction IDs always 
increase by 256. And now we give the explanation. As we 
disclosed it in [30], the old version of TOTD generated 
sequential numbers as Transaction IDs. The increase of 256 is 
the result of the facts that the notebook used for testing has an 
Intel CPU, which uses LSB byte order (least significant byte 
first), whereas the network byte order is MSB (most significant 
byte first). The programmer could have been used the standard 
 function for the conversion, but omitting it is just a 
feature and not a bug, as Transaction IDs are just identifiers and 
they do not convey any special meaning. For more information 
about the bug, which randomly caused an unresponsiveness of 
the old version of TOTD, and for its correction, please refer to 
[30], where we have also described the elimination of its 
vulnerability for Transaction ID prediction attack. 
Fig. 7 shows the input correlation and autocorrelation of the 
Transaction IDs of NEWTOTD. They seem to be like noise, 
which is exactly what we expected. 
Fig. 8 shows the input correlation and autocorrelation of the 
Transaction IDs of mtd64ng. They are two completely 
identical graphs, as the two CSV files were found also 
completely identical. It is visibly the graph of y=x function, 
because mtd64ng reuses the Transaction ID of the received 
query and sends both of its own queries with the same 
Transaction ID, which is a serious vulnerability. 
As we already mentioned, mtd64ng is a result of an ongoing 
university project and it not yet ready to be used in production 
systems [31]. 
As for PowerDNS and Unbound, we have also performed the 
tests and evaluated the results. All their plots looked like the 
plots of BIND or NEWTOTD, thus we can state that we found 
no signs of Transaction ID predictability. (We omit the four 
plots, because we see no point in including further four “random 
art” images.) 
VII. SOURCE PORT NUMBER RANDOMNESS TESTING 
The results of the Transaction ID prediction tests could have 
been used also for port number randomness tests, but  
did not include the port numbers in its output. (Its default output 
contains the same data as the Wireshark screen shown in 
Fig. 4.) Therefore, we had to make a new series of 





The capture filter ensured that only IPv4 packets sent from 
the DNS64 server program at  (with source IP address 
10.0.0.2) to the authoritative DNS server program (listening at 
port 53 of ) be included. The output file contained only the 
source port numbers. As expected, the result files contained 
131072 numbers, except for BIND, in the case of which there 
were 131073 numbers in the file. We have investigated the case 
and found that it was so because BIND also sent a query for the 
IP addresses of the root DNS servers. None of the other 
implementations did so. 
We have summarized our results in Table 2. BIND, 
PowerDNS and Unbound follow the guidelines of RFC 5452 
[13] and choose a source port number randomly from the largest 
available range of [1024, 65535]. Both versions of TOTD use 
source port 53 for all outgoing queries. This is trivially 
predictable. As for mtd64ng, what can be seen from Table 2, 
is that the source port number range is [32768, 61000]. What 
cannot be seen from the table is that the same source ports are 
used for querying the AAAA record and the A record for the 
same domain name.  This is deliberate from the raw 







And it is also deliberate from the source code [38]. Although, 
this phenomenon does not mean predictability in the bind 
spoofing attack model, we recommend the usage of different 
source ports for the AAAA and A record queries. 
It can also be seen from the source code, that mtd64ng 
entrusts the source port selection to the operating system. It can 
be satisfactory, if the operating system complies with RFC 6056 
[14], but we contend that is safer if source port randomization 
is done by the DNS or DNS64 implementation itself. 
VIII. MULTIPLE EQUIVALENT QUERIES VULNERABILITY 
TESTING 
To be able to test, whether the examined DNS64 
implementations send multiple equivalent queries concurrently, 
we had to modify the test program so that it can send multiple 
queries for the same domain name. 
      

The  [35] test program was used as a starting 
point of our new  program. Its arguments 
are: , , ,  and . Parameter  can 
Table 2.  Source Port Randomness Test Results 
DNS64 
Implementation 
source ports observed in the experiments 
minimum maximum std. dev. 
BIND 1024 65535 18635 
OLDTOTD 53 53 0 
NEWTOTD 53 53 0 
mtd64ng 32768 61000 8136 
PowerDNS 1025 65534 18655 
Unbound 1024 65535 17467 
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number of working threads of mtd64ng to 1. Due to this 
setting, mtd64ng serialized the processing of the requests from 
our test program, as shown in Fig. 12. However, the DNS64 
server of a large network with a high number of users should 
use multiple threads, therefore we executed the test also with 
two threads. The results in Fig. 13 reveal that mtd64ng sends 
separate AAAA and A record requests for each client request. 
Although mtd64ng currently does not support caching, thus it 
is not a serious vulnerability, the problem must be addressed 
later, because including caching is among the midterm 
development plans of mtd64ng. 
The results of PowerDNS and Unbound are shown in Fig. 14 
and Fig. 15, respectively. None of them send out multiple 
equivalent queries, thus they are not vulnerable to birthday 
attacks. 
IX. SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND DISCUSSION 
We have summarized the results of the three kind of 
measurements in Table 3. As for BIND, PowerDNS, and 
Unbound, we have not found any vulnerabilities that could lead 
to cache poisoning. Although TOTD and mtd64ng have 
several vulnerabilities that could lead to cache poisoning, they 
do not implement caching, thus cache poisoning is not possible 
in their cases.  
As the implementation of caching is included in the midterm 
development plans of mtd64ng, the protection against all three 
vulnerabilities must also be included. We recommend the usage 
of cryptographically secure random number generators [40] for 
generating Transaction IDs and source port numbers. The 
elimination of the vulnerability to birthday attacks seems to be 
a more difficult problem, as now the performance of mtd64ng 
benefits from the solution that the requests from the clients are 
not stored in a central database, but they are distributed to the 
working threads. However, it will be necessary to centrally keep 
track of the queries sent by mtd64ng to the authoritative DNS 
servers and are currently awaiting for an answer, in order to 
 
Fig. 12. Wireshark capture taken during the birthday attack vulnerability test of mtd64ng with 1 working thread. 
 
Fig. 13. Wireshark capture taken during the birthday attack vulnerability test of mtd64ng with 2 working threads. 
 
Fig. 14. Wireshark capture taken during the birthday attack vulnerability test of PowerDNS. 
 
 
Fig. 15. Wireshark capture taken during the birthday attack vulnerability test of Unbound. 
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be used to perform multiple tests with a different domain name 
in each test. It is for convenience: when multiple tests are done, 
the DNS64 server may cache the previously used domain names 
and it is easier to use a different one for a new test, than 
restarting the DNS64 server. Parameter  specifies the number 
of queries to be sent. The rest of the parameters are to be 
interpreted as that of the original test program, that is, 
,  and  specify the timeout value of 
the receive function, the IPv6 address (or host name) of the 
DNS64 server to be tested and the port number, where the 
DNS64 server listens, respectively. (The port number is 
optional, its default value is 53.)  
The program sends  number of AAAA record requests for 
the 100b0.dns64perf.test domain name, where  and  
should be in the [0, 255] interval. After sending all the queries, 
it also receives the replies, but it does not use them for any 
purposes. It receives them only to avoid the annoying 
“Destination Unreachable (Port Unreachable)” ICMP error 
messages. 
The source code of the test program is available from [39]. 
 
The concurrently sent multiple equivalent queries 
vulnerability tests were performed in the same testbed as the 
previous two measurements. Wireshark (executed on the host 
computer under Windows) was used to monitor the behavior of 
the DNS64 implementations. We captured the packets on the 
VMnet1 interface using the  capture filter. 
The usual command line was: 

(However, sometimes different values were used for , e.g. 
3 instead of 0 in the case shown in Fig. 9.) 
The results produced by BIND can be seen in Fig. 9. 
Although we sent two queries for the AAAA record of the same 
domain name, BIND sent only one request to the authoritative 
DNS server for the AAAA record of the given domain name. 
(Its next query is for the A record.) Thus BIND is not vulnerable 
to the “birthday attack”. 
The results produced by OLDTOTD can be seen in Fig. 10. 
It sent two equivalent queries for the same resource records 
(first for AAAA records and then for A records). It can be also 
observed that the Transaction IDs were incremented by 0x100, 
as they took the values: 0x7ca9, 0x7da9, 0x7ea9, 0x7fa9. 
We note that none of them is a serious problem, because 
TOTD does not use caching. Thus no cache poisoning attack 
against TOTD is possible. The attacker can at most achieve that 
a single client receives forged answer. 
The results produced by NEWTOTD can be seen in Fig. 11. 
The only improvement over OLDTOTD is the proper 
Transaction ID randomization. 
We performed two measurements with mtd64ng because of 
the following reasons. As only one CPU core was assigned to 
the  virtual machine in the testbed, originally we set the 
 
Fig. 9. Wireshark capture taken during the birthday attack vulnerability test of BIND. 
 
Fig. 10. Wireshark capture taken during the birthday attack vulnerability test of OLDTOTD. 
 
Fig. 11. Wireshark capture taken during the birthday attack vulnerability test of NEWTOTD. 
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be used to perform multiple tests with a different domain name 
in each test. It is for convenience: when multiple tests are done, 
the DNS64 server may cache the previously used domain names 
and it is easier to use a different one for a new test, than 
restarting the DNS64 server. Parameter  specifies the number 
of queries to be sent. The rest of the parameters are to be 
interpreted as that of the original test program, that is, 
,  and  specify the timeout value of 
the receive function, the IPv6 address (or host name) of the 
DNS64 server to be tested and the port number, where the 
DNS64 server listens, respectively. (The port number is 
optional, its default value is 53.)  
The program sends  number of AAAA record requests for 
the 100b0.dns64perf.test domain name, where  and  
should be in the [0, 255] interval. After sending all the queries, 
it also receives the replies, but it does not use them for any 
purposes. It receives them only to avoid the annoying 
“Destination Unreachable (Port Unreachable)” ICMP error 
messages. 
The source code of the test program is available from [39]. 
 
The concurrently sent multiple equivalent queries 
vulnerability tests were performed in the same testbed as the 
previous two measurements. Wireshark (executed on the host 
computer under Windows) was used to monitor the behavior of 
the DNS64 implementations. We captured the packets on the 
VMnet1 interface using the  capture filter. 
The usual command line was: 

(However, sometimes different values were used for , e.g. 
3 instead of 0 in the case shown in Fig. 9.) 
The results produced by BIND can be seen in Fig. 9. 
Although we sent two queries for the AAAA record of the same 
domain name, BIND sent only one request to the authoritative 
DNS server for the AAAA record of the given domain name. 
(Its next query is for the A record.) Thus BIND is not vulnerable 
to the “birthday attack”. 
The results produced by OLDTOTD can be seen in Fig. 10. 
It sent two equivalent queries for the same resource records 
(first for AAAA records and then for A records). It can be also 
observed that the Transaction IDs were incremented by 0x100, 
as they took the values: 0x7ca9, 0x7da9, 0x7ea9, 0x7fa9. 
We note that none of them is a serious problem, because 
TOTD does not use caching. Thus no cache poisoning attack 
against TOTD is possible. The attacker can at most achieve that 
a single client receives forged answer. 
The results produced by NEWTOTD can be seen in Fig. 11. 
The only improvement over OLDTOTD is the proper 
Transaction ID randomization. 
We performed two measurements with mtd64ng because of 
the following reasons. As only one CPU core was assigned to 
the  virtual machine in the testbed, originally we set the 
 
Fig. 9. Wireshark capture taken during the birthday attack vulnerability test of BIND. 
 
Fig. 10. Wireshark capture taken during the birthday attack vulnerability test of OLDTOTD. 
 
Fig. 11. Wireshark capture taken during the birthday attack vulnerability test of NEWTOTD. 
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number of working threads of mtd64ng to 1. Due to this 
setting, mtd64ng serialized the processing of the requests from 
our test program, as shown in Fig. 12. However, the DNS64 
server of a large network with a high number of users should 
use multiple threads, therefore we executed the test also with 
two threads. The results in Fig. 13 reveal that mtd64ng sends 
separate AAAA and A record requests for each client request. 
Although mtd64ng currently does not support caching, thus it 
is not a serious vulnerability, the problem must be addressed 
later, because including caching is among the midterm 
development plans of mtd64ng. 
The results of PowerDNS and Unbound are shown in Fig. 14 
and Fig. 15, respectively. None of them send out multiple 
equivalent queries, thus they are not vulnerable to birthday 
attacks. 
IX. SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND DISCUSSION 
We have summarized the results of the three kind of 
measurements in Table 3. As for BIND, PowerDNS, and 
Unbound, we have not found any vulnerabilities that could lead 
to cache poisoning. Although TOTD and mtd64ng have 
several vulnerabilities that could lead to cache poisoning, they 
do not implement caching, thus cache poisoning is not possible 
in their cases.  
As the implementation of caching is included in the midterm 
development plans of mtd64ng, the protection against all three 
vulnerabilities must also be included. We recommend the usage 
of cryptographically secure random number generators [40] for 
generating Transaction IDs and source port numbers. The 
elimination of the vulnerability to birthday attacks seems to be 
a more difficult problem, as now the performance of mtd64ng 
benefits from the solution that the requests from the clients are 
not stored in a central database, but they are distributed to the 
working threads. However, it will be necessary to centrally keep 
track of the queries sent by mtd64ng to the authoritative DNS 
servers and are currently awaiting for an answer, in order to 
 
Fig. 12. Wireshark capture taken during the birthday attack vulnerability test of mtd64ng with 1 working thread. 
 
Fig. 13. Wireshark capture taken during the birthday attack vulnerability test of mtd64ng with 2 working threads. 
 
Fig. 14. Wireshark capture taken during the birthday attack vulnerability test of PowerDNS. 
 
 
Fig. 15. Wireshark capture taken during the birthday attack vulnerability test of Unbound. 
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be used to perform multiple tests with a different domain name 
in each test. It is for convenience: when multiple tests are done, 
the DNS64 server may cache the previously used domain names 
and it is easier to use a different one for a new test, than 
restarting the DNS64 server. Parameter  specifies the number 
of queries to be sent. The rest of the parameters are to be 
interpreted as that of the original test program, that is, 
,  and  specify the timeout value of 
the receive function, the IPv6 address (or host name) of the 
DNS64 server to be tested and the port number, where the 
DNS64 server listens, respectively. (The port number is 
optional, its default value is 53.)  
The program sends  number of AAAA record requests for 
the 100b0.dns64perf.test domain name, where  and  
should be in the [0, 255] interval. After sending all the queries, 
it also receives the replies, but it does not use them for any 
purposes. It receives them only to avoid the annoying 
“Destination Unreachable (Port Unreachable)” ICMP error 
messages. 
The source code of the test program is available from [39]. 
 
The concurrently sent multiple equivalent queries 
vulnerability tests were performed in the same testbed as the 
previous two measurements. Wireshark (executed on the host 
computer under Windows) was used to monitor the behavior of 
the DNS64 implementations. We captured the packets on the 
VMnet1 interface using the  capture filter. 
The usual command line was: 

(However, sometimes different values were used for , e.g. 
3 instead of 0 in the case shown in Fig. 9.) 
The results produced by BIND can be seen in Fig. 9. 
Although we sent two queries for the AAAA record of the same 
domain name, BIND sent only one request to the authoritative 
DNS server for the AAAA record of the given domain name. 
(Its next query is for the A record.) Thus BIND is not vulnerable 
to the “birthday attack”. 
The results produced by OLDTOTD can be seen in Fig. 10. 
It sent two equivalent queries for the same resource records 
(first for AAAA records and then for A records). It can be also 
observed that the Transaction IDs were incremented by 0x100, 
as they took the values: 0x7ca9, 0x7da9, 0x7ea9, 0x7fa9. 
We note that none of them is a serious problem, because 
TOTD does not use caching. Thus no cache poisoning attack 
against TOTD is possible. The attacker can at most achieve that 
a single client receives forged answer. 
The results produced by NEWTOTD can be seen in Fig. 11. 
The only improvement over OLDTOTD is the proper 
Transaction ID randomization. 
We performed two measurements with mtd64ng because of 
the following reasons. As only one CPU core was assigned to 
the  virtual machine in the testbed, originally we set the 
 
Fig. 9. Wireshark capture taken during the birthday attack vulnerability test of BIND. 
 
Fig. 10. Wireshark capture taken during the birthday attack vulnerability test of OLDTOTD. 
 
Fig. 11. Wireshark capture taken during the birthday attack vulnerability test of NEWTOTD. 
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be used to perform multiple tests ith a different dom in name 
in each test. It is for convenience: when multiple tests are done, 
the DNS64 server may cache the previously used domain names 
and it is easier to use a different one for a new test, than 
restarting the DNS64 server. Parameter  specifies the number 
of queri s to be sent. T  rest of the parameters are to be 
interpreted as that of the original test program, that is, 
,  and  specify the timeout value of 
the receive function, the IPv6 address (or host name) of t  
 ser er to be tested and the port number, wher  the 
DNS64 serv r listens, respectively. (The port number is 
optional, its default value is 53.)  
The program sends  number of AAAA record requests for 
t e 100b0.dns64perf.test domain name, where  and  
should be i  the [0, 255] interval. After sending all the queries, 
it also receives the replies, but it does not use them for a y 
purposes. It rec ives them only to avoid the annoying 
“De tination Unreachable (Port Unreachable)” ICMP error 
messages. 
The source code of the test program is available from [39]. 
 
The concurrently s nt multiple equivalent queries 
vulnerability tests w re performed in the same testbed as the 
previous two measurements. Wir shark (executed on the host 
computer under Windows) was used to monitor the b havior of 
the DNS64 implementations. We captured the packets on the 
VMnet1 interface using the  capture filter. 
The usual command line was: 

(However, sometimes different values were used for , e.g. 
3 instead of 0 in the case shown in Fig. 9.) 
The results produced by BIND can be seen in Fig. 9. 
Although we sent two queries for the AAAA record of the sam  
domain name, BIND sent only one requ st to the authorit tive 
DNS server for the AA A record of the given d main name. 
(Its next query is for the A record.) Thus BIND is not vulnerable 
to the “birthday atta k”. 
The results produced by OLDTOTD can be seen in Fig. 10. 
It sent two equivalent queries for the same resource records 
(first for AAAA records and then for A records). It can be also 
observed that the Transaction IDs were incremented by 0x100, 
as th y t ok the valu s: 0x7ca9, 0x7da9, 0x7ea9, 0x7fa9. 
We n te that none of them is a serious pr blem, because 
TOTD does not use caching. Thus no cache p isoning attack 
gainst TOTD is possible. The attacker can at most achieve that 
a single client receives forged answer. 
The results produced by NEWTOTD can be seen in Fig. 11. 
he only improve ent ver OLDTOTD is the proper 
Transaction ID rand iz tion. 
We perform d two measurements with mtd64ng because of 
t e following reasons. As only one CPU core was assigned to 
the  virtual machine in the testbed, originally we set the
 
Fig. 9. Wireshark capture taken during the birthday attack vulnerability test of BIND. 
 
Fig. 10. Wireshark capture taken during the birthday attack vulnerability test of OLDTOTD. 
 
Fig. 11. Wireshark capture taken during the birthday attack vulnerability test of NEWTOTD. 
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number of working threads of mtd64ng to 1. Due to this 
setting, mtd64ng serialized the processing of the requests from 
our test program, as shown in Fig. 12. However, the DNS64 
server of a large network with a high number of users should 
use multiple threads, therefore we executed the test also with 
two threads. The results in Fig. 13 reveal that mtd64ng sends 
separate AAAA and A record requests for each client request. 
Although mtd64ng currently does not suppor  cachi g, thus it
is not a serious vulnerability, the problem must be addressed 
later, because including caching is among the midterm 
development plans of mtd64ng. 
The results of PowerDNS and Unbound are shown in Fig. 14 
and Fig. 15, respectively. None of them send out multiple 
equivalent queries, thus they are not vulnerable to birthday 
attacks. 
IX. SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND DISCUSSION 
We have summarized the results of the three kind of 
measurements in Table 3. As for BIND, PowerDNS, and 
Unbound, we have not found any vulnerabilities that could lead 
to cache poisoning. Although TOTD and mtd64ng have 
several vulnerabilities that could lead to cache poisoning, they 
do not implement caching, thus cache poisoning is not possible 
in their cases.  
As the implementation of caching is included in the midterm 
development plans of mtd64ng, the protection against all three 
vulnerabilities must also be included. We recommend the usage 
of cryptographically secure random number generators [40] for 
generating Transaction IDs and source port numbers. The 
elimination of the vulnerability to birthday attacks seems to be 
a more difficult problem, as now the performance of mtd64ng 
benefits from the solution that the requests from the clients are 
not stored in a central database, but they are distributed to the 
working hr ads. However, it will be nec ssary to centrally keep 
track of the queries sent by mtd64ng to the authoritative DNS 
servers and are currently awaiting for an answer, in order to 
 
Fig. 12. Wireshark capture taken during the birthday attack vulnerability test of mtd64ng with 1 working thread. 
 
Fig. 13. Wireshark capture taken during the birthday attack vulnerability t st of mtd64ng with 2 working thr ads. 
 
Fig. 14. Wireshark cap ure take  during the birthday attack vulnerability test of PowerDNS. 
 
 
Fig. 15. Wireshark capture taken during the birthday attack vulnerability test of Unbound.  
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number of orking threads of mtd64ng to 1. Due to this 
setting, mtd64ng serialized the processing of the requests from 
our test program, as shown in Fig. 12. However, the DNS64 
server of a large network with a high number of users should 
use multiple threads, therefore we executed the test also with 
two threads. The results in Fig. 13 reveal that mtd64ng sends 
separate AAAA and A record requests for each client request. 
Although mtd64ng currently does not upport caching, thus it 
is not a serious vulnerability, the problem must be ad ressed 
later, because including caching is among the midterm 
development plans of mtd64ng. 
The results of PowerDNS and Unbound are shown in Fig. 14 
and Fig. 15, respectively. None of them send out multiple 
equivalent queries, thus they are not vulnerable to birthday 
attacks. 
IX. SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND DISCUSSION 
We have summarized the results of the three kind of 
measurements in Table 3. As for BIND, PowerDNS, and 
Unbound, we have not found any vulnerabilities that could lead 
to cache poisoning. Although TOTD and mtd64ng have 
several vulnerabilities that could lead to cache poisoning, they 
do not implement caching, thus cache poisoning is not possible 
in their cases.  
As the implementation of caching is included in the midterm 
development pl ns of mtd64ng, the protection against all three 
vulner bilities must al o be inclu ed. We recommend the usage 
of cryptographically secure random number generators [40] for 
generating Transaction IDs and source port numbers. The 
elimination of the vulnerability to birthday attacks seems to be 
a more difficult problem, as now the performance of mtd64ng 
benefits from the solution that the requests from the clients are 
not stored in a central database, but they are distributed to the 
working threads. However, it will be necessary to centrally keep 
track of the queries sent by mtd64ng to the authoritative DNS 
servers and are currently awaiting for an answer, in order to 
 
Fig. 12. Wireshark capture taken during the birthday attack vulnerability test of mtd64ng with 1 working thread. 
 
Fig. 13. Wireshark capture taken during the birthday attack vulnerability test of mtd64ng with 2 working threads. 
 
Fig. 14. Wireshark capture taken during the birthday attack vulnerability test of PowerDNS. 
 
 
Fig. 15. Wireshark capture taken uring the birthday attack vulnerability te t of Unboun . 
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nu ber of working threads of td64ng to 1. ue to this 
setting, td64ng serialized the processing of the requests fro  
our test progra , as sho n in Fig. 12. o ever, the S64 
server of a large net ork ith a high nu ber of users should 
use ultiple threads, therefore e executed the test also ith 
t o threads. The results in Fig. 13 reveal that td64ng sends 
separate  and  record requests for each client request. 
lthough td64ng currently does not support caching, thus it 
is not a serious vulnerability, the proble  ust be addressed 
later, because including caching is a ong the idter  
develop ent plans of td64ng. 
The results of Po er S and nbound are sho n in Fig. 14 
and Fig. 15, respectively. one of the  send out ultiple 
equivalent queries, thus they are not vulnerable to birthday 
attacks. 
I . SU RY, RECO ENDATIONS AND ISCUSSION 
e have su arized the results of the three kind of 
easure ents in Table 3. s for BI , Po er S, and 
nbound, e have not found any vulnerabilities that could lead 
to cache poisoning. lthough T T  and td64ng have 
several vulnerabilities that could lead to cache poisoning, they 
do not i ple ent caching, thus cache poisoning is not possible 
in their cases.  
s the i ple entation of caching is included in the idter  
develop ent plans of td64ng, the protection against all three 
vulnerabilities ust also be included. e reco end the usage 
of cryptographically secure rando  nu ber generators [40] for 
generating Transaction I s and source port nu bers. The 
eli ination of the vulnerability to birthday attacks see s to be 
a ore difficult proble , as no  the perfor ance of td64ng 
benefits fro  the solution that the requests fro  the clients are 
n t stored in a central database, but they are distributed to the 
orking threads. o ever, it ill be necessary to centrally keep 
track of the queries sent by td64ng to the authoritative S 
servers and a e curr ntly a aiting for an ans er, in order to 
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eliminate the possibility of sending out multiple equivalent 
queries concurrently. 
We note that all the examined DNS64 implementations are 
free software [25] (also called open source [26]), thus their 
source code may also be studied, as we did it in the case of 
TOTD [30]. The significance of our testing method is that it 
may also be used for closed source software, or in the cases 
when the subject of the study also includes the interaction with 
the random number generator of the operating system. 
The very same framework could be used for the analysis of 
NAT64 gateways. 
X. CONCLUSION 
We have shown that DNS cache poisoning may be a crucial 
vulnerability of DNS64 servers and we have given an 
introduction to the three main components of DNS cache 
poisoning vulnerability, namely Transaction ID prediction, 
source port number prediction, and a birthday paradox based 
attack, which is possible if a DNS or DNS64 server sends out 
multiple equivalent queries concurrently. 
After surveying the available test tools for DNS cache 
poisoning vulnerability analysis and pointing out that they are 
not suitable for our purposes, we have designed a methodology 
and implemented it in a testbed, which can be used for the 
systematic testing of DNS or DNS64 implementations, whether 
they are susceptible to the above mentioned three 
vulnerabilities. 
We have selected BIND, PowerDNS, Unbound two versions 
of TOTD, and mtd64ng for testing and also presented their 
setup. We have carried out their testing concerning the three 
possible components of the DNS cache poisoning vulnerability. 
We have pointed out several vulnerabilities in TOTD and 
mtd64ng. As they do not currently support caching, thus, cache 
poisoning is not possible in their cases. As the implementation 
of caching is included in the midterm development plans of 
mtd64ng, we have also given recommendations for the 
elimination of its uncovered vulnerabilities. 
As for BIND, PowerDNS, and Unbound, we have not found 
any vulnerabilities that could lead to cache poisoning. 
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mtd64ng 1.1.0 vulnerable vulnerable vulnerable not applicable 
PowerDNS 3.6.2 no problem found no problem found protected no problem found 
Unbound 1.6.0 no problem found no problem found protected no problem found 
 
10 
> REPLACE THIS LINE WITH YOUR PAPER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (DOUBLECLICK HERE TO EDIT) < 
 
be used to perform multiple tests with a different domain name 
in each test. It is for convenience: when multiple tests are done, 
the DNS64 server may cache the previously used domain names 
and it is easier to use a different one for a new test, than 
restarting the DNS64 server. Parameter  specifies the number 
of queries to be sent. The rest of the parameters are to be 
interpreted as that of the original test program, that is, 
,  and  specify the timeout value of 
the receive function, the IPv6 address (or host name) of the 
DNS64 server to be tested and the port number, where the 
DNS64 server listens, respectively. (The port number is 
optional, its default value is 53.)  
The program sends  number of AAAA record requests for 
the 100b0.dns64perf.test domain name, where  and  
should be in the [0, 255] interval. After sending all the queries, 
it also receives the replies, but it does not use them for any 
purposes. It receives them only to avoid the annoying 
“Destination Unreachable (Port Unreachable)” ICMP error 
messages. 
The source code of the test program is available from [39]. 
 
The concurrently sent multiple equivalent queries 
vulnerability tests were performed in the same testbed as the 
previous two measurements. Wireshark (executed on the host 
computer under Windows) was used to monitor the behavior of 
the DNS64 implementations. We captured the packets on the 
VMnet1 interface using the  capture filter. 
The usual command line was: 

(However, sometimes different values were used for , e.g. 
3 instead of 0 in the case shown in Fig. 9.) 
The results produced by BIND can be seen in Fig. 9. 
Although we sent two queries for the AAAA record of the same 
domain name, BIND sent only one request to the authoritative 
DNS server for the AAAA record of the given domain name. 
(Its next query is for the A record.) Thus BIND is not vulnerable 
to the “birthday attack”. 
The results produced by OLDTOTD can be seen in Fig. 10. 
It sent two equivalent queries for the same resource records 
(first for AAAA records and then for A records). It can be also 
observed that the Transaction IDs were incremented by 0x100, 
as they took the values: 0x7ca9, 0x7da9, 0x7ea9, 0x7fa9. 
We note that none of them is a serious problem, because 
TOTD does not use caching. Thus no cache poisoning attack 
against TOTD is possible. The attacker can at most achieve that 
a single client receives forged answer. 
The results produced by NEWTOTD can be seen in Fig. 11. 
The only improvement over OLDTOTD is the proper 
Transaction ID randomization. 
We performed two measurements with mtd64ng because of 
the following reasons. As only one CPU core was assigned to 
the  virtual machine in the testbed, originally we set the 
 
Fig. 9. Wireshark capture taken during the birthday attack vulnerability test of BIND. 
 
Fig. 10. Wireshark capture taken during the birthday attack vulnerability test of OLDTOTD. 
 
Fig. 11. Wireshark capture taken during the birthday attack vulnerability test of NEWTOTD. 
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number of working threads of mtd64ng to 1. Due to this 
setting, mtd64ng serialized the processing of the requests from 
our test program, as shown in Fig. 12. However, the DNS64 
server of a large network with a high number of users should 
use multiple threads, therefore we executed the test also with 
two threads. The results in Fig. 13 reveal that mtd64ng sends 
separate AAAA and A record requests for each client request. 
Although mtd64ng currently does not support caching, thus it 
is not a serious vulnerability, the problem must be addressed 
later, because including caching is among the midterm 
development plans of mtd64ng. 
The results of PowerDNS and Unbound are shown in Fig. 14 
and Fig. 15, respectively. None of them send out multiple 
equivalent queries, thus they are not vulnerable to birthday 
attacks. 
IX. SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND DISCUSSION 
We have summarized the results of the three kind of 
measurements in Table 3. As for BIND, PowerDNS, and 
Unbound, we have not found any vulnerabilities that could lead 
to cache poisoning. Although TOTD and mtd64ng have 
several vulnerabilities that could lead to cache poisoning, they 
do not implement caching, thus cache poisoning is not possible 
in their cases.  
As the implementation of caching is included in the midterm 
development plan  of mtd64ng, the pr tection against all three 
v lnerabilities must also be included. We recommend the usage 
of crypt graphic lly s cure ra dom number generators [40] for
g nerating Transaction IDs and source port number . The 
elimination of the vulnerability to birthday attacks se ms to be 
a more difficult problem, as now the p rformance f mtd64ng
benefit  from the solution that the r quests f om the cli nts are 
not stor d in a central database, but they are d stributed to the 
worki g threads. However, it will b necessary to c ntrally keep 
track of the queries sent by mtd64ng to the authoritative DNS 
servers and are currently awaiting for an answer, in order to 
 
Fig. 12. Wireshark capture taken during the birthday attack vulnerability test of mtd64ng with 1 working thread. 
 
Fig. 13. Wireshark capture taken during the birthday attack vulnerability test of mtd64ng with 2 working threads. 
 
Fig. 14. Wireshark capture taken during the birthday attack vulnerability test of PowerDNS. 
 
 
Fig. 15. Wireshark capture taken during the birthday attack vulnerability test of Unbound. 
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number of working threads of mtd64ng to 1. Due to this 
setting, mtd64ng serialized the processing of the requests from 
our test program, as shown in Fig. 12. However, the DNS64 
server of a large network with a high number of users should 
use multiple threads, therefore we executed the test also with 
two threads. The results in Fig. 13 reveal that mtd64ng sends 
separate AAAA and A record requests for each client request. 
Although mtd64ng currently does not support caching, thus it 
is not a serious vulnerability, the problem must be addressed 
later, because including caching is among the midterm 
development plans of mtd64ng. 
The results of PowerDNS and Unbound are shown in Fig. 14 
and Fig. 15, respectively. None of them send out multiple 
equivalent queries, thus they are not vulnerable to birthday 
attacks. 
IX. SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND DISCUSSION 
We have summarized the results of the three kind of 
measurements in Table 3. As for BIND, PowerDNS, and 
Unbound, we have not found any vulnerabilities that could lead 
to cache poisoning. Although TOTD and mtd64ng have 
several vulnerabilities that could lead to cache poisoning, they 
do not implement caching, thus cache poisoning is not possible 
in their cases.  
As the implementation of caching is included in the midterm 
development plans of mtd64ng, the protection against all three 
vulnerabilities must also be included. We recommend the usage 
of cryptographically secure random number generators [40] for 
generating Transaction IDs and source port numbers. The 
elimination of the vulnerability to birthday attacks seems to be 
a more difficult problem, as now the performance of mtd64ng 
benefits from the solution that t e requests from the clients r  
not stored i  a central database, but they are distributed to the 
working threads. However, it will be necessary to centrally keep 
track of the queries sent by mtd64ng to the authoritative DNS 
servers and are currently awaiting for an answer, in order to 
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number of working threads of mtd64ng to 1. Due to this 
setting, mtd64ng serialized the processing of the requests from 
our test program, as shown in Fig. 12. However, the DNS64 
server of a large network with a high number of users should 
use multiple threads, therefore we executed the test also with 
two threads. The results in Fig. 13 reveal that mtd64ng sends 
separate AAAA and A record requests for each client request. 
Although mtd64ng currently does not support caching, thus it 
is not a serious vulnerability, the problem must be addressed 
later, because including caching is among the midterm 
development plans of mtd64ng. 
The results of PowerDNS and Unbound are shown in Fig. 14 
and Fig. 15, respectively. None of them send out multiple 
equivalent queries, thus they are not vulnerable to birthday 
attacks. 
IX. SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND DISCUSSION 
We have summarized the results of the three kind of 
measurements in Table 3. As for BIND, PowerDNS, and 
Unbound, we have not found any vulnerabilities that could lead 
to cache poisoning. Although TOTD and mtd64ng have 
several vulnerabilities that could lead to cache poisoning, they 
do not implement caching, thus cache poisoning is not possible 
in their cases.  
As the implementation of caching is included in the midterm 
development plans of mtd64ng, the protection against all three 
vulnerabilities must also be included. We recommend the usage 
of cryptographically secure random number generators [40] for 
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be used to perform multiple tests with a different domain name 
in each test. It is for convenience: when multiple tests are done, 
the DNS64 server may cache the previously used domain names 
and it is easier to use a different one for a new test, than 
restarting the DNS64 server. Parameter  specifies the number 
of queries to be sent. The rest of the parameters are to be 
interpreted as that of the original test program, that is, 
,  and  specify the timeout value of 
the receive function, the IPv6 address (or host name) of the 
DNS64 server to be tested and the port number, where the 
DNS64 server listens, respectively. (The port number is 
optional, its default value is 53.)  
The program sends  number of AAAA record requests for 
the 100b0.dns64perf.test domain name, where  and  
should be in the [0, 255] interval. After sending all the queries, 
it also receives the replies, but it does not use them for any 
purposes. It receives them only to avoid the annoying 
“Destination Unreachable (Port Unreachable)” ICMP error 
messages. 
The source code of the test program is available from [39]. 
 
The concurrently sent multiple equivalent queries 
vulnerability tests were performed in the same testbed as the 
previous two measurements. Wireshark (executed on the host 
computer under Windows) was used to monitor the behavior of 
the DNS64 implementations. We captured the packets on the 
VMnet1 interface using the  capture filter. 
The usual command line was: 

(However, sometimes different values were used for , e.g. 
3 instead of 0 in the case shown in Fig. 9.) 
The results produced by BIND can be seen in Fig. 9. 
Although we sent two queries for the AAAA record of the same 
domain name, BIND sent only one request to the authoritative 
DNS server for the AAAA record of the given domain name. 
(Its next query is for the A record.) Thus BIND is not vulnerable 
to the “birthday attack”. 
The results produced by OLDTOTD can be seen in Fig. 10. 
It sent two equivalent queries for the same resource records 
(first for AAAA records and then for A records). It can be also 
observed that the Transaction IDs were incremented by 0x100, 
as they took the values: 0x7ca9, 0x7da9, 0x7ea9, 0x7fa9. 
We note that none of them is a serious problem, because 
TOTD does not use caching. Thus no cache poisoning attack 
against TOTD is possible. The attacker can at most achieve that 
a single client receives forged answer. 
The results produced by NEWTOTD can be seen in Fig. 11. 
The only improvement over OLDTOTD is the proper 
Transaction ID randomization. 
We performed two measurements with mtd64ng because of 
the following reasons. As only one CPU core was assigned to 
the  virtual machine in the testbed, originally we set the 
 
Fig. 9. Wireshark capture taken during the birthday attack vulnerability test of BIND. 
 
Fig. 10. Wireshark capture taken during the birthday attack vulnerability test of OLDTOTD. 
 
Fig. 11. Wireshark capture taken during the birthday attack vulnerability test of NEWTOTD. 
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number of working threads of mtd64ng to 1. Due to this 
setting, mtd64ng serialized the processing of the requests from 
our test program, as shown in Fig. 12. However, the DNS64 
server of a large network with a high number of users should 
use multiple threads, therefore we executed the test also with 
two threads. The results in Fig. 13 reveal that mtd64ng sends 
separate AAAA and A record requests for each client request. 
Although mtd64ng currently does not suppor  cachi g, thus it
is not a serious vulnerability, the problem must be addressed 
later, because including caching is among the midterm 
development plans of mtd64ng. 
The results of PowerDNS and Unbound are shown in Fig. 14 
and Fig. 15, respectively. None of them send out multiple 
equivalent queries, thus they are not vulnerable to birthday 
attacks. 
IX. SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND DISCUSSION 
We have summarized the results of the three kind of 
measurements in Table 3. As for BIND, PowerDNS, and 
Unbound, we have not found any vulnerabilities that could lead 
to cache poisoning. Although TOTD and mtd64ng have 
several vulnerabilities that could lead to cache poisoning, they 
do not implement caching, thus cache poisoning is not possible 
in their cases.  
As the implementation of caching is included in the midterm 
development plans of mtd64ng, the protection against all three 
vulnerabilities must also be included. We recommend the usage 
of cryptographically secure random number generators [40] for 
generating Transaction IDs and source port numbers. The 
elimination of the vulnerability to birthday attacks seems to be 
a more difficult problem, as now the performance of mtd64ng 
benefits from the solution that the requests from the clients are 
not stored in a central database, but they are distributed to the 
working hr ads. However, it will be nec ssary to centrally keep 
track of the queries sent by mtd64ng to the authoritative DNS 
servers and are currently awaiting for an answer, in order to 
 
Fig. 12. Wireshark capture taken during the birthday attack vulnerability test of mtd64ng with 1 working thread. 
 
Fig. 13. Wireshark capture taken during the birthday attack vulnerability t st of mtd64 g wi h 2 working thr ds. 
 
Fig. 14. Wireshark cap ure take  during the birthday attack vulnerability test of PowerDNS. 
 
 
Fig. 15. Wireshark capture taken during the birthday attack vulnerability test of Unbound. 
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number of working threads of mtd64ng to 1. Due to this 
setting, mtd64ng serialized the processing of the requests from 
our test program, as shown in Fig. 12. However, the DNS64 
server of a large network with a high number of users should 
use multiple threads, therefore we executed the test also with 
two threads. The results in Fig. 13 reveal that mtd64ng sends 
separate AAAA and A record requests for each client request. 
Although mtd64ng curren ly do  not support caching, thus it 
is not a serious vulnerability, the problem must be addressed 
later, because including caching is among the midterm 
development plans of mtd64ng. 
The results of PowerDNS and Unbound are shown in Fig. 14 
and Fig. 15, respectively. None of them send out multiple 
equivalent queries, thus they are not vulnerable to birthday 
attacks. 
IX. SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND DISCUSSION 
We have summ rized the results of the three kind of 
measurements in Table 3. As for BIND, PowerDNS, and 
Unbound, we have not found any vulnerabilities that could lead 
to cache poisoning. Although TOTD and mtd64ng have 
several vulnerabilities that could lead to cache poisoning, they 
do not implement caching, thus cache poisoning is not possible 
in their cases.  
As the implementation of caching is included in the midterm 
development plans of mtd64ng, the protection against all three 
vulnerabilities must also be included. We recommend the usage 
of cryptographically secure random number generators [40] for 
generating Transaction IDs and source port numbers. The 
elimination of the vulnerability to birthday attacks seems to be 
a more difficult problem, as now the performance of mtd64ng 
benefits from the solution that the requests from the clients are 
not stored in a central database, but they are distributed to the 
working threads. However, it will be necessary to centrally keep 
track of the queries sent by mtd64ng to the authoritative DNS 
servers and are currently awaiting for an answer, in order to 
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number of working threads of mtd64ng to 1. Due to this 
setting, mtd64ng serialized the processing of the requests from 
our test program, as shown in Fig. 12. However, the DNS64 
server of a large network with a high number of users should 
use multiple threads, therefore we executed the test also with 
two threads. The results in Fig. 13 reveal that mtd64ng sends 
separate AAAA and A record requests for each client request. 
Although mtd64ng currently does not upport caching, thus it 
is not a serious vulnerability, the proble  must be ad ressed 
later, because including caching is among the midterm 
d velop ent plans of mtd64ng. 
Th  results of PowerDNS a d Unbound are shown in Fig. 1  
and Fig. 15, respectively. None of the  send out multiple 
equivalent queries, thus they are not vulnerable to birthday 
attacks. 
IX. SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND DISCUSSION 
We have summarized the results of the three kind of 
measurements in Table 3. As for BIND, PowerDNS, and 
Unbound, we have not found any vulnerabilities that could lead 
to cache poisoning. Although TOTD and mtd64ng have 
several vulnerabilities that could lead to cache poisoning, they 
do not implement caching, thus cache poisoning is not possible 
in their cases.  
As the implementation of caching is included in the midterm 
development pl ns f mtd64ng, the protection against all three 
vulner bilities must al o be inclu ed. We recommend the usage 
of cryptographically secure random number generators [40] for 
generating Transaction IDs and source port numbers. The 
elimination f the vulnerability to birthday attacks seems to b  
a ore difficult problem, as now the performance of mtd64ng 
benefits from the solution that the requests from the clie ts ar  
not stored in a central database, but they are distributed to the 
working threads. However, it will be necessary to centrally keep 
track f the queries sent by mtd64ng t  the authoritative DNS 
serv rs and are currently awaiting for an answer, in order to 
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nu ber of orking threads of td64ng to 1. ue to this 
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t o threads. The results in Fig. 13 reveal th t td64ng sends 
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eliminate the possibility of sending out multiple equivalent 
queries concurrently. 
We note that all the examined DNS64 implementations are 
free software [25] (also called open source [26]), thus their 
source code may also be studied, as we did it in the case of 
TOTD [30]. The significance of our testing method is that it 
may also be used for closed source software, or in the cases 
when the subject of the study also includes the interaction with 
the random number generator of the operating system. 
The very same framework could be used for the analysis of 
NAT64 gateways. 
X. CONCLUSION 
We have shown that DNS cache poisoning may be a crucial 
vulnerability of DNS64 servers and we have given an 
introduction to the three main components of DNS cache 
poisoning vulnerability, namely Transaction ID prediction, 
source port number prediction, and a birthday paradox based 
attack, which is possible if a DNS or DNS64 server sends out 
multiple equivalent queries concurrently. 
After surveying the available test tools for DNS cache 
poisoning vulnerability analysis and pointing out that they are 
not suitable for our purposes, we have designed a methodology 
and implemented it in a testbed, which can be used for the 
systematic testing of DNS or DNS64 implementations, whether 
they are susceptible to the above mentioned three 
vulnerabilities. 
We have selected BIND, PowerDNS, Unbound two versions 
of TOTD, and mtd64ng for testing and also presented their 
setup. We have carried out their testing concerning the three 
possible components of the DNS cache poisoning vulnerability. 
We have pointed out several vulnerabilities in TOTD and 
mtd64ng. As they do not currently support caching, thus, cache 
poisoning is not possible in their cases. As the implementation 
of caching is included in the midterm development plans of 
mtd64ng, we have also given recommendations for the 
elimination of its uncovered vulnerabilities. 
As for BIND, PowerDNS, and Unbound, we have not found 
any vulnerabilities that could lead to cache poisoning. 
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eliminate the possibility of sending out multiple equivalent 
queries concurrently. 
We note that all the examined DNS64 implementations are 
free software [25] (also called open source [26]), thus their 
source code may also be studied, as we did it in the case of 
TOTD [30]. The significance of our testing method is that it 
may also be used for closed source software, or in the cases 
when the subject of the study also includes the interactio  with 
the random number generator of the operati g system. 
The very same framework could be used for the analysis of 
NAT64 gateways. 
X. CONCLUSION 
We have shown that DNS cache poisoning may be a crucial 
vulnerability of DNS64 servers and we have given an 
introduction to the three main components of DNS cache 
poisoning vulnerability, namely Transaction ID prediction, 
source port number prediction, and a birthday paradox based 
attack, which is possible if a DNS or DNS64 server sends out 
multiple equivalent queries concurrently. 
After surveying the available test tools for DNS cache 
poisoning vulnerability analysis and pointing out that they are 
not suitable for our purposes, we have designed a methodology 
and implemented it in a testbed, which can be used for the 
systematic testing of DNS or DNS64 implementations, whether 
they are susceptible to the above mentioned three 
vulnerabilities. 
We have selected BIND, PowerDNS, Unbound two versions 
of TOTD, and mtd64ng for testing and also presented their 
setup. We have carried out their testing concerning the three 
possible components of the DNS cache poisoning vulnerability. 
We have pointed out several vulnerabilities in TOTD and 
mtd64ng. As they do not currently support caching, thus, cache 
poisoning is not possible in their cases. As the implementation 
of caching is included in the midterm development plans of 
mtd64ng, we have also given recommendations for the 
elimination of its uncovered vulnerabilities. 
As for BIND, PowerDNS, and Unbound, we have not found 
any vulnerabilities that could lead to cache poisoning. 
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eliminate the possibility of sending out multiple equivalent 
queries concurrently. 
We note that all the examined DNS64 implementations are 
free software [25] (also called open source [26]), thus their 
source code may also be studied, as we did it in the case of 
TOTD [30]. The significance of our testing method is that it 
may also be used for closed source software, or in the cases 
when the subject of the study also includes the interaction with 
the random number generator of the operating system. 
The very same framework could be used for the analysis of 
NAT64 gateways. 
X. CONCLUSION 
We have shown that DNS cache poisoning may be a crucial 
vulnerability of DNS64 servers and we have given an 
introduction to the three main components of DNS cache 
poisoning vulnerability, namely Transaction ID prediction, 
source port number prediction, and a birthday paradox based 
attack, which is possible if a DNS or DNS64 server sends out 
multiple equivalent queries concurrently. 
After surveying the available test tools for DNS cache 
poisoning vulnerability analysis and pointing out that they are 
not suitable for our purposes, we have designed a methodology 
and implemented it in a testbed, which can be used for the 
systematic testing of DNS or DNS64 implementations, whether 
they are susceptible to the above mentioned three 
vulnerabilities. 
We have selected BIND, PowerDNS, Unbound two versions 
of TOTD, and mtd64ng for testing and also presented their 
setup. We have carried out their testing concerning the three 
possible components of the DNS cache poisoning vulnerability. 
We have pointed out several vulnerabilities in TOTD and 
mtd64ng. As they do not currently support caching, thus, cache 
poisoning is not possible in their cases. As the implementation 
of caching is included in the midterm development plans of 
mtd64ng, we have also given recommendations for the 
elimination of its uncovered vulnerabilities. 
As for BIND, PowerDNS, and Unbound, we have not found 
any vulnerabilities that could lead to cache poisoning. 
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Table 3.  Summary of the Vulnerability Test Results 
 
DNS64 Implementation 
Attack Typ  
Transaction ID Prediction Source Port Number Prediction Multiple Equivalent Queries DNS Cache Poisoning 
BIND 9.9.5 no problem found no problem found protected no problem found 
TOTD 1.5.2 vulnerable vulnerable vulnerable not applicable 
TOTD 1.5.3 protected vulnerable vulnerable not applicable 
mtd64ng 1.1.0 vulnerable vulnerable vulnerable not applicable 
PowerDNS 3.6.2 no problem found no problem f und protected no problem foun  
Unbound 1.6.0 no problem found no problem found protected no problem found 
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eliminate the possibility of sending out multiple equivalent 
queries concurrently. 
We note that all the examined DNS64 implementations are 
free software [25] (also called open source [26]), thus their 
source code may also be studied, as we di  it in the case f 
TOTD [30]. The significance of our testing method is that it 
may also be used for closed source software, or in the cases 
when the subject of the study also includes the interaction with 
the random number generator of the operating system. 
The very same framework could be used for the analysis of 
NAT64 gateways. 
X. CONCLUSION 
We have shown that DNS cache poisoning may be a crucial 
vulnerability of DNS64 servers and we have given an 
introduction to the three main components of DNS cache 
poisoning vulnerability, namely Transaction ID prediction, 
source port number prediction, and a birthday paradox based 
attack, which is possible if a DNS or DNS64 server sends out 
multiple equivalent queries concurrently. 
After surveying the available test tools for DNS cache 
poisoning vulnerability analysis and pointing out that they are 
not suitable for our purposes, we have designed a methodology 
and implemented it in a testbed, which can be used for the 
systematic testing of DNS or D S64 implementations, whether 
they are susceptible to the above mentioned three 
vulnerabilities. 
We have selected BIND, PowerDNS, Unbound two versions 
of TOTD, and mtd64ng for testing and also presented their 
setup. We have carried out their testing concerning the three 
possible components of the DNS cache poisoning vulnerability. 
We have pointed out several vulnerabilities in TOTD and 
mtd64ng. As they do not currently support caching, thus, cache 
poisoning is not possible in their cases. As the implementation 
of caching is included in the midterm development plans of 
mtd64ng, we have also given recommendations for the 
elimination of its uncovered vulnerabilities. 
As for BIND, PowerDNS, and Unbound, we have not found 
any vulnerabilities that could lead to cache p isoning. 
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eliminate the possibility of sending out multiple equivalent 
queries concurrently. 
We note that all the examined DNS64 implementations are 
free software [25] (also called open source [26]), thus their 
source code may also be studied, as we did it in the case of 
TOTD [30]. The significance of our testing method is that it 
may also be used for closed source software, or in the cases 
when the subject of the study also includes the interaction with 
the random number generator of the operating system. 
The very same framework could be used for the analysis of 
NAT64 gateways. 
X. CONCLUSION 
We have shown that DNS cache poisoning may be a crucial 
vulnerability of DNS64 servers and we have given an 
introduction to the three main components of DNS cache 
poisoning vulnerability, namely Transaction ID prediction, 
source port number prediction, and a birthday paradox based 
attack, which is possible if a DNS or DNS64 server sends out 
multiple equivalent queries concurrently. 
After surveying the available test tools for DNS cache 
poisoning vulnerability analysis and pointing out that they are 
not suitable for our purposes, we have designed a methodology 
and implemented it in a testbed, which can be used for the 
systematic testing of DNS or DNS64 implementations, whether 
they are susceptible to the above mentioned three 
vulnerabilities. 
We have selected BIND, PowerDNS, Unbound two versions 
of TOTD, and mtd64ng for testing and also presented their 
setup. We have carried out their testing concerning the three 
possible components of the DNS cache poisoning vulnerability. 
We have pointed out several vulnerabilities in TOTD and 
mtd64ng. As they do not currently support caching, thus, cache 
poisoning is not possible in their cases. As the implementation 
of caching is included in the midterm development plans of 
mtd64ng, we have also given recommendations for the 
elimination of its uncovered vulnerabilities. 
As for BIND, PowerDNS, and Unbound, we have not found 
any vulnerabilities that could lead to cache poisoning. 
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eliminate the possibility of sending out multiple equivalent 
queries concurrently. 
We note that all the examined DNS64 implementations are 
free software [25] (also called open source [26]), thus their 
source code may also be studied, as we did it in the case of 
TOTD [30]. The significance of our testing method is that it 
may also be used for closed source software, or in the cases 
when the subject of the study also includes the interactio  with 
the random number generator of the operati g system. 
The very same framework could be used for the analysis of 
NAT64 gateways. 
X. CONCLUSION 
We have shown that DNS cache poisoning may be a crucial 
vulnerability of DNS64 servers and we have given an 
introduction to the three main components of DNS cache 
poisoning vulnerability, namely Transaction ID prediction, 
source port number prediction, and a birthday paradox based 
attack, which is possible if a DNS or DNS64 server sends out 
multiple equivalent queries concurrently. 
After surveying the available test tools for DNS cache 
poisoning vulnerability analysis and pointing out that they are 
not suitable for our purposes, we have designed a methodology 
and implemented it in a testbed, which can be used for the 
systematic testing of DNS or DNS64 implementations, whether 
they are susceptible to the above mentioned three 
vulnerabilities. 
We have selected BIND, PowerDNS, Unbound two versions 
of TOTD, and mtd64ng for testing and also presented their 
setup. We have carried out their testing concerning the three 
possible components of the DNS cache poisoning vulnerability. 
We have pointed out several vulnerabilities in TOTD and 
mtd64ng. As they do not currently support caching, thus, cache 
poisoning is not possible in their cases. As the implementation 
of caching is included in the midterm development plans of 
mtd64ng, we have also given recommendations for the 
elimination of its uncovered vulnerabilities. 
As for BIND, PowerDNS, and Unbound, we have not found 
any vulnerabilities that could lead to cache poisoning. 
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